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ABSTRACT 
 
The following study has three principle aims and objectives: 
 
1) understand how the police deal with ‘Burglary other Building’ incidents; 
2) appreciate which investigative activities and operations undertaken lead to the 
successful detection of these BOB incidents;  
3) assess the scope for adjusting existing investigative operational procedures into 
crimes classified by the police as ‘Burglary other Building’, or non-residential 
burglary, with a view to boosting detections. 
 
The research was based on a sample drawn from a population of 7070 ‘burglary other 
building’ incidents recorded by West Midlands Police over a six month period 
between April 1
st
 and September 31
st
 1998. 
 
The study made use of both contemporaneous primary, and secondary sources of data.  
The primary data was provided by police officer questionnaires, whilst the secondary 
data was collected from police records and databases. 
 
The police solved a significant minority of cases (15.3%). The police were found to 
use a number of diverse methods to achieve this success.  The principle means of 
detection were the arresting of offenders at or near the scene and the use of evidence 
gathered at the scene either through the questioning of individuals or through SOCO 
examination.  Allied to this, more proactive investigative techniques proved useful in 
the investigative process.   
 
There appear, however, to be a number of areas that may still offer some scope for 
improvement.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Studying crime has been popular because of the depth and wealth of available 
research material, and also because of the useful application of many of its findings.  
The focus of such criminological study, as one would expect, has been through many 
changes over the last fifteen-year period, as more material becomes accessible.  
Despite this, certain topics have received rather less attention, including non-
residential burglary, possibly because it can be viewed as a ‘victimless crime’, 
affecting buildings and organisations rather than people.  The result of this is a 
comparative dearth of research-based literature available upon the subject.  By 
comparison, residential burglary has received greater attention. 
 
Burglaries committed against non-residential properties, however, should be 
considered as important as burglaries committed against residential properties for four 
primary reasons: 
 
1) there are almost as many non-residential burglary incidents each year as there 
are residential burglary incidents; 
2) there are many fewer target premises so the victims of these crimes tend to 
suffer more, especially when revictimisation is taken into account; 
3) any losses incurred can affect the economic wellbeing of the population; 
4) ‘Burglary Other Building’ incidents (BOB) include a diverse range of 
buildings from garden sheds, garages, lock ups, hotels and community centres/ 
social clubs, through to what are commonly recognised as business concerns, 
such as shops and offices. 
 
During this same fifteen-year period, the study and measurement of the police has 
also seen many changes, especially within the last ten years, when the police have 
been subjected to greater scrutiny of the work that they do, and the evaluation of 
outputs and outcomes.  Many attempts have been made to assess the work of the 
police using numerous metrics, each of which, although proving useful in some 
respects, has suffered from limitations.  
 
This thesis therefore draws these research strands together, involving the study of 
non-residential burglary and the elemental police investigative procedures and 
operations currently in practice for solving non-residential burglaries (BOB’s), from 
the moment of alert to the filing of the case as either ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’. 
 
The approach taken considers the crime of non-residential burglary, as far as possible, 
holistically i.e. breaks down the process of dealing with non-residential burglaries into 
its component activities, and assesses the contribution of these activities in 
successfully solving cases.  A sample of non-residential burglaries was taken, 
containing information on key police activities.  These included the initial police 
response and the screening of non-emergency cases for attendance, investigations 
conducted at the scene, attendance and evidence collected by SOCO (Scenes of Crime 
Officers), the screening process for any subsequent contact, and the use of any further 
evidence collected.  This wealth of data, drawn from both primary and secondary 
sources, allowed a thorough exploration into police actions taken during the non-
residential burglary investigation process. 
 
In this way, it was possible to establish which burglary and response characteristics 
influenced the outcome of the case, the most useful items of evidence, and the 
operations the police took to collect them.  By analysing the sources of detections and 
examining the impact of each activity the police undertook in dealing with non-
residential burglary incidents, on their detection and recovery of evidence, it was 
possible to determine those activities that were fruitful and those that were not. 
1.1 Purpose of research 
The principle aims of this research are to: 
 
1) understand how the police currently deal with incidents of non-residential 
burglary; 
2) recognise those investigative activities that are more likely to lead to the 
successful detection of such cases;   
3) where feasible, suggest ways of adjusting existing police operating 
procedures, in order to improve the primary detection rate with non-residential 
burglary enquiries. 
 The research is particularly concerned with primary detections.  This is because 
primary detections result from the police activities and operations undertaken in 
dealing with the burglary cases studied, whereas secondary detections inevitably arise 
from other primary detections once the offender is in custody, generally arrested for 
another offence.  An increase in the number of primary detections should therefore 
result in a corresponding increase in secondary detections, and hence increases in the 
overall detection rate.  The remainder of the thesis describes the research in detail. 
 
Chapter 2 shows how a study of non-residential burglary will provide greater insight 
into both the extent and variety of targets, and the effectiveness of police actions in 
terms of particular activities.  Chapter 3 lays out the research objectives and the 
methodology for achieving these aims.  Chapters 4 considers the diversity of targets, 
whilst Chapter 5 provides information upon patterns and influences in the reporting of 
non-residential burglary incidents, and how the police actually respond.  Chapter 6 
considers, in detail, the various differences and characteristics of those ‘emergency’ 
responses where arrests are made.  
 
Chapters 7 looks at officer activities conducted at the scene and the collection and 
worth of evidence, including the attendance of SOCO officers, whilst Chapter 8 
considers more proactive actions that the police can undertake, including the use of 
surveillance operations.  Chapter 9 evaluates the worth of any follow up contact by 
officers and Chapter 10 finally draws together the conclusions from the work and 
discusses any policy implications. 
 
 
 
 
 The West Midlands Police use seven categories to record clear-ups; these are: 
 
i) Original Charge ii) Further Charge iii) Caution iv) Taken into consideration, T.I.C. - previously 
recorded v) T.I.C. - not previously recorded vi) Prison Write-Offs vii) Other Write-Offs 
 
Categories i) - iii) are considered as primary detections, the rest are secondary detections.  Primary 
detections and T.I.C.'s are recorded once the offender has been charged.  Write-offs are not recorded 
until the offender has been to court or is in prison. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Summary 
 
Non-residential burglary is a considerable problem in the UK, where businesses run 
approximately a six times higher risk of being burgled than domestic premises.  Such 
premises also face a much greater risk of multiple victimisation within a short period 
of time (Mirrlees-Black and Ross, 1995) and studies have shown that the victims of 
such crime can suffer similar effects to those of domestic burglary (Johnston et al 
1990, Ekblom and Simon 1988, Charlton1990).  
 
Analyses of the investigative effectiveness of specific police activities in relation to 
crime have been quite rare, particularly in relation to volume crimes such as non-
residential burglary.  This is as much to do with the inherent difficulties involved in 
trying to measure such an area, especially given the often diverse nature of police 
activities and actions, and difficulty in identifying objectives and measures.  Those 
studies that have been conducted show that there is a need for more focused research 
into such areas (Horton and Smith 1988), though few provide the required detail, if 
the aim is to improve police effectiveness through the study of police activities. 
 
This study fills a gap therefore in relation to police investigative effectiveness, by 
looking at specific aspects of a specific investigation procedure.  It also considers the 
crime holistically, enabling the assessment of the contribution of different types of 
police activity to the solving of non-residential burglary.  By considering the activities 
in this way, the effectiveness of any operations can be assessed with a view to 
understanding how the police deal with BOB incidents, the effectiveness of the 
various activities, and the assessment of the scope for adjusting current procedures. 
2.2 Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly considers the extent of non-residential burglary and highlights the 
few, and restricted, studies that have been conducted in this area.  It goes on to review 
appropriate studies that have researched relevant effects of similar crimes, and draws 
pertinent similarities between those crimes and non-residential burglary.  It goes on to 
consider the measurement of police activities, both in terms of what to measure and 
how best to measure them, and provides a theoretical foundation for this research.  
Many valid attempts have been made at measuring and analysing police activities.  
Although highlighting the value of looking at specific aspects of police work, many 
studies have, to date, been too broad in their scope and so have failed to adequately 
assess police activities, especially within the context of the investigation process. 
 
This chapter also reviews research that has been conducted looking at specific police 
activities and considers whether they provide appropriate levels of insight, both into 
the focus of their study, and within the context of the police investigation process per 
se.  It also appraises the influence of the built environment in the commission and 
investigation of non-residential burglary. 
2.3 Definitions 
 
The distinction between the following is useful, as there is often confusion concerning 
the definitions of the following offences.   
 
THEFT:  The dishonest appropriation of another’s property with the intention of 
permanently depriving the owner of it. 
ROBBERY:  The use or threat of force to a person immediately before or at the time 
of a theft. 
BURGLARY:  Entering a building as a trespasser with the intention of committing 
theft, rape, grievous bodily harm or unlawful damage.  If a person commits the above 
offence whilst in possession of a weapon or explosive, the offence becomes 
aggravated burglary for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life. 
 
The above are simplified definitions of those used in The Theft Act of 1968, therefore 
although not precise, the essence of the definition is clear. 
2.4 Property Crime in Context 
 
In 1994, there were 5.3 million notifiable offences recorded by the police, reflecting a 
5% decrease on the figures for 1993 (Mirrlees-Black, Mayhew and Percy 1996).  Of 
these notifiable offences, the greatest majority by far were taken up by crimes against 
property, with 93% (4.9 million) of crimes committed against property (including 
theft, burglary, criminal damage, arson and fraud), 6% of crimes committed against 
the person, with the remainder accounted for by other crime.  The actual breakdown 
of notifiable offences recorded by the police in 1994, by type of offence, can be seen 
in Figure 2.4.  These offences total 5,258,000. 
 
Figure 2.4 Notifiable offences recorded by the police by offence type (1994) 
 
The above figures would appear to validate the findings of Waller (1984) who has 
argued that burglary is one of the most frequent offences committed in the western 
world.  More worryingly perhaps, are the following figures that show that in England 
and Wales in 1994, there were 1,261,400 cases of burglary recorded by the police, of 
which 681,900 were burglary in a dwelling, with the remainder accounted for by 
burglary in a building other than a dwelling (579,500) (Mirrlees-Black, Mayhew and 
Percy 1996).  In essence, although there are many fewer non-residential targets, there 
are almost as many cases of burglary accounted for and recorded by the police.  As 
such, non-residential premises present a major target for criminal activity, second 
only to car crime. 
2.5 Extent of Non-Residential Crime 
 
From the various studies conducted within the area of crime against business 
(Johnston et al 1990a and b, Tilley 1993, Ekblom and Simon 1988), it becomes 
apparent that there is just as much of a problem within the business sector as there is 
in the domestic sector, with all forms of crime, not just burglary.  However, as one 
would expect, crime varies both in its extent and types depending on whether we look 
at industrial and manufacturing industries, or whether it is commercial and retail 
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businesses that are considered.  For instance, retail outlets suffer more from theft than 
do manufacturing premises, whilst the opposite is true for vehicle crime (Mirrlees-
Black and Ross 1995).  Furthermore, there are also differences in crime rates between 
different industrial estates or commercial areas, and even within different sectors of 
each of the respective areas (Johnston et al 1990).  The problem it would seem is far 
from straightforward. 
2.5.1 Crime on industrial estates 
In a three-stage study, Johnston et al (1990) found some interesting results when 
looking at the nature of, and the extent of, the crime problem on industrial estates.  It 
was found that, as one might expect, crimes against people themselves are particularly 
low in numbers whilst crimes against property occur to quite a large extent.  
Furthermore, when compared to crime survey figures, the Johnston study results show 
that industrial estates display a much higher rate of burglary and attempted burglary 
compared to domestic properties.    
 
As far as burglary is concerned, Johnston et al found that 37% of victimisation on 
industrial estates involved burglary or attempted burglary, yet Mayhew and Aye-
Maung (1993) found that, amongst other things, only 9% of victimisation in 
residential areas was accounted for by burglary or attempted burglary.  Secondly, the 
best estimate for the number of burglaries involving loss in residential areas in 1988 
was 517, 000, whilst in 1991 it was 612,000.  If the figure of 19,818 million 
residential properties in England and Wales is accurate, then this means that 2.6% of 
residential properties in England and Wales were the victims of burglary in 1988.  
Even in 1992, Mayhew and Aye-Maung (1993) found that the figure for burglary and 
attempted burglary was still only 5.3%.   
 
However, it was found that the rate of similar burglary on industrial estates averaged 
9.7%, suggesting that there is more chance of burglary occurring in an industrial unit 
than in a residential property.  This finding is consistent across studies.  The 1994 
Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black and Ross 1995) states that, 
‘retailing and manufacturing premises have a much greater chance of falling victim to 
burglary.......than domestic premises’ (p.10), with the risk of burglary approximately 
six times higher for business than for domestic premises.   
 The problems mentioned above however are not isolated within industrial estates.  
There are a number of studies available which paint a similar picture for commercial 
and retail businesses.  In essence, these studies also show that there are higher rates of 
victimisation for certain crimes than are apparent in the residential environment. 
2.5.2 Crime in retail/ commercial environment 
Hibberd and Shapland (1993) conducted a study that looked at small shops in city 
areas in both the Midlands and London.  The results showed that the burglary figures 
of 16% in the Midlands and 7% in London still outweigh the 1992 BCS estimate of 
5.3% of households being victims of burglary or attempted burglary (Mayhew and 
Aye-Maung 1993).  Higher burglary rates have also been found in other studies. 
 
Ekblom and Simon (1988) in a survey of Asian shopkeepers in Muswell Hill, Brent, 
Brixton and Newham, found that 22% of those surveyed had suffered burglaries in the 
last year.  The rates actually varied from 14% in Newham up to 35% in Brent, yet still 
these figures far outstrip any BCS estimate for residential burglary.  Charlton (1990) 
conducted a study on fifty businesses in Deptford High Street and found that 30% of 
the respondents had been the victims of burglary or attempted burglary in the last 
year.  Again, this is far greater than any figures for rates of domestic burglary.  Even 
in the worst residential areas, the burglary figures found in the 1992 BCS were still 
only 14.4% (Mayhew and Aye-Maung 1993).  If this figure is compared to those 
burglary rates for commercial and retail businesses above, it is possible to ascertain 
some idea about the extent of the burglary problem faced in a small business 
environment. 
2.6 Revictimisation 
 
Not only do non-residential properties suffer victimisation to a greater extent than 
residential properties, they are also more prone to revictimisation or multiple 
victimisation.  Allied to this, many non-residential properties will more than likely get 
burgled again within a relatively short space of time, indicating a problem that needs 
to be addressed as quickly as possible.   
 
The figures from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black and 
Ross 1995) make for rather unpleasant reading.  In both cases many of the businesses 
sampled experienced more than one crime in a year, if not more than one type of 
crime.  
2.6.1 Revictimisation of industrial/ manufacturing concerns 
The survey reveals that 41% of those industrial/ manufacturing businesses which had 
been victimised, had been victimised four or more times in 1993.  Overall, it was 
found that 63% of the total amount of crime was against only 8% of the premises 
surveyed, 39% of the premises that had been burgled, had been burgled two or three 
times, whilst 7% of the premises had been burgled four or more times.  In all, it was 
found that only 2% of the sample of manufacturers accounted for a quarter of all 
burglaries.  This figure is perhaps the most worrying of all because it indicates a 
distinct lack of positive action either in crime prevention advice, in the installation of 
crime prevention measures, or on the part of the police.  This picture however is not 
specific to the Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black and Ross 1995). 
 
In total, 46% of the units within the Johnston (1990) sample who had been burgled in 
the last two years, suffered more than one incident of burglary.  This figure compares 
to 18% of residential properties according to BCS figures (Mirrlees-Black, Aye-
Maung and Mayhew 1993).  It was further found that 30% of units on the industrial 
estates had been burgled at least once during their tenancy, and 25% had been the 
victims of attempted burglary.  Even these figures pale into insignificance if it is 
considered that on the worst estates, 82% of the units had suffered from burglary 
during their tenancy, and 80% had been the victims of attempted burglary.  All of 
these figures are particularly worrying however, if they are considered alongside the 
fact that 33% of the units had tenants occupying them for less than one year, and 75% 
of the units had tenants occupying them for less than five years.  This would suggest 
that burglary on industrial estates has a great propensity for recurrence, and one that is 
very much an immediate problem. 
2.6.2 Revictimisation of commercial/ retail concerns 
It was found, again in the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black 
and Ross 1995), that of those premises that had been victimised, 33% had been 
victimised ten or more times in 1993.  In total, 59% of crime was against only 3% of 
the premises surveyed.  As far as burglary was concerned, 25% of all burglaries were 
suffered by only 2% of the sample.  Again, the results of this survey are not isolated 
incidents.          
 
In a study looking specifically at the repeat victimisation of commercial premises on 
four beats in the Hartlepool area, Tilley (1993) found that of the 250 eligible 
addresses (discounting schools, colleges and training centres) at which burglary had 
occurred, 39% had been reburgled at least once within twelve months of the first 
incident.  In total, it was found that there had been 209 incidents of repeat 
victimisation.  More interesting however is the temporal distribution of these repeat 
burglaries.  It was found that of the 209 incidents, 119 had occurred within the first 73 
days, 37 incidents had occurred within the period of 74 to 146 days, 29 incidents had 
occurred between 147 and 219 days, 13 incidents had occurred between 220 and 292 
days, and the remaining 11 incidents had occurred from day 293 until the end of the 
year.  These figures are displayed in Table 2.6.2 below. 
 
No. of days between 
burglaries 
No. of burglary incidents in 
that time 
0-73 119 
74-146 37 
147-219 29 
220-292 13 
293-365 11 
Table 2.6.2 Temporal distribution for being reburgled 
 
2.7 Consequences of non-residential crime 
Compared to residential burglary, very little is known about the effects of burglary in 
a Non-Residential setting.  The available literature (next to nothing) shows that 
businesses are often in a very poor position to assess the true effects of burglary, other 
than the tangible losses that inevitably are a result of insurance claims. 
 
There is a dearth of literature that actually looks at the consequences of crime for 
businesses, both in terms of the losses, and in terms of what would normally be 
recognised as victim effects.  The following therefore looks at the available evidence 
from the few studies that have looked at the effects of burglary upon non-residential 
victims.  Further to the above, the extra financial burden and trading consequences 
which business may suffer from are highlighted.  Although this study does not 
consider the effects upon victims, either of the crime or the police investigation 
process, it is essential to include these studies as they indicate the importance of 
solving these crimes. 
2.7.1 Victim Effects 
In the Johnston et al (1990) stage 1 study, it was found that burglaries in industrial 
units could actually produce very similar effects to those reported from studies of 
domestic burglary victims.  That is, a sense of invasion of privacy, diffuse worry 
about crime in general and a more specific worry about the possibility of being 
reburgled and generally heightened anxiety levels.   
 
In some instances, it is argued that burglary of a small industrial unit may actually 
have more serious consequences than those in a residential setting.  That is, the 
everyday running of the business may be severely disrupted, which at an extreme may 
lead to workers being laid off and the business collapsing.  This may be particularly 
likely if any elements crucial to the running of the business are taken in the burglary 
or crucial business is lost as a result.  In a similar vein, Johnston et al (1990) also 
argue that larger industries may also be vulnerable, with extra stress created for those 
in middle management positions and those in charge of the premises, and the 
possibility of police investigation and auditing creating more stress for the employees 
generally.   
 
Similar effects of burglary have also been found in the studies conducted with 
commercial and retail businesses.  Ekblom and Simon (1988) found in their survey of 
Asian shopkeepers that with crime in their area, 21% worried ‘a lot’, 24% worried a 
‘fair amount’, 19% worried ‘a little’, 17% were ‘not very worried at all’ and 19% 
were ‘not worried’.  These figures are comparable to those found in Charlton’s (1990) 
study of Deptford High Street.  It was found that 28% of shop owners felt crime was a 
‘big or very big problem’, 48% thought it was a ‘bit of a problem’, 16% felt it was 
‘not much of a problem’ and 2% felt it was ‘no problem’.  Allied to these concerns 
raised by the individual business owners, it has also been argued that crime against 
local businesses is also detrimental to the wellbeing of the community as a whole 
(Shapland and Vagg 1988).  According to this line of argument, if local businesses 
suffer, then their functioning is restricted, to the disadvantage of the local residents, 
and this in turn may be a factor leading to increases in crime.  
 
Given the above evidence for both industrial estate units and commercial and retail 
businesses, the conclusion reached by Johnston et al (1990) would seem applicable to 
both.  Their study states that  
 
“it is wrong to think of the victims of Non-Residential burglary simply as abstract ‘businesses’, and 
instead consideration must be given to the victimisation effects on the individuals who make up the 
business” (p. 11) 
 
and possibly the communities in which the businesses are situated.  Furthermore, 
given that non-residential burglary involves premises such as sheds and garages, it is 
even more misguided a belief that all victims of non-residential burglary are ‘abstract 
businesses’.  It is not just a case of totalling up the capital loss and contacting the 
insurance company, and then installing more security devices. 
2.7.2 Cost of burglary 
According to the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black and Ross 
1995), the cost of crime to the retail industry amounts to approximately £780 million, 
whilst for manufacturing premises, the amount runs at about £275 million.  Burglary 
was found to be the most accountable for the losses suffered by business.  Further to 
this, it was found that where an offender got onto the premises, irrespective of 
whether anything was stolen, the average cost to retailers was £1,660 and £2,420 for 
manufacturing concerns.  If compared to domestic premises, businesses were on 
average, likely to be faced with a cost at least half as much again as a residential 
property.  This further reinforces the need to discover how the police currently detect 
such crime and how the detection may be improved upon. 
2.8 Non-residential burglary in perspective – the value of research 
 
Property crime is an ongoing and very real problem, and non-residential premises 
suffer burglary to a greater extent than residential premises.  Even in the worst 
residential area, the rate of burglary has been shown to be lower than in most areas in 
which business or industry is the main concern.  Opportunities for valid research 
within the field of non-residential burglary are largely being wasted, probably because 
the biggest mistake being made is to forget that businesses are made up of people, 
whose livelihood largely depends on the smooth running of that business.  
Furthermore, businesses, irrespective of their main concern, may not always be able 
to meet the costs of crime. 
 
The figures show that the police are faced with a considerable problem.  Non-
residential burglary, and the investigation process, needs to be examined in greater 
detail, especially if the effects of the act of burglary on a non-residential property are 
fully examined, both in financial terms and in personal and personnel terms.  
Essentially however, the consensus between studies is that non-residential properties 
run a much higher risk of burglary and attempted burglary than domestic properties.  
However, whereas the prevention and detection of residential burglary has received 
high priority by both public (Maxfield, 1984) and the police (Audit Commission 
1994), non-residential burglary has become the forgotten sibling. 
   
It can be seen that the above studies are methodologically specific in their research, 
often dealing with either industrial estates or retail outlets, and providing general 
conclusions regarding burglary.  Although providing us with interesting findings, 
each study tends to give only a partial view of the difficulties faced within a non-
residential environment.   
 
Because this research approaches the issue from an investigation perspective 
however, it provides a complete overview of the non-residential burglary problem, 
and the way that this is dealt with on a day-to-day, operational level.  It considers 
burglary in a full range of organisations, examining non-residential burglary over a 
variety of property types including shed and garage burglaries.  By considering the 
investigation of the crime in this way, this study is also able to provide an insight into 
the influences of the different built environments upon police investigations into non-
residential burglary. 
 
 
2.9 Why measure the Police? 
 
There has been long standing interest from academia and government institutions, in 
the evaluation of performance within the public sector, especially concerning the 
police force in this country.  This interest has been renewed in the last decade.    
 
Horton and Smith (1988) suggest three reasons for this renewed interest in the use of 
police resources and the effectiveness of that usage.   
 
1) the desire to make forces more financially accountable; 
2) increased doubt about the fundamental purposes of the police;  
3) a challenge, from some quarters, to the legitimacy of the police force. 
 
As such, Stockdale, Whitehead and Gresham (1999) argue that;  
 
“……there is a growing need for the police to make resource allocation decisions transparent, to 
evaluate outputs and outcomes, and to demonstrate that resources are being used to generate the best 
returns” 
 
The above quotation is essential in understanding the contribution made by any 
Operational Research conducted within this area, as the main objective of such study 
is to determine how the object being measured is performing, with the aim of 
improving that performance.    
 
However, this is often easier said than done, because the remit of the police force is 
particularly broad and still expanding, and it is often difficult to achieve a balance 
between the demand and expectation of the force, given the diversity of roles the 
police are now expected to fulfil.  This diversity or roles also means that there is 
difficulty in identifying what best to measure.  
 
Further to this, the myriad of roles and multiple aims expected to be fulfilled by the 
police force in this country can often conflict with what is the main objective of such 
a law enforcement agency: to reduce the overall crime rate by apprehending those 
responsible for such crime. 
 That is not to say that there have been no attempts to rectify this situation, though the 
issues associated with such a task are formidable, primarily because of the diversity of 
duties that the police are expected to perform, and the outcomes of such tasks are not 
easily quantifiable (Abbotts 1989).  As such, it is of little surprise to see that these 
issues have been approached in various ways, as it seems extremely difficult to find 
an overall indicator of police effectiveness. 
2.10 Problems associated with measuring the Police – what to measure 
 
Chatterton (1987) has argued that the police force has a very general objective in 
maintaining law and order, as this objective is inevitably achieved by conducting a 
variety of activities, from community policing through to the establishment of 
specialist squads used in targeting specific groups of criminals.  Given that there is 
this great diversity of methods in pursuit of their objectives, it is of little surprise to 
find that no single performance indicator of police activity has been found.  Although 
in some cases, the objective may be clear, quantifiable and measurable outcomes are 
often not (Abbotts 1989).      
 
Because this is the case, there has been a tendency in the past to try and measure 
police operations using a variety of approaches. 
2.10.1 Government Initiatives 
In the 1970’s and early 1980’s several government initiatives were set in motion, 
including the formation of the Audit Commission, in an attempt to assess and gain, 
amongst public sector services, what amounted to ‘value for money’.   
 
The Financial Management Initiative was launched in 1982, the aim of which was to 
promote: 
 
1) a clear view of objectives, and the means to assess and where possible measure 
outputs or performance in relation to those objectives; 
2) well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources, including a 
critical scrutiny of output and value for money; 
3) the information (particularly about costs), the training and the access to expert 
advice that they need to exercise their responsibilities effectively (HMSO, 1982). 
 
However, trying to apply what can best be described as market discipline to the police 
force proved to be problematic, especially as, has been stated, it is difficult to find 
clear objectives let alone measure them, and also, the outcomes of police actions are 
many and varied.  As Weatheritt (1987) found, the objectives may often be in conflict.  
When measuring the police, it is not a case of assessing an organisation whose main 
aim is the making of money, and where inputs can literally be measured against 
outcome (when the ultimate outcome is the creation of a financial profit).  The police 
force in this country is not a business in the strict sense of the word, therefore trying 
to assess it as one seems somewhat inappropriate. 
2.10.2 Crime Rate 
In order to assess the police and police activity in a satisfactory manner, the outcomes 
of police work need to be aligned with the actual objectives of that work.  One such 
general indicator of objective versus outcome is the use of the crime rate.  However, 
many studies have shown that it is difficult to assess the true crime rate, since much 
crime goes unreported leading the way to the ‘dark figure’ of crime (Mayhew et al 
1993).  Indeed, even if it were possible to accurately gauge the crime rate, and 
perhaps measure the crime rate per officer in certain police force areas or patrol areas, 
the police, per se, only have partial control over such a rate.  As Bottomley and 
Coleman (1981) argue, the police should not be assessed upon measures over which 
they have only partial control.      
 
Because of the inherent problems noted above in trying to assess police actions either 
along business lines, or through the use of measures that may not be directly related to 
police actions, there was a distinct move towards what can best be described as crude 
and inappropriate ‘intermediate measures’. 
2.10.3 Intermediate Measures 
These measures consider a more direct outcome of specific kinds of police activity 
e.g. the investigation of crime and the apprehension of offenders.  As such, they 
provide a better reflection of police actions, since they provide some way of 
measuring police performance against objectives that are more under the control of 
the police force, and address some of the shortfalls of using the crime rate.  However, 
there are inherent problems in the use of such measures. 
 
The use of both detection and clearance rates as an ‘adequate’ measure of police 
effectiveness seems somewhat misguided, and it has only been in recent years that 
superior, and more appropriate, measures of police effectiveness have been sought.  
Although there can be no doubt that both detection and clear-up rates are within the 
control of the police force, and attributable to police actions and operations, there are 
problems associated with the use of such measures. 
 
The biggest problem is that different crimes have varying levels of solvability and 
invoke dramatically different investigation processes, more often as result of their 
perceived level of seriousness by the police and public, and the public expectation of 
outcomes.  A rape or murder investigation, for example, will inevitably invoke the use 
of a different investigative process to that of a burglary of a shed.  Similarly, the 
success of rape and murder enquiries is very different to those concerning shed and 
garage burglaries. 
 
The second problem lies more specifically with the use of detection rates as an 
indicator of police effectiveness.  It is clear that the chances of an offence being filed 
‘detected’ are not necessarily dependent on police operations and activities.  Burrows 
(1986) reports of a variable use made of ‘secondary’ detections.  This distinction 
between primary detection rates and secondary detection rates is crucial if there is any 
hope of achieving an accurate measure of police effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
A primary detected case can be considered as owing to active police investigations 
and their ability to make an arrest and charge an offender.  A secondary detection 
owes more to an offender’s willingness to admit to the offence whilst being held 
either in custody or on a prison sentence, generally for other offences.  These cases 
will be ‘written off’ whilst in custody, or ‘taken into consideration’ (TIC’d).  
 
Because ‘detection rates’ per se, as a measure of effectiveness, have tended to either 
encompass both primary and secondary, or fail to differentiate between the two, the 
police have, not surprisingly, concentrated more on realising secondary detections in 
order to improve their detection rates (Pallister 1996).  It is the use of the primary 
detection rates however that provides a more robust measure of police effectiveness 
and provides the possible means of boosting detections.  That said, they offer no 
information regarding the differences in primary detection rates between forces, and 
the differences and effectiveness of police operations used in securing the arrest of an 
offender. 
  
Another associated problem is that not only do different crimes have different levels 
of reporting (‘dark figure of crime’) with many crimes going unreported (Mayhew et 
al 1993), forces will inevitably make use of differing recording practices.  The overall 
result is a highly inefficient, ineffectual and very variable measure of police 
effectiveness. 
 
In essence, the police are required to perform a multitude of varied tasks, many of 
which have immeasurable outcomes, especially if trying to find one overall measure 
of police effectiveness, which seems a very much misguided way of attacking the 
problem.  Although some moves have been made to rectify this situation through the 
use of intermediate output measures, which are more within the control of the police, 
these too can provide largely inaccurate and greatly varied measures of police 
effectiveness.  It would seem to be more appropriate therefore, to study specific police 
activities and operations in more detail in an effort to find ways of accurately 
assessing the effectiveness of police operations, and especially the role of these 
activities in the primary detection of offences. 
2.11 The measurement of the Police in perspective 
It has been shown that the police are required to fulfil multiple and varied roles, often 
detracting from the main objective of such a body which is to apprehend the 
perpetrators of crime.   
 
Although initiatives have been launched in the past in an attempt to measure police 
input and output and provide adequate metrics for the measurement of such inputs and 
outputs, it can be seen that these have often been flawed, most often because they 
attempt to measure the police according to criteria that are either inappropriate or not 
within their control. 
The adoption of intermediate measures has gone some way to redressing this balance, 
though it is clear that even these are flawed, with measures varying dramatically 
according to the crime considered, and the method of measuring primary and 
secondary detections.  Therefore, it appears that determining how well the police are 
performing and the use of police resources cannot be measured according to one 
simple, generalised metric.  Given these findings, it would appear to make more sense 
to study individual police activities and examine those actions that are more effective 
in producing measurable outcomes that are within the control of the police i.e. 
primary detections. 
2.12 Individual studies of Police activity 
 
There have been studies conducted in the past that have attempted to rectify this 
situation by looking at more specific aspects of police work such as response times 
and uniformed police activities.  However, this research has largely ignored issues 
surrounding the effectiveness of individual activities and / or focused upon specific 
issues.  However, by considering previous studies that look at various police activities 
a number of issues are raised that are considered within this study of non-residential 
burglary investigation. 
2.12.1 Patrol Activities 
There is a fairly large body of research available upon police patrolling per se, both 
on foot and in vehicles, primarily because it has been a major cause of public concern 
for some years now, especially regarding the visibility of the police on the streets, and 
the persistent public desire for the ‘bobby on the beat’ (Audit Commission 1996b).  
Indeed, estimates place police patrolling activity at 60% of consumption of police 
resources (Audit Commission 1996b). 
 
However, Clarke and Hough (1984), in their review, indicate that the majority of 
studies conducted provide little evidence that patrolling is effective as a crime 
prevention activity.  The majority of studies that have been conducted, mainly in 
America, provide evidence that varying levels of police patrol have no noticeable 
effect in deterring crime.  Kelling et al (1974), in the Kansas City Preventative Patrol 
Experiment, suggested that altering the level of preventative patrol in order to 
maintain visibility and deter crime produced little effect.  Although based upon minor 
differences in levels of patrolling, larger changes have been found to show similar 
effects.  Zimring (1978) concluded that increasing the level of preventative patrol by a 
factor of two or more for twelve months does not reduce the incidence of crime to a 
great extent.  Heal and Morris (1985) in their review of patrolling supported these 
findings, and highlighted further studies that indicated even larger changes in patrol 
levels had minimal effect on criminal activity (Schnelle et al 1977).  Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that patrolling is of little or no use in terms of crime 
prevention. 
 
Whilst failing to show any discernible differences in patrolling levels and crime 
prevention, these studies highlight the need for more detailed investigation and 
measurement of police activities.  This study, although not adding anything to the 
overall debate on police patrolling, considers in chapter six, the indirect effects of 
patrolling levels on both the speed of response and aspects of that response and, as a 
consequence, the successful apprehension of offenders.  Further to this, it considers 
the effects of vehicle patrol types and the manning levels of those patrols and their 
role and influences, if any, in the successful apprehension of offenders at the time of 
the incident. 
2.12.2 Police Response 
The majority of studies have found that a rapid police response to alerts has little if 
any impact upon the majority of crimes committed.  Indeed, Clarke and Hough (1984) 
indicated that only 3% of crimes would see any benefit from a rapid response from 
the police.  Even within this 3% where some benefit could be gained from a rapid 
response, Pate et al (1976) in a study in the US, found that a number of other factors 
are critical in determining a rapid response.  These were, reporting time, distance 
from the scene and the pre-despatch time of the responding police unit.  As such, the 
report concluded that there was no significant relationship between response time and 
outcome. 
 
Despite this however, a rapid response still contributes significantly to the primary 
detection of a number of crimes, even if a rapid response in its own right appears to 
have a minimal effect.  Burrows (1986) for instance, found that up to half of all 
primary detections could be linked to a fast response to ‘in progress’ burglaries, with 
over 30% attributable to catching offenders in the act.  Indeed, chapter six within this 
study considers these issues, both in terms of speed of response, and in terms of 
success of providing a rapid response.   
 
Further to this, it considers response times in the context of the burgled premises, the 
method and route of alert, and the type and manning levels of the responding vehicles.  
This in itself gives some indication as to why a rapid response alone does not 
guarantee success at the scene, and why the scope of this research is an improvement 
over previous studies, as there are many variables at work that are likely to determine 
any single success.  As can be seen, little work has been conducted so far on the 
individual determinants of a successful rapid response. 
2.12.3 Patrol Staffing – One versus two-officer units 
Studies have been conducted that have looked at the relative merits of one and two-
officer vehicle units, the majority of which were conducted in the US.  Wilson and 
Brewer's review of one and two person patrols (1992) found that the use of single 
manned units is likely to enhance efficiency, with one-person patrols completing the 
same number of calls for service and officer initiated activities as two-person patrols 
(Boydstun et al, 1977).  Although slower at servicing calls, they appear to be quicker 
in responding to emergencies (Boydstun et all 1977, Kessler 1985) by offering the 
advantage of faster response times (Chelst, 1981; Green and Kolesar, 1984). 
 
Allied to the above, deploying more officers in single manned units has also been 
shown to enable fewer resources to cover the same area, with two one-person patrols 
covering an area 71% greater than one two-person patrol (Kaplan, 1979).  Overall, 
previous studies would appear to indicate the use of single manned vehicles are more 
economical and no less effective when deployed than those twin crewed units.     
 
However, Wilson and Brewer (1992) state in their review, the data is limited and it 
does not “permit an examination of possible differences in the way individual 
offences may be dealt with” (p.452).  This study redresses this balance and considers 
the relative benefits of using single and two-officer units in dealing with non-
residential burglary incidents reported ‘in progress’.  This research therefore assesses 
both the worth of, and influences, on the use of one and two officer patrols, primarily 
the ‘panda’ and ‘zulu’ vehicle patrols used at ‘in progress’ incidents.  These features 
of the police response are considered in chapter six. 
2.12.4 Uniformed Police Activities 
With regard to the work of uniformed officers, Bennett and Lupton (1992) conducted 
a national activity survey of uniformed police work, focusing on how officers spent 
their time, either inside the police station or out on patrol.  However, this concentrated 
more upon the broader categories of work conducted, such as foot patrolling or 
administrative duties, rather than considering the effectiveness of particular 
uniformed police actions, especially at the scenes of crimes e.g. questioning.  Given 
that earlier studies (Greenwood 1980, Chaiken 1975) had found that the great 
majority of detections had arisen from either catching the offender ‘red handed’ or 
from collecting scene evidence that clearly implicated the offender, this seems 
somewhat surprising, especially when it is considered that these actions fall 
predominantly within the remit of the uniformed officer.  Burrows and Tarling (1987) 
confirm this. 
 
In fact, previous studies had shown that a majority of burglary detections had resulted 
from, what was considered to be, fairly basic witness evidence collected at the scene 
(Burrows 1986a).  Very few studies however have actually considered the 
effectiveness of individual uniformed officer actions in any detail, let alone 
considered the differences in activities and evidence availability between detected 
cases and undetected cases.  Those that have (Eck 1983) have been mainly conducted 
in the US, did not consider non-residential burglary, and did not consider the activities 
of SOCO (Scenes of Crime Officers). 
 
This thesis will look in detail at these individual uniformed police activities, including 
SOCO, and place them within the broader context of the non-residential investigation 
process as a whole.  Further to this, this research considers the differences between 
detected and undetected cases and highlights any impact that the type of property may 
have on the provision of any evidence, including the collection of Modus Operandi 
evidence by uniformed officers.  This is largely considered in chapters seven and 
eight within this study. 
2.12.5 Further Police activities 
Further studies, though few of them, have been conducted which assess any 
subsequent investigative activities such as visits by Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) 
(Tilley and Ford 1996) and the work of officers (CID or uniform) at follow up visits 
(Bottomley and Coleman 1980), or the screening process followed to weed out those 
promising cases from the less promising ones (Eck 1983).  These few studies that 
have been conducted have tended to focus on the more general aspects of these roles, 
such as how these activities are used rather than how well they are used. Also, 
although studies have been conducted which address issues concerned with the 
integrated use of proactive techniques, both in terms of force implementation studies 
(Barton and Evans 1999) and more specific proactive technique studies (Maguire and 
John 1995), few assess the use of these techniques within investigation process, and 
none within the non-residential burglary investigation process. 
2.12.5.1 Crime Screening 
Although some past research has made reference to the screening process 
(Greenwood 1980, Gill et al 1996), and noted the importance of making the correct 
decisions, very little has been made of the actual effectiveness of this screening 
procedure, and the differences between those cases that merit further attention and 
those that do not.  The effectiveness of this activity can have profound implications 
upon the remainder of the investigative process and the success, or otherwise, in 
detecting non-residential burglary. 
 
The screening process takes place after the initial police response has been made, and 
a decision is made as to the worth of any follow up contact either by uniform or CID.  
This process has previously been described as one that divides cases according to 
those that cannot be solved with a reasonable amount of investigative effort, those 
that require further investigation that could lead to a detection and those that have 
already been solved circumstantially and merely require the arrest of the suspect (Eck 
1983). 
 
Although the Eck (1983) study made inroads into the screening process by identifying 
what was described as an ‘implicit triage system’, it did not consider the effectiveness 
of this crime allocation to one of the three groups.  Indeed Greenwood (1980), in one 
of the larger pieces of research work to be conducted as part of the Rand study, 
concluded that crime screening was highly subjective. 
 
Although previous research does therefore provide an insight into crime screening, 
none consider how well it works in practice and the criteria allocated to the screening 
decision.  This study is able to assess whether the screening process in operation is 
being used systematically or not, and whether potential detections are being lost 
through inappropriate screening techniques.  As a result, it is also able to assess the 
worth, if any, of any subsequent contact in the context of the non-residential burglary 
investigation process as a whole. 
2.12.5.2 Follow-up visits / Subsequent Contact 
Little research has been conducted that considers the worth of follow up visits to the 
crime scene, either by uniformed or CID (Criminal Investigation Department) 
officers, or by Scenes of Crimes Officers (SOCO).   
 
What little research has been conducted in this area has tended to focus more on the 
follow up visits of CID, to the detriment of considering SOCO and uniformed 
officers, and has been directed more towards the evaluation of CID work.  Elliot 
(1978) looked at the difference between specific detection squads, or crime control 
teams, and normal detective work.  Although he found that the crime control teams 
achieved higher clearance rates, no effort was made to examine officers’ actions.  It 
has also been shown, earlier within this chapter, that the use of clearance rates is not a 
suitable measure when considering the effectiveness of police actions.    Further to 
this, The Audit Commission (1993) concluded that additional visits to the crime scene 
by detectives were largely duplicated effort, gaining further evidence in less than 5% 
of cases.  Eck (1983) produced similar findings, concluding that follow up interviews 
conducted by CID were not significantly related to detection of cases. 
 
These findings, when taken within the context of more general research that looks at 
the sources of detections, makes more sense.  Zander (1979) found that in the vast 
majority of serious crimes, the offender should have been readily identifiable.  These 
results were supported by a number of studies conducted in the US, most notably by 
Greenwood et al (1977) and Elliot (1978), which found similar results.  Two studies 
conducted by Steer (1980) and Mawby (1979) both concluded that many detections 
did not require numerous police actions, with the majority of detections being 
straightforward, often as a result of the offender being caught at or near the scene or 
as a result of a name being provided to the police.  Indeed. Greenwood et al (1977) 
recommended that more use be made of the first police visit to the scene and that 
detectives should concentrate on more promising cases. 
 
Although the above studies do indicate the sources of detections, as with previous 
research highlighted within this chapter, they do not consider the individual actions at 
the scene that led to the provision of such information, nor the series of factors that 
effect whether the suspect is caught at or near the scene.  Also, it is clear from the 
above that no studies have considered the use of follow up contact conducted by 
uniformed officers, and the role that their activities may play in the investigation 
process, let alone within the non-residential burglary investigation process.   
 
There has also been little research into the worth of follow up visits made by SOCO.  
Those studies that have been conducted have tended to focus more on the costs 
associated with the testing and use of forensic evidence (Tilley and Ford 1996), and 
the variance in SOCO practices and evidence submission between different forces 
(McCulloch 1996).  Although some studies have shown that SOCO evidence is 
normally available as supporting evidence and contributes to only 2% of detections 
(Burrows and Tarling 1987), no studies have evaluated, in detail, the specifics of 
SOCO visits to the scene, the types of evidence collected and how SOCO attendance 
is actually determined in the first place.  This research plugs those gaps. 
2.13 Police research in perspective 
 
Although the above studies demonstrate the importance of looking at as many 
individual aspects of police activity as possible, many are still too broad in focus to be 
of any definite value in the accurate assessment of police effectiveness.  This is 
especially true if a good measure of effectiveness arises through the comparison of 
separate inputs to those instances where the outcome is successful or unsuccessful. 
 
Whilst the studies mentioned do, for example, highlight issues concerning the success 
or lack thereof of a fast response time, or how much uniformed police time is spent 
inside the station or out on community patrol, they do not give any insight into the 
numbers of factors which actually affect that response time, or the activities of the 
uniformed officer at the crime scene that may lead to an arrest.  These features are 
essential if there is to be any hope of measuring the effectiveness of police activities 
against outcomes, and offering improvements.  As can be seen, most often, such 
studies have considered aspects of police work in isolation.   
 
This study fills gaps left by past research that has focused either on those broader 
categories of police measurement or on individual activities studied in isolation.  This 
research follows the process from the time and method of alert through to the 
apprehension of the offender, considering the deployment of units and officers, any 
influences of the built environment, the time of day and day of the week, and the 
effect that these have upon where the offender is apprehended.  In doing so, this 
research is better placed to assess the most influential determinants of a successful 
police response and, where possible, assess the scope for improving capture rates. 
 
Similarly, no research to date has looked specifically at the role played by the 
attending officer at non-residential burglary incidents, their questioning of victims and 
neighbours, the gathering of other evidence and their assessment of the scene for the 
possibility of any SOCO evidence.  This study looks at the actions and operations 
undertaken by the attending officer regarding all of these factors, from the questioning 
of relevant parties, to the evidence actually provided by the scene, and places them 
within the context of the investigation process. 
 
Further to the above, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of any force 
policies that dictate whether SOCO attention is required or not, the screening abilities 
of the first attending officer, or the differences and worth of SOCO evidence collected 
from different types of premises and the role played in the detection of cases.  By 
analysing such factors, this study is able to pinpoint whether current police force 
operating procedures can be made more effective. 
 
This research aims to address a number of issues by considering investigations into 
non-residential burglary holistically.  Information will be collected for the same 
sample of burglaries on all aspects of the police response to crime.  This will allow 
police actions to be evaluated in terms of investigative effectiveness and the detection 
of crimes classified as ‘Burglary Other Building’ (BOB).  This method of research 
has strong grounding.  Bottomley and Coleman (1976) argue that there should be a   
 
“…..more deliberate and direct attempt to examine the relationship between central aspects of police 
work in discovering and detecting crime”. 
 
Further to this, Clarke and Hough (1984) state that  
 
“Gains can be expected from the more focused strategies aimed at the arrest of specific groups of 
offenders” 
 
This study achieves just that aim, by considering police investigative effectiveness 
into ‘non-residential burglary’ holistically.  As such, the contribution made by any 
given police activity in the investigation process can be considered.  This is 
particularly relevant in the case of a volume crime such as ‘Burglary Other Building’, 
as there has been no prior research conducted that analyses the investigative 
effectiveness of the specific police activities in relation to this crime. 
2.14 Influence of the physical environment on Police actions 
 
Thus far, work conducted on police activities has been reviewed with regard to their 
scope, relevance and investigative effectiveness within the context of detecting crime.  
All of these issues are largely within the control of the police force, at least to some 
extent.  However, the environmental setting in which the crime actually occurs is 
further outside the control of the police.  This section therefore considers how the 
environment may influence the investigation and subsequent detection of non-
residential burglary offences. 
 
There are proponents of the view that the very design of the environment, as well as 
the buildings themselves, can influence crime, either by increasing susceptibility to it, 
or reducing levels of it.  Although the actual assessment of these aspects, per se, are 
not part of this study, it is important to be aware of the fact that there are influential 
elements of the situation, and outside of the polices’ control, that can affect both the 
way the police deal with any particular non-residential burglary incident and any 
resultant success of emergency ‘in progress’ incidents. 
Studies by both Angel (1968) and Newman (1972) argue that certain aspects of 
environmental design may reduce the opportunities for committing crime and hence 
reduce crime levels.  Two key elements of Newman’s ‘defensible space theory’ are 
territoriality and increased surveillability of the site.  These findings concerning 
environmental design fall into line with those of Johnston et al (1990), who found that 
over 50% of the tenants on the industrial estates surveyed thought that basic design 
aspects of either their unit or the estate itself made them unnecessarily vulnerable to 
burglary.  
 
The most interesting finding of the Johnston study was the fact that the basic design 
and layout of the estate and the surrounding area are indeed the factors most 
associated with higher crime rates.  The security precautions taken by units and the 
policing of the estate were found to have little significance.  Hope (1986) made 
similar conclusions in his study on the design of schools.  Large amounts of empty 
space between the buildings/ units or being generally more open plan was found to be 
most influential regarding the susceptibility of such premises to crime.     
 
If buildings were situated nearby, from which people could come or be observed, then 
this became a factor.  Equally, if there was some open space adjacent to the building, 
then this became a factor primarily because it allowed unobserved access.  Bennett 
and Wright’s (1984) study of burglars picked this up as a key finding, in as much that 
those interviewed stated that the amount of cover provided and the closeness of other 
premises to the chosen target were considered as risk factors.  In essence, this reflects 
a fear of being seen and, as such provides some evidence in support of the concept of 
a ‘rational criminal’ (Clarke and Cornish 1986).           
 
The above suggests that physical prevention measures fitted have a reduced effect in 
preventing crime.  Indeed Bennett (1986) found that, although burglars made note of 
security levels, they were not mentioned particularly frequently nor were they 
described as being influential in the determining of the decision to offend.   
 
Although not considering the use of physical security measures, per se, within this 
study, references are made to the use of alarms and their role in alerting the police.   
Many previous studies have considered various aspects of physical security measures 
(Bennett 1986, Burrows 1991, Felson and Clarke 1998), though few, if any, have 
considered their role within the investigation process.  The main thrust of many of the 
studies conducted, considers the effectiveness of measures in reducing levels of 
crime, mainly by reducing opportunity, from an offenders’ perspective.  Although 
extremely valid, they largely ignore the proactive value, role and influences of some 
security measures, especially alarms, in how the police respond, and any impacts 
made upon the investigation process.  This study considers these aspects, and notes 
the varying influences, primarily between alerts made by people and alerts from alarm 
activations, and how the varying environments impact upon this.  This study does not 
attempt to throw further light on to the relative efficacy of various prevention 
measures.   
 
It becomes apparent from the above that the situational role of the building within the 
context of what surrounds it, whether the premises attracts the public (retail units) or 
has public access (town centre environments), and whether the building can be seen 
from neighbouring premises (sheds and garages), is influential.  
 
The true relevance of the above will be assessed within this research through the 
study of the diversity of environments in which non-residential burglary occurs.  This 
study takes note of any differences between environments that may impact upon 
police effectiveness in apprehending burglars.  This is an important consideration 
both with regard to the availability of any witness evidence at the time of the incident, 
and at those incidents where a suspect was seen.  The latter will be shown to be 
particularly important especially concerning the method of alert and whether, in those 
cases where a suspect was seen, they were first seen either entering or inside the 
building.   
 
Given the nature of many non-residential environments, the predictability with which 
the majority of such premises will be vacant and the fact that offenders’ target 
selection is based largely on occupancy and surveillability (Wright and Bennett 
1984), the environmental relevance to the investigation process can be seen.  Further 
to this, there are aspects of current police force policy regarding specific 
environments (residential sheds and garages) and the worth, if any, of either SOCO 
attention or a first officer visit, that need to be taken into consideration. 
2.15 Conclusions 
It can be seen that non-residential burglary is a worthy focus topic for research, as it is 
clearly facing a considerable problem within this country when looking at initial rates 
of burglary, revictimisation rates and the affects upon the victims of such crime.  
Needless to say however, because it has generally been considered a ‘victimless 
crime’, there is very little research-based material upon the subject.  The few studies 
that do exist present a somewhat narrow outlook of the true extent and nature of the 
problem.   
 
The picture is similar for those studies that have looked at aspects of police 
effectiveness, including both larger Government initiatives and smaller individual 
research studies, both within this country and in the US.  The measures used have 
been shown to be either both inadequate and too variable to be of any true worth, or 
too general in their focus.  Although the studies show the worth of looking at specific 
aspects of police effectiveness such as response times or patrolling, many look at the 
broader use of such activities and actions without considering the effectiveness of 
such activities or the role of such activities in satisfying their objectives.  As such, 
these studies can provide only isolated information.  
 
This is not to dismiss the efforts made, as it has been shown that trying to find a 
suitable measure of police effectiveness and then actually measuring it is far from 
straightforward.  This study however, by having clear aims and objectives, and by 
approaching the police investigation into non-residential burglary holistically is in a 
better position to assess those police actions undertaken in the investigation process.  
Further to this, by approaching this area from an investigative perspective, the true 
extent and variety of the problem can be more fully appreciated, as many different 
types of building can be affected.  This in turn can have a variable influence over the 
police investigation of the crime and any subsequent success in the arrest of the 
offender, specifically with regard the provision of witness information or evidence 
availability at the scene. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown how a comprehensive study of non-residential 
burglary, with specific focus upon the investigation and primary detection of such 
crimes, will provide new insights into the effectiveness of police actions.  Chapter 
three describes the method followed for obtaining the data required to facilitate this 
research. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Objectives 
 
It was shown in chapter two that there is scope to extend the knowledge of both non-
residential burglary, and more specifically, police investigation into it, by considering 
the crime holistically.  The majority of previous research into the police force had 
either examined it at a high, aggregate level, or had looked at specific aspects of 
police operations without considering the elements that constitute an effective police 
investigation.  By addressing these issues, the various investigative procedures and 
activities can be understood, allowing assessment of how resources could better be 
allocated in the investigation of non-residential burglary, with a view to improving 
primary detections. 
 
The principal aims of this study are therefore to: 
 
4) understand how the police deal with ‘Burglary other Building’ incidents; 
5) appreciate which investigative activities and operations undertaken lead to the 
successful detection of these BOB incidents;  
6) assess the scope for adjusting existing investigative operational procedures into 
crimes classified by the police as ‘Burglary other Building’, or non-residential 
burglary, with a view to boosting detections. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
The following chapter details the considerations and research design methodology 
used to obtain the data required, in order to achieve the objectives of the research.   
 
This study covers a significant part of the second largest police force area in England 
and Wales, spread over 348 square miles and made up of mainly urban clusters, with 
a population of 2.63 million people.  The force itself is made up of 7,333 police 
officers supported by 3,300 civilian staff.  The research covered a sample of 657 
‘Burglary other Building’ incidents, from a total of 7070, occurring in a six-month 
period between 1
st
 April and 30
th
 September 1998, committed on 9 Operational 
Command Units (OCU’s) of the West Midlands Police force area. 
 
The methodology was assessed after an initial research design was formulated, and 
tested during a feasibility study with the assistance of police officers at both Bilston 
Street and Birmingham Road Police stations in Wolverhampton, West Midlands.  A 
thorough understanding of police procedures was achieved through the observation 
and interviewing of officers, the examination of police records and the piloting of the 
officer surveys.  It was at this stage that any further changes were made and tested.  
This led to the detailed research design.  
 
This research was funded by the Home Office. 
 
3.3 Proposed research design 
The research design proposed the use of three officer surveys conducted on a sample 
of non-residential burglary cases collected across the West Midlands Police force 
area.  The surveys were designed to pick up all aspects of the investigation procedure 
into non-residential burglary so that the individual elements involved in the 
investigation of such cases could be related on the basis of individual incidents.  The 
surveys consisted of an initial response, ‘routine’ or ‘immediate’ questionnaire, a 
subsequent contact questionnaire and a ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’ questionnaire.  
These would then be complemented by secondary police data available on the 
‘CRIMES’ and ‘MDIS’ computer systems. 
 
By using both primary and secondary sources of data, the most successful and 
effective methods of investigation and detection and their role in the investigative 
process could be pinpointed.  The burglaries considered in the sample would be 
profiled in terms of the activities conducted from the moment of alert and any initial 
screening considered, through the police response and investigation practices, to the 
filing of the case as either detected or undetected.  In considering the burglaries in this 
way, the flow of activities could be better understood. 
 
3.4 The feasibility study 
A feasibility study was conducted in order to develop the research instruments and 
assess whether the proposed research design would be able to provide suitable and 
sufficient data in order to achieve the set objectives.  This information needed to be 
obtained in a clear, unambiguous, non-leading and objective manner.  References on 
social scientific research design and questionnaire design were utilised in order to 
achieve these aims (Moser and Kalton, 1993; Oppenheim, 1992).   
 
Sample sizes were determined to ensure that there would be enough cases available to 
permit any required analyses and also, in part, to select the police areas to be used 
within this study.  This was supported using secondary data from West Midlands 
Police records concerning the incidence and detection of non-residential burglary 
cases across a similar six-month period.  The operational and technical feasibility of 
the design was also addressed. 
 
The feasibility study was conducted using Bilston Street and Birmingham Road police 
stations within G1 and G2 OCU’s (Operational Command Unit).  During this study 
period the following was conducted:  
 
1) gathering knowledge on the different activities used in the non-residential 
burglary investigation process; 
2) ascertaining the best method for obtaining all relevant information on the 
investigation of cases classified by the police as ‘Burglary other Building’; 
3) designing and piloting the series of questionnaires to be used in gathering 
information on those police activities. 
 
The questionnaires for the initial response (both ‘routine’ and ‘immediate’) and the 
‘subsequent contact’ questionnaire were piloted continuously on non-residential 
burglaries that occurred during a three month period between 1
st
 September and 30
th
 
November 1996.  The finalised questionnaires can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
The questionnaires investigating filed cases (both ‘detected’ and ‘undetected’) were 
piloted on a sample of recently filed non-residential incidents and completed by the 
investigating officers.  The finalised questionnaires can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
The questionnaires themselves were developed from a basic framework based upon 
the perceived activities that the police were likely to undertake in dealing specifically 
with non-residential burglary incidents.  A series of interviews were conducted with 
uniformed constables and sergeants who would be best placed to outline the majority 
of procedures and activities that would need to be addressed.  Interviews were also 
conducted with members of the crime bureaus and Scenes of Crime Officers to further 
understand principles and activities other than those conducted by uniformed officers.  
Finally, interviews were conducted with members of the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) to identify specific features of the investigation that would largely 
identify those cases as detected or undetected, and the evidence that is considered as 
part of the investigations.   
 
Once the draft questionnaires were complete, interviews were conducted with senior 
inspectors to assess both the information coverage and the viability of using such 
instruments.  Extra factors were also determined e.g. any likely differences in police 
practice across areas, so as to ensure that the finalised questionnaires would be valid 
across any of the police force areas under consideration.  The piloting of the 
questionnaires was further complemented by the additional interviewing of officers 
involved in dealing with Burglary other Building incidents, who were given the 
opportunity to provide feedback on the content and layout of the questionnaires 
themselves.  Officer feedback was then compared to the information provided by the 
questionnaires to determine survey effectiveness. 
3.5 Choice of study area 
 
For operational feasibility, police officer liaison, travelling time used in conducting 
the research and in consultation with West Midlands Police, it was decided to use nine 
police force OCU’s (Operational Command Units) contained within the urban area of 
Birmingham and surrounding towns in the Black Country.  These equate to what were 
once F (1, 2, 3), G (1, 2), J (1, 2) and K (1, 2) divisions.   
 
These nine areas were chosen because: 
 
1) they are contiguous, and provide an area for study that is large enough to provide 
sufficient non-residential burglary incidents and primary detections (given the 
detection rate from the feasibility study) during the proposed six-month period of 
data collection.  250 primary detected cases are required and the overall number 
of cases during the six months must provide this; 
2) they are accessible to the research team for liaising with police personnel; 
3) the areas have a diversity of non-residential environments, and where applicable, 
residential environments (sheds and garages), including a variety of retailing, 
office, manufacturing and industrial concerns and locations; 
4) these OCU’s provide a variety of areas that make it possible to gauge the impact 
of any possible diversity in investigation methods.  The centralised crime bureaus 
are, however, likely to impose a degree of uniformity. 
3.5.1 OCU information 
 
3.5.1.1 Birmingham Central (F1) 
Birmingham Central operational command unit is divided into three sectors, based at 
Vyse Street, Digbeth and Steelhouse Lane, and is the smallest in the force in terms of 
resident population and area. 
 
‘A’ Sector covers the Jewellery Quarter, the National Indoor Arena and International 
Convention Centre, Centenary Square and Broad Street, the focus of the city’s night 
life.  ‘B’ Sector is responsible for the shopping and commercial areas, the Crown and 
Magistrates’ Courts and both Victoria and Chamberlain Squares, the chosen venues 
for many events and demonstrations.  ‘C’ Sector covers the east of the centre, Aston 
University, the industrial areas around Digbeth, the markets and most of the 
residential areas of Highgate and Lee Bank. 
 
3.5.1.2 Rose Road (F2) 
Rose Road operational command unit is responsible for one of the most diverse areas 
in the West Midlands covering the four distinct communities of Harborne, Quinton, 
Ladywood and Winson Green. 
 
3.5.1.3 Thornhill Road (F3) 
Thornhill Road operational command unit covers a multi-cultural area of Birmingham 
and is divided into four sectors based at Walsall Road, Holyhead Road, Thornhill 
Road and Bridge Street West police stations. 
  
3.5.1.4 Wolverhampton West (G1) 
Wolverhampton West operational command unit covers Tettenhall, Pendeford, 
Blakenhall, Compton, Whitmore Reans and the town centre. 
 
3.5.1.5 Wolverhampton East (G2) 
Wolverhampton East operational command unit delivers policing to the Wednesfield 
and Bilston areas of Wolverhampton.  The area is mainly residential, with an 
increasing mix of light industry.  In 1998/99 policing was carried out by officers 
based on five sectors.  These have now been realigned to three sectors. 
 
3.5.1.6 Dudley North (J1) 
Dudley North operational command unit covers Dudley, Brierley Hill, Gornal, 
Sedgley and Coseley, an area which also includes the Merry Hill shopping centre, 
Dudley Zoo and the Black Country Museum. 
 
3.5.1.7 Dudley South (J2) 
Dudley South operational command unit serves Halesowen, Stourbridge, Lye and 
Kingswinford and policing is delivered from locally-based sectors. 
 
3.5.1.8 Sandwell North (K1) 
Sandwell North operational command unit serves Tipton, Wednesbury, Great Barr 
and West Bromwich; the heart of the West Midlands.  The OCU covers some of the 
most deprived areas in the country. 
 
3.5.1.9 Sandwell South (K2) 
Sandwell South operational command unit covers Smethwick, Oldbury, Warley, 
Langley and Old Hill; a multi-cultural urban environment with a diverse population. 
3.6 Required size of the sample area 
 
Within the proposed six month study period, the study area needed to provide at least 
250 ‘primary detected’ non-residential burglary cases and an equivalent number of 
undetected cases.  This would provide a sufficient number of cases for the required 
levels of confidence in findings for West Midlands Police investigation methods into 
Burglary other Building (BOB).  The number of cases that would be available for 
study during the six-month period would be dependent on a number of factors. 
3.6.1 Limiting factors 
Because the objective of the study is to analyse aspects of the police investigation 
process that lead, or do not lead, to the charging or formal cautioning of an offender, 
the number of ‘primary detections’ available to study is crucial in gaining an accurate 
view of police effectiveness in investigating non-residential burglary.  However, the 
actual number of primary detections available in the six-month study period would be 
dependent on several factors. 
 
1) the number of non-residential burglaries in the OCU’s; 
2) the primary detection rate of the areas considered; 
3) the length of time taken for a burglary to be primary cleared; 
4) the non-response rate of questionnaires; 
5) the number of cases telephone investigated. 
 
3.6.1.1 The number of non-residential burglaries 
During the six-month period between November 1995 and April 1996, there were 
approximately 9103 cases of burglary other building in the proposed study areas.  
When broken down by division, this amounted to a total of 2329 burglaries in F 
Division, 1855 burglaries in G Division, 1975 burglaries in J Division and 2944 in K 
Division.  It had to be assumed that these figures for burglary other building would 
remain reasonably constant, so providing a sufficient number of cases to be studied 
within the proposed six-month data collection period. 
 
3.6.1.2 The primary detection rate  
The primary detection rate between November 1995 and April 1996 across the four 
divisions, F, G, J and K was c. 5.1 %.  If broken down by division, F division had a 
primary detection rate of 5.0%, G division had a primary detection rate of 5.5%, J 
Division had a primary detection rate of 5.9% and K, one of 4.3%.  The equivalent 
rate across the entire West Midlands Police Force area was 4.7% during the same 
period.  Again, it was assumed that these figures would not deviate too greatly, so 
providing c. 460 primary detections across the four divisions during the proposed six-
month research period.  This was sufficiently in excess of the 250 required, so that 
any reductions due to a fall in crime rate, plus non-response could be more than 
accommodated. 
 
3.6.1.3 The length of time for cases to be primary cleared 
The numbers of primary detected incidents about which complete data could be 
collected would be affected by the time actually taken to detect incidents.  Some non-
residential burglary incidents during the first few months of the study would be 
primary detected but will have been committed before the data collection began.  
Therefore, information on the police's initial investigation would not be available 
since detections in the first few weeks of the study would not have full information, 
e.g. details of the initial visits to the scene.  To accommodate this fact, a 'warm up' 
period for the study was used. 
 
This ‘warm up’ period was determined by the length of time taken to obtain primary 
detections.  Analysis on G Division’s primary clearance time showed that 92% of the 
non-residential cases that were primary cleared, were cleared within one month, 
whilst the remaining 8% took between two and six months to be cleared.  Of those 
92% of cases primary detected within a month, 84% of those were within twenty 
days, whilst 76% were within 7 days (see Figure 3.6.1.3 below). 
Figure 3.6.1.3 Time taken for cases to be cleared (days) 
 
If these figures remained consistent for the remaining three proposed study divisions, 
there would be an approximate loss of only 6% of the data sample over the entire six-
month period, so reducing the number from 460 to 432.  However, if the six-month 
data collection period were to be extended for an additional month, and police records 
monitored, the bulk of any loss should be balanced by gains made from the burglaries 
taking place towards the end of the six-month data collection period.  A small 
proportion of burglaries would be lost however, as some take much longer than a 
month to be detected. 
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3.6.1.4 The non-response rates on questionnaires 
The number of primary detected cases for which questionnaire data could be collected 
would be further reduced by the non-response rate.  Response rates from West 
Midlands’ officers from research into residential burglary however, averaged over 90 
per cent for the first officer surveys, with a response rate of 82% across all 
questionnaires used (Coupe and Griffiths 1996).  
 
This feasibility study indicated that the sample of 432 primary detected cases prior to 
non-response would be reduced to 389 for the first officers’ survey.  This would be 
reduced further to 354 cases for the full set of questionnaires covering the three 
investigative stages: the initial response questionnaire, the subsequent contact 
questionnaire, and the final questionnaires concerned with the filing of cases as either 
‘detected’ or ‘undetected’. 
 
3.6.1.5 The number of cases ‘telephone investigated’ 
The manner in which certain non-emergency incidents are dealt with can also have a 
bearing on the required sample size.  Some non-emergency cases are selected for a 
‘routine’ grading first officer visit, while other less promising non-emergency cases 
are dealt with entirely over the telephone.  It is necessary for sufficient cases of each 
type to be available for comparison so that the effectiveness of the screening process, 
in terms of the investigation of promising cases and the exclusion of those with little 
chance of detection, can be verified. 
 
3.7 Research methodology 
 
Having chosen an appropriate study area that would provide sufficient numbers of 
cases for analysis, the best method of obtaining the information had to be ascertained.  
There were two major inter-related issues that needed to be considered.  Firstly, the 
choice between the use of historic or contemporaneous data, and secondly, the actual 
instruments to be used during the six-month data collection period. 
3.7.1 The use of historic or contemporaneous data 
Selecting a sample of cases that have been ‘primary detected’ during the proposed 
six-month data collection period, and sending questionnaires out to the officers 
involved seems both feasible and appealing upon first inspection.  However, using 
this type of ‘retrospective’ approach would present the following problems: 
1) memory lapse of officers is likely to degrade the quality of data collected.  Results 
from the residential burglary feasibility study (Coupe and Griffiths 1996) show 
that officers have poor recall on the undetected cases after 2-4 weeks though recall 
on detected incidents lasts much longer.  The biggest problem however would 
occur regarding the accuracy of the information provided about the initial police 
response taken in the investigation procedure; 
2) any missing data would create further problems because, in general, it would not 
be possible to ask questions of the officers directly involved in any particular case; 
3) there could be a danger that officers, already knowing the outcome of the case, 
might retrospectively complete details of the case accordingly. 
 
Evidence from the feasibility study indicated that contemporaneous surveys would 
provide the only feasible method of obtaining the research data, to ensure that as 
many relevant incidences as possible were included and the data satisfied the need for 
completeness and high enough quality to conduct such research.  Also, by using 
contemporaneous data, completeness of information allowed the research to be 
conducted on the same sample of burglaries across the entire investigation process.  
This was one of the major strengths of this research design. 
3.7.2 Principal research instruments 
The use of contemporaneous surveying meant that data would be required for as many 
initial visits to the scene of the burglary as possible in order to guarantee 250 primary 
detections.  The only feasible method for obtaining such a large amount of quality 
data was by using: 
 
3.7.2.1 Questionnaires 
Three stages of the investigation process would be covered, with the aim of 
ascertaining the impact of different investigative activities on the ‘primary detection’ 
of non-residential burglary incidents. 
 
1) Initial response to the BOB incident – The initial response questionnaires (A and 
B), ‘self-completed’ when officers first attended the burglary scene, covered the 
relative effects of both non-emergency and emergency responses (routine, early 
and immediate), the numbers of officers and types of vehicle used and response 
timings associated with each response type.  Information was also available on 
any questioning of victims (injured parties (IP’s)), neighbours, and other 
witnesses, the evidence gathered and the use of that evidence.  Information 
concerning modus operandi (MO) details, information on stolen property and any 
SOCO attention and associated evidence details were also available (SOCO 
information was supported further by the report forms compiled by the scenes of 
crime officers for all scenes visited, whether positive or negative).  The collection 
of this data needed to involve as many ‘non-emergency’ and ‘emergency’ alerts 
where a ‘first-officer’ visited as was possible to collect, given the difficulties in 
collecting such data; 
 
Supplementary questions regarding the ‘in progress’ (immediate response) incidents 
that considered factors that enabled a fast response were also contained in the 
questionnaires.  These provided information regarding the location of the patrols 
when the alert was received, when and where the burglar/s were first seen, and any 
police activities conducted at the scene and in the surrounding area. 
 
The questionnaires were left with main liaison officers at the nine principal police 
stations in the four OCU’s covered.  It was their role to distribute the questionnaires 
appropriately.  This inevitably entailed attaching the questionnaires to the WC200 
incident registers for completion, though there was some minor variation between 
police stations.  It was hoped that this would provide a suitable number of incidents 
where first officers visited.  Further to this, this method reduced the problem of 
memory lapse, as completed WC200’s are required within 24 hours of the incidents 
being attended. 
 
2) Subsequent contact - A second ‘self-completed’ questionnaire (C) covered any 
further activities conducted at any single particular incident.  Information 
concerning the type and time spent on this contact, the number of officers dealing 
with the contact, the purpose of this contact and any further IP or witness 
information were collected.  These questionnaires were also attached to the 
WC200’s, as the incident registers also required update upon any subsequent 
contact; 
3) Detected and Undetected cases - ‘Self-Completed’ questionnaires (D and E) by 
the OIC’s (Officers in Charge) of the cases, covered all operations and 
investigative activities undertaken that either led to the case being filed as 
‘detected’ or ‘undetected’. 
 
These final questionnaires covered any evidence available either from the scene or 
elsewhere, and the resultant investigations.  Furthermore, they allowed the collection 
of information concerning any investigations that were pursued concerning any 
particular incident, but led nowhere.  This enables both the key factors in determining 
primary detections, and the factors that trigger investigations, to be identified.  It also 
makes it possible to establish the sequence of activities that are more likely to lead to 
a successful outcome. 
  
The final total number of completed questionnaires should include enough detected 
cases to satisfy the minimum 250 requirement.  It should also include a sample of 
cases filed ‘undetected’ that contain a satisfactory minima of incidents where both 
visits to the scene and investigations took place, and those where neither occurred.    
 
Without employing the use of ‘self-completed’ questionnaires to gather information 
from officers, there would be the following problems: 
 
1) increased problems regarding timeliness, police time and research costs.  These 
rendered interviewing for all cases across all questionnaires infeasible; 
2) difficulty in identifying non-residential burglary incidents using computer 
databases alone.  Missing data are a problem with police database systems, and 
this can affect sample representation; 
3) data that depend on officer responses at or near the time of the crime would not be 
available.  This would include any attitude data as well as certain factual 
information such as where a patrol car was located when a burglary alert was 
received; 
4) it would be impossible to pin down exactly how non-residential burglaries are 
detected without the final questionnaires.  Police records and databases do not 
readily include comprehensive information on how cases are detected, rarely 
containing details regarding the use of surveillance and informants.  However, 
research into residential burglary (Coupe and Griffiths 1996) indicated that 
officers would tick the use of such items on questionnaires; 
5) if this study were reliant on secondary data, it would be further reliant on the 
availability of sufficient computer operator resources to search and print out all 
relevant details of incidents;  
6) the privacy rules under the Data Protection Act would prevent the use of certain 
data derived from a computerised database.  Such information may be used 
however, if supplied by officers in the form of questionnaire responses. 
 
3.7.2.2 Interviewing of officers 
Officer interviews were conducted to provide supplementary detail on both the 
investigative and screening processes involved in any investigation procedure.  This 
was essential with Scenes of Crime Officers, as no data would be available as to their 
operational work or the problems encountered regarding any SOCO input into a case.  
Although these interviews would prove to be resource intensive it was considered 
essential to conduct such interviews. 
 
3.7.2.3 Use of police databases 
The collection of information from police records and databases was also used, within 
the constraints of the data protection act.  Police logs for incidents would be collected 
using the MDIS computer database, whilst all relevant tracking and searching would 
be conducted using the CRIMES computer system.  Allied to this, secondary data 
would be collected where no visit was made to the crime scene due to the incident 
being ‘telephone investigated’ by a member of the Crime Bureau/ Call Handler.  This 
would be used as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the screening process 
employed that dictates whether a police attendance should be made to the scene of the 
crime or not. 
 
3.8 Technical and Operational Feasibility of Research 
 
It was important to ensure that the proposed design was feasible both from a technical 
and operational perspective.  The technical feasibility of the research was dependent 
on the quality of information that could be obtained about the different aspects of 
police investigations using the questionnaires, police databases and interviews.  It was 
further dependent on the level of analyses that could be conducted on this 
information.  The operational feasibility of the research was concerned with the 
workload that would be placed on the researcher, and the extra workload created for 
the police officers involved.  The factors that affect the robustness of the research and 
their evaluation from the feasibility study are as follows: 
3.8.1 Co-operation of police officers 
Although there are a large number of non-residential burglary incidents to be 
considered, they would be spread across nine OCU’s.  The burden placed on 
individual officers for completion of initial response and subsequent contact 
questionnaires would therefore be small.  Further to this, and to avoid problems of 
low response rate, the questionnaires were designed to use quick tick-box responses, 
taking approximately two minutes to complete.  It was determined therefore that the 
research would not have an adverse effect on the officers’ efficiency.   
 
The questionnaires for filed cases, although somewhat longer, would be completed 
less frequently and by fewer officers, and the officers involved should typically have 
to complete only ten ‘final questionnaires’ during the main six-month data collection 
period. 
3.8.2 Accuracy of information 
Memory lapse will be minimised by the use of contemporaneous questioning and by 
the completion of questionnaires by officers within a week of the case being filed or 
within four weeks of the incident if the case is not filed by the end of the third week.  
Data from police logs (MDIS) and information from crime sheets will also provide 
cross-checks on certain variables.  The feasibility study showed that data was 
available for all cases sampled after any investigations had been completed. 
3.8.3 Scope of the study 
The methodology covers each principal police activity used in the investigation of 
non-residential burglary incidents, from the initial response through to the case being 
filed either ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’.  The variety of factors that influence primary 
detection rates will therefore become apparent. 
3.8.4 Constraints imposed by data protection and the disclosure of evidence 
The pilot study showed that all information required on police investigations could be 
provided by officers and through the use of computer databases, since the research did 
not require detailed information on sensitive issues. 
3.8.5 Method of distribution and collection of questionnaires 
Both the initial response questionnaires (A and B), and the subsequent contact 
questionnaires will be distributed and collected through a liaison officer at each of the 
nine OCU’s involved in the research.  During the pilot study, a Detective Inspector at 
Birmingham Road Police Station carried this out. 
 
The questionnaires for the filed cases (D and E) will be sent to either the detecting 
officer, or the officer in charge of the case depending on whether it was detected or 
not.  The police ‘CRIMES’ system will be used to identify relevant officers, and 
indicate when a case has been filed ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’.  The ‘CRIMES’ 
system should be updated within one week of the state of the case changing, therefore 
the cases should still be fresh in the minds of the officers when the questionnaires are 
received. 
3.9 Details of the research design 
 
The following section gives details of the research design as it was implemented in 
the main study.  It shows how the study fulfils the need to take a holistic view of the 
non-residential burglary investigation process and how, by doing so, it provides an 
extremely rich source of data for analysis.  The proposed research design reflects the 
way the police deal with non-residential burglary enquiries.  The full investigation 
procedure can be seen in Figure 3.9 overleaf.  It shows the procedures, activities, and 
operations used selectively in investigating ‘Burglary other Building’ cases, according 
to the characteristics of the incident. 
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Figure 3.9 Investigation procedure for Burglary other Building incidents 
 
3.10 Police activities, procedures and operations 
The police, in the non-residential burglary investigation process, selectively undertake 
the following distinctive activities and procedures: 
 
1) receive an alert regarding a non-emergency burglary incident, inevitably from the 
IP (injured party/ victim), and the screening of this information in order to decide 
whether a police attendance under a ‘routine response’ grading is required; 
2) receive an alert from the scene of the crime regarding the availability of evidence 
likely to lead to the arrest of an offender, and the despatching of resources under 
an ‘early response’ grading; 
3) receive an alert from any number of sources (IP, witness, alarm activation) that 
dictates emergency treatment of the case under an ‘immediate response’ grading, 
and the despatching police units to such cases.  Inevitably the alert will suggest 
that the offence is ongoing or ‘in progress’; 
4) investigations conducted at the burglary scene, including the interviewing of the 
victim and any witnesses to the act; 
5) visits by Scenes of Crime Officers and the collection of any available forensic 
evidence; 
6) the following up of any evidential leads provided at the scene of the crime; 
7) the screening for any subsequent contacts made by officers to selected burglary 
incidents; 
8) intelligence activities, including surveillance, collecting information from 
informants, targeting known offenders, and the use of Crime Pattern Analysis and 
Modi Operandi. 
3.11 Distinctive Types of Activity 
 
Four distinctive kinds of activity therefore should ideally be evaluated to determine 
their contribution to securing primary detections.  These are:  
 
 the screening of non-emergency incidents for a police attendance; 
 visits to the burglary site, either as a non-emergency ‘routine response’, or as an 
‘early’ or ‘immediate response’ emergency grading;  
 activities conducted at the scene including any SOCO attention and the collection 
and types of evidence; 
 the response and associated factors corresponding to those ‘in progress’ incidents.  
 
Table 3.11 describes the data collected at each stage of the non-residential burglary 
investigation process. 
 
Information on police investigations for each of the stages was obtained using the 
questionnaires, the police database systems (MDIS and CRIMES), and the 
interviewing of officers.  These measurements provided the data for evaluating the 
effectiveness of each of the investigative stages and the impact of specific activities 
and procedures on the successful detection of non-residential burglary. 
 
In addition, fuller measurement of ‘in progress’ burglaries has been incorporated into 
this study so as to provide an opportunity to determine the circumstances where 
‘immediate responses’ to burglaries reported while ‘in progress’ are successful, and 
those where they are unsuccessful.  Further to this, any variation in the practices 
between divisions depending on policy and work pressure will also be examined in 
the study. 
 
Stage of Investigation Data Source Data Collected 
Initial response Initial response 
Questionnaire (A/B) 
Strength of response (no. of officers and patrols and 
their arrival order), time spent at scene, witnesses 
questioned, type and quality of evidence provided, 
arrests made, practices at the scene 
 MDIS logs Precise information concerning the response; number 
and type of vehicle and response timings  
Subsequent contact Subsequent contact 
Questionnaire (C)  
Purpose of contact, time spent, number of officers 
dealing, witnesses questioned, type and quality of 
information provided, officer’s case assessment 
Visits by Scenes of Crime 
Officers (SOCO) 
Initial response 
Questionnaire (A/B) 
Details of whether a SOCO had been requested, or why 
not requested 
 Final Questionnaires 
(D/E) 
Details of any forensic evidence provided and if and 
how it was used 
 Visiting forms Official SOCO record of all scenes visited and 
negative or positive evidence 
 Interviews  Operational difficulties, ongoing concerns 
Detected cases CRIMES system Tracking of case and investigating/ detecting officer 
 Detected Case 
Questionnaire (D) 
Factors and evidence used in gaining the detection, 
operations undertaken and any proactive work 
Undetected cases CRIMES system Tracking of case and officer in charge (OIC) 
 Undetected Cases 
Questionnaire (E) 
The evidence considered and any operations 
undertaken during the course of any investigations 
conducted 
Table 3.11 Data source and collection and method of collection 
3.12 Survey implementation 
 
Following the feasibility study, meetings were held with all liaising officers from the 
nine OCU’s to best decide the method of implementation of the questionnaires.  
 
Although this process took place separately, a common approach was used across the 
nine OCU’s.  A research liaison officer was appointed as a contact between the 
researcher and the operational police officers.  This varied from Detective Inspectors 
to Performance Review officers.  The researcher cultivated the relationship with each 
of these officers and they proved invaluable in assisting in both the distribution and 
collation of questionnaires, and where possible, the return of questionnaires. 
 
Once the survey was up and running, progress was monitored on a weekly basis, 
through visits, telephone calls and the interrogation of both the MDIS and CRIMES 
databases.  The completed questionnaire data was also collected during these visits 
and any issues highlighted. 
3.13 Difficulties encountered 
 
Given the nature of the environment within which the data collection took place, and 
the type and amount of data required, several difficulties were encountered over the 
six-month data collection period. 
3.13.1 Officer response 
The response from the initial visit questionnaires was excellent, however, there was 
some difficulty in gaining subsequent contact questionnaires, and some OIC’s were 
less willing than others to complete the final questionnaires.  Overall however, close 
monitoring proved worthwhile in guaranteeing the running of the study. 
3.13.2 Co-ordination of manpower; direct liaison 
Given the nature of the environment and the changing of roles within the 6 month 
period across the 9 police force areas used within this research, liaison was required 
with a total of 23 police personnel, whether within a police study area or at West 
Midlands Police Headquarters.  This created some problems with continuity of 
personnel, especially with regard the collection of the contemporaneous data.  On four 
of the nine study areas, the main police liaison altered during the data collection 
period, with two areas altering more than once. 
 Allied to the above, there were further problems with continuity of personnel when 
the main area liaison officer was absent due to annual leave.  This inevitably led to 
further changes of personnel, all of who had to be fully appraised concerning data 
collection, in a very short space of time.  If no change of personnel was available, this 
meant further delays in the return of any data.  These issues were, again, countered by 
regular and close monitoring of the situation. 
3.13.3 Co-ordination of manpower; officer liaison 
Similar problems were faced to those mentioned above with the actual completion of 
the police questionnaires, especially if this was required near the end of a shift.  
Problems were again encountered concerning annual leave, sick leave, and the delay 
in the return of questionnaires if an officer was attending a course on any particular 
occasion. 
3.13.4 Operational Restructuring 
Within the six-month data collection period, four of the nine study areas went through 
major operational restructuring, which again led to difficulties in the co-ordination of 
personnel and data collection.  When the data collection began in April, areas J (J1, 
J2) and K (K1, K2) each had a centralised Crime Bureau and Divisional Information 
Room (DIR).  During the data collection period however, both of these units were 
split in half, involving the relocation of part of both bodies to different stations within 
their respective police areas. 
3.13.5 Access to Police Databases (CRIMES and MDIS) 
Given that the police computer systems were in full use during the week, it was 
impossible at times to access required secondary police data.  Although access was 
sometimes made available on occasional weekend periods, staff had to be available to 
oversee the use of the computers.  If no staff were available, access to the databases 
was not possible, and therefore the collection of the required secondary data was 
delayed. 
   
Allied to this, as the databases were not generally needed on an operational level at 
weekends, West Midlands Police IT unit had a tendency to take them ‘off line’ whilst 
the records and systems were updated or modified.  This created further limitations 
regarding the collection of data. 
3.13.6 Collection of Secondary Data 
Although the majority of staff were able to use the databases on a general level, the 
specificity of this research meant that few staff possessed the required specialised 
knowledge to set up the kinds of specific searches to meet the needs of this research.  
This meant, that both the CRIMES and MDIS systems had to be learnt within a very 
short space of time in order to create the specific searches required to gain the 
secondary police data.  Consequently, weekends that could have been spent collecting 
data were spent learning and creating the searches for future access. 
3.13.7 Delays in the return of Questionnaires 
In most cases, the best way to ensure that the initial response police questionnaires 
were completed (A and B), was to actually attach them to the crime report (WC200) 
until the case was filed ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’, at which time the research 
questionnaires were removed and returned.  However, this inevitably meant a 
minimum delay of 28 days in the return of most questionnaires, as the majority of 
cases would be given a ‘further referral date’ (FR date) whilst any police enquiries 
were completed. 
 
A cut off point had to be set for the ‘detected’ and ‘undetected’ questionnaires, (D and 
E) to ensure that any delays in the return of these questionnaires was not too great.  
Although this meant that a minimal number of detections might be missed, this was 
unavoidable, as the return of questionnaires could not feasibly have been left any 
longer.  The majority of cases that would be detected however, were inevitably 
detected within this time period, even allowing for the return of any Scenes of Crime 
(SOCO) evidence from the testing labs. 
3.13.8 West Midlands Police Internal Post  
Because of the restructuring across the study areas, instances occurred where the 
returned questionnaires were effectively ‘swallowed’ by the system for up to 8 weeks.  
This meant that in many cases, because the questionnaires did not show up as 
returned, a second sweep of the internal system had to be conducted with regard the 
return of questionnaires. 
3.13.9 Major Investigations 
Understandably, when a major investigation arose, officers were often too busy to 
complete and return questionnaires.  This proved problematic, especially in those 
areas where the direct liaison was a CID officer who was subsequently seconded to an 
Incident Room.  As stated above, this created problems with regard to changing police 
personnel, and further problems associated with this change.  By ensuring direct and 
close liaison however, any effects were largely mediated. 
3.13.10  Environmental ethos 
The problems stated above are entirely of a practical nature, dealing with the specifics 
of data collection and collation.  Equally important however were the problems 
encountered with the general environmental ethos within which the data collection 
took place.  Similar problems have been noted by Horton and Smith (1988). 
 
The key issue was the difficulty in conducting such research as an outsider.  Although 
there was frequent liaison with officers charged with the task of collating the 
information required, it proved difficult at times to ensure the prompt return of 
relevant data without the authority to secure co-operation. 
3.14 Response rates and representativeness of sample 
 
The population studied consisted of 7070 ‘burglary other building’ incidents that were 
committed in the survey area between April and September, 1998.  765 burglary cases 
were systematically sampled from these incidents, and the sample was stratified 
according to whether cases were detected or not.  Incidents were identified from data 
on West Midland Police computers within two weeks of their occurrence, and every 1 
in 2 detected cases, and every 1 in 25 undetected cases were selected for inclusion in 
the sample, representing half of the detected and 4% of the undetected cases.  This 
resulted in 306 cases recorded as detected and 459 undetected cases.    
 
The response rate for the questionnaires completed by police officers was 86% 
providing 657 burglary cases, 285 of which were detected and 372 undetected.  There 
is no evidence that systematic bias due to non-response affected sample 
representativeness, since the profile e.g. property types, timing of the offences, 
characteristics of the offence, for the burglaries with a non-response matched quite 
closely that of cases where officers completed questionnaires. 
 
Sample stratification meant that sample data needed to be adjusted or weighted using 
the differing proportions of detected and undetected incidents, in order to estimate 
correct population parameters, such as proportions.  In view of the fact that the 
sample consists of 50% of detected burglaries but only 4% of the undetected, it is 
necessary to multiply the undetected sample by 16.1 and the detected sample by 3.7 
and then sum these two together.  Similarly, the estimation of confidence limits needs 
to be proportionately adjusted to take account of any differences in the variances 
between detected and undetected cases.  Statistical tests were carried out on the 
unmodified sample data.  The examples in Appendix 2 illustrate how sample 
percentages are adjusted and confidence limits can be calculated to take account of 
the unequal proportions of detected and undetected cases. 
 
The analytic approach adopted was to decompose the investigation of burglary 
incidents into component activities and operations.  This makes it possible to assess 
the contribution of each type of operation to detection, and understand the factors that 
influence whether or not these crimes are successfully solved, and, hence, meet the 
objectives of the thesis.   
 
The police selectively undertake a number of operations and activities in order to 
attempt to solve cases.  These can be viewed as activities carried out sequentially but 
selectively, so that in effect, there are different potential paths through the burglary 
investigative process.  It would be expected that more promising cases that remain 
unsolved will tend to receive continuing and greater attention than those with a 
slimmer chance of detection.  An ‘in-progress’ burglary incident where no offender 
was caught but where there was good quality witness evidence is therefore more 
likely to undergo further investigation than where there is little or no information 
available.  A summary description of the burglary investigation along these lines was 
not undertaken, because it would not in itself assist in meeting the thesis objectives, 
namely assessing the effectiveness of different types of investigative activity under 
different circumstances.  If this is accurately assessed, then the appropriate activities 
can be carried out to investigate different types of cases. 
 
The statistical analyses employed reflected the types of data, with inferential 
significance testing using variable control.  Data summarising the importance of each 
operation or activity for successful detection were cross-related to incident or police 
response circumstances using inferential significance tests that matched the data level. 
3.15 Conclusions 
 
The research design incorporates a total of five officer surveys representing the three 
stages of police response.  These are the initial response questionnaires (A and B), a 
subsequent contact questionnaire (C), and two final questionnaires that consider both 
detected and undetected cases (D and E).   
 
Where appropriate, the information from the surveys was supplemented by secondary 
data from ‘MDIS’ and ‘CRIMES’ as permitted by the data protection act, and officer 
interviews.  The minimum sample size required for the officer surveys was 250 
primary detected cases, and a total of 285 were collected. 
 
The key features of the Non-Residential design are similar to those used in the 1994-5 
research into residential burglary (Coupe & Griffiths, 1996) that proved reliable and 
accurate.  Adjustments have been made to the design to take account of the 
differences in the way ‘burglary other building’ cases are dealt with.  This is most 
noticeable with respect to the differences in those ‘non-emergency’ incidents that 
receive a police attendance and further investigation, and the much smaller group of 
‘non-emergency’ incidents that are not investigated at all. 
 
The approach adopted in this research involves contemporaneous measurement of 
police activities.  As a consequence, data collection was more difficult than if it were 
based on secondary police records, or if the study relied on questioning officers about 
their views as to what happens and how things might be improved.  Although the 
latter may be a useful complement, it is more reliable to measure how officers deal 
with each case from a representative sample of incidents, assess the impact of each of 
their activities on detection, and then aggregate the findings across every case to 
determine their comparative impact on solving cases and any potential to enhance 
detection. 
 
This research design provides a data set that is of extremely good quality and 
collected from both primary and secondary sources.  As all data were linked to a 
single set of non-residential burglary incidents, police activities could be considered 
in a holistic manner.  The final data set consisted of over five hundred variables. 
4. DIVERSITY OF TARGETS 
4.1 Summary 
 
Twenty-eight different property types were identified within this study that suffered 
from burglary during the six-month data collection period, showing that almost every 
type of property and organisation can fall prey to the burglar. 
 
A little over a half of all targets were offices, shops and industrial concerns or 
warehouses.  The remaining burgled properties were schools and colleges, leisure 
facilities, including pubs, clubs, sports centres, cinemas and restaurants, and a variety 
of public service establishments and facilities, including hospitals, surgeries, churches 
and both fire and police stations.  Parts of domestic properties, principally sheds, 
garages and ‘void’ dwellings are also classified by the police as ‘Burglary Other 
Building’, and as such, constitute almost one fifth of the sample.    
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the variety of property types and environments within which 
‘Burglary Other Building’ incidents occur.  It is important that this diversity is fully 
appreciated because, as will be shown in following chapters, there are indications that 
the influence of the varying environments may have an effect upon factors involved in 
the police response to, investigation of, and the successful apprehension of the 
burglary offenders.  This is of particular relevance when the burglary occurs within an 
environment that contains larger concentrations of people and, as such, is likely to 
increase the chance of an offender being seen, or the availability of other witness 
evidence.  The influence of the differences between different premises and 
environments therefore runs as a common thread throughout the following research, 
acting, as it does, as one of the more relevant features outside police control that may 
impact successful detection. 
 
To date, because police force classifications do not differentiate between non-
residential building types, the majority of information available has come from 
individual studies conducted within the field of ‘non-residential burglary’.  These 
studies have tended to concentrate on specific, and more obvious, business types such 
as industrial estates (Johnston et all 1990) or retail concerns (Hibberd and Shapland 
1993).  This has resulted in a specificity that a) hides, to a large extent, the variety of 
targets and b) largely ignores the various influences upon burglary and detection that 
such diverse environments can have.  By addressing the issue from an investigation 
perspective however, this study reflects more accurately the true nature of the 
problem by identifying these property types, and displaying the sheer diversity of 
properties that can be affected.  Allied to this, any environmental influences that may 
be exerted on the police response and investigation that can impact upon the 
successful detection of non-residential burglary become more apparent. 
 
4.3 Diversity of Premises and Environment 
 
28 different ‘non-residential’ property types suffered burglaries.  These vary from 
what one would expect to be classified as ‘non-residential’ (shops, offices, 
warehouses, pubs), through those properties which we are surprised to find burgled 
(libraries, fire stations, police stations, churches, dental surgeries), to those premises 
which one would not immediately consider to be cases of ‘non-residential’ burglary 
(domestic sheds and garages). 
 
Although both shops (13%) and warehouse/ industrial premises (30%) do feature 
heavily within this study, as do other more obvious non-residential targets such as 
offices (12%), they only constitute half of all ‘burglary other building’ cases (55%).  
Both schools and colleges (10%), and domestic sheds and garages (14%) also feature 
heavily.  It seems surprising that sheds and garages should be classed as non-
residential premises, given that they are both set within a residential environment.  
However, by definition, they are both premises that are not generally used for living 
in.  It is worth noting however, that a burgled garage with an adjoining door to a 
residential property will be classified as Burglary Dwelling House (BDH).   
 
Even though the remaining property types do not feature to as large an extent, we 
cannot deny the fact that premises such as fire stations (0.2%), hospitals (1.1%), rest 
homes (0.2%), building sites (0.8) and churches/ mosques (1.1%) still suffer from 
incidents of burglary.  It is through the study of the ‘burglary other building’ problem 
from the perspective of the West Midlands Police, and their investigation of such 
cases, that this research is able to provide an idea of just how widespread the problem 
is, and how many property types are affected. 
  
More importantly perhaps, given past domestic burglary research with its justifiable 
focus on victim effects, it can be seen that ‘non-residential burglary’ is not simply a 
case of crime against business, per se.  It is a popular misconception therefore to see 
‘burglary other building’ as a victimless crime against organisations rather than 
people.  This is important for two reasons.   
 
1) just because ‘the victim’ is business, it does not necessarily follow that any 
losses can be afforded.  Allied to this, it is not the case that ‘burglary other 
building’ does not affect people because, even within businesses, employee 
jobs and the company future may be at stake;   
2) it can be seen that residential properties are a ‘non-residential’ concern, with 
burglaries to both sheds and garages. Therefore, there will be what are 
generally recognised as ‘true victims’ of such crime.  The picture is therefore 
much more complicated, with a wider variety of targets and people affected. 
 
4.3.1 Generic property categories 
For the purposes of analysis, the twenty-eight property types have been condensed 
into seven generic categories.  These can be seen in Table 4.3.1 below. 
 
Type of property Frequency  Valid % 
Offices 830 12  
Shops 899 13  
Warehouse/ industrial 2076 30  
Residential environment 969 14  
School/ college 692 10  
Leisure facilities 623 9  
Other 830 12  
Total  6919 100.0  
Table 4.3.1 Condensed property types 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
 
The categories ‘office’, ‘shop’ and ‘school/college’ have remained the same.  The 
‘warehouse’ and ‘industrial’ burglary cases have been combined to account for 30% 
of all incidents, whilst the ‘residential environment’ category now includes both sheds 
and garages, so accounting for 14% of all incidents.  The largest grouping has 
occurred within the ‘leisure facilities’ category, which now includes such property 
types as pubs, clubs, cinemas, sporting venues and restaurants.  This grouping seemed 
appropriate, as there were many various types of leisure/ social premises that, 
individually, did not account for much of the total, but as a group, account for 9% of 
the total. 
 
The remaining property types have been categorised as ‘other’, both because of their 
small numbers, and difficulty in categorising those premises appropriately.  This 
category now accounts for 12% of the total. 
 
4.4 Influences on non-residential burglary 
 
There are two inherent considerations that need to be taken into account when bearing 
in mind police activities and gauging the influence of the differing non-residential 
environments. 
 
1) predictable levels of occupancy;   
Many non-residential burglary targets are situated in areas that will not be 
routinely occupied after 7.00 p.m. in the evening, or during the weekend 
period.  This will mean that at predictable times of both the daily and the 
weekly period, it is a reasonable assumption that the majority of premises 
considered here would have neither owners nor members of staff on the 
premises. 
2) location of site; 
Some property types such as schools, and factories or warehouses on 
industrial estates, would be located away from areas generally considered to 
have good surveillability, such as residential areas.  Such targets will offer 
better opportunities for a burglar to commit the offence unobserved, and leave 
the scene unobserved.  Given previous research concerning both the risks of 
being observed (Bennett and Wright 1984) and building location (Hope 1986), 
these features of the environment are important considerations.   
 
Both of the above will influence the availability of witnesses from the time of the 
offence, and are therefore likely to have an important bearing on both the amount and 
quality of suspect evidence and other information.  It also follows that certain 
environments will afford better escape opportunities for the offender.  At a more 
fundamental level, it can also effect the alerting of the offence, with the more isolated 
properties affording fewer opportunities for the offender to be seen, and so necessarily 
being more reliant on alarm systems. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
It becomes clear from the above that there is great variation in the targets chosen by 
burglars, and that is somewhat naïve to see ‘Burglary Other Building’ as a problem 
that affects only business premises, or certain types of business premises. 
 
Given the types of property seen to be targeted, especially residential buildings, it is 
misleading to view ‘non-residential burglary’ as a ‘victimless crime’, and one that 
does not have an effect on people.  This classification of crime also effects many 
businesses, and could well result in the loss of business or jobs for the victim.   
 
Although previous studies have given some indication of the problems faced, their 
outlook has been limited both by the study of specific business premises and the 
failure to recognise that it is not only business concerns that can suffer.  This study 
highlights the fact that almost every type of premises can fall prey to burglary, and the 
variety of these targets can play a role in the way the police deal with such crimes.  
Given that the majority of premises involved in this study will be unoccupied at 
predictable times, it is useful to understand any influence associated with the different 
environments.  
 
As will be shown in following chapters, these influences may exert subtle control 
throughout the whole burglary investigation process, from the type of alert received, 
through the police response allocated, to the collection of any evidence at the scene 
and the detection of such cases.  It is therefore essential to appreciate the extent and 
variety of the premises that suffer from ‘non-residential burglary’, and any effects that 
these differing environments may have on any successful apprehension of burglars. 
5. INITIAL REPORT AND POLICE RESPONSE 
5.1 Summary 
The largest number of burglaries were reported to the police at the beginning of the 
week, mainly in the mornings, and by someone from within the burgled premises.  
Neighbours or witnesses/ passers-by were also responsible for a number of alerts, 
with 2.9% of these incidents reported as the burglary was taking place, indicating the 
modest role of the general public in helping the police to tackle crime. 
 
Alerts attributable to alarms were especially important for more isolated buildings 
such as school and colleges, whilst external individuals reported more burglaries in 
‘people rich’ environments.  Victims themselves most often called the during working 
hours, whilst alarm and witness reports were responsible for the greater majority of 
alert calls to the police later at night and early in the morning.  It is clear however, 
that commercial and industrial premises and public facilities rely for much of the 
reporting of burglars committed outside of business hours on members of the public, 
whilst alarm activations also play a significant role in alerting the police. 
 
The majority of incidents were dealt with as non-emergencies, though a significant 
proportion of all burglary incidents were emergencies reported whilst ‘in progress’, 
and would appear to offer the best opportunities for successful detection of the 
offence through catching the offender at or near the burglary scene at the time of the 
incident.  This is reflected in the strength and speed of response given to ‘immediate 
response’ gradings.  A large minority of emergency incidents were also designated by 
the police as ‘earlies’, at which, evidence was available and likely to lead to the arrest 
of an offender. 
 
Whilst single police units, most often panda mobiles, dealt with routine cases, foot 
patrols tended to complement this function in town centres, whilst an average 3.3 
patrols responded to calls for immediate assistance at ‘in progress’ burglaries, using 
larger proportions of faster response zulu units.  At early response incidents an 
average two police units attended.  Since most patrols were crewed by either one or 
two officers, the bulk of routine incidents involved either one or two officers, whilst 
an average 5.5 officers attended each ‘in progress’ alert.    
 The time taken to respond to burglary alerts also varied between the three incident 
responses, with immediate responses receiving the fastest response and routine 
responses the slowest.  These overall response times depend on pre-travel time during 
which the alert is processed, actual travel time, and the distance travelled by units. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
The following chapter examines, on a general level, when and how the police are 
made aware of burglary incidents, and the ways that the police can and do respond, 
including the screening criteria attributed to those non-emergency incidents.  The 
understanding of the various routes from which the alert is made and when it is made 
are essential, as both exert an influence over how the police initially attack the report 
of a burglary.  As such, the speed, strength, vehicle type and manning levels of any 
police response will be directly affected. 
 
The method of alert also exerts an influence over the availability of information to the 
police at the time of their response, and so has a distinct effect on the chances of an 
arrest being made, primarily at the time of the incident, but also at a later date as a 
result of any witness information available.  Chapter 6 considers the specifics of those 
emergency incidents where arrests were made, whilst chapter 7 considers, amongst 
other aspects of the investigation process, the value of witness information. 
 
Essentially, it will be seen that the strength and speed of any police response depends 
upon: 
 
whether the burglary can be graded as a ‘non-emergency’;  
whether the incident can be dealt with over the telephone; 
whether the incident satisfies ‘early response’ grading criteria; 
whether the burglary is reported as ‘in progress’.       
 
5.3 Answering the alert 
There are four different ways in which the police can respond once an alert has been 
received: 
 Non-emergency incidents: 
1) Crime Bureau; no attendance; deal with all non-emergency calls; ascertain if 
attendance required through ‘telephone investigation’; 
2) Routine Response; ascertained line of enquiry; attend within 24 hours. 
 
Emergency incidents: 
1) Early response; protection of evidence likely to lead to an arrest; attend within 30 
minutes; 
2) Immediate Response; danger, offence ‘in progress’, offender in vicinity; attend 
within 10 minutes. 
 
The full breakdown of responses for the six-month data collection period can be seen 
in Figure 5.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Response gradings for the six month data collection period 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
 
How the police do actually respond is largely dependent upon the form of that initial 
alert, especially in terms of the availability of any information, and the timing of the 
alert.    Within this study, nine different types of alert were originally identified, and 
these have been appropriately condensed, with essentially four unique methods of 
alert; 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
919 
5205 
410 536 
crime bureau routine early immediate
1) alert from the burgled premises e.g. the injured party (IP) or staff member; 
2) alert from an individual external to the burgled premises e.g. a witness or passer-
by; 
3) alert from an alarm activation; 
4) police discovery of the burglary. 
 
The frequencies of these methods of alert, upon which data was available, can be seen 
in Table 5.3 below. 
 
Alert Method Frequency % 
Burgled premises 5702 82.6 
External burgled premises 644 9.3 
Alarm 469 6.8 
Police discovery 86 1.3 
TOTAL 6901 100 
 
Table 5.3 Condensed response directives 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
5.4 Non-emergency incidents 
All cases of ‘burglary other building’ that do not require an ‘immediate’ or ‘early’ 
response will be dealt with initially by the Crime Bureau, whose job it is to ascertain 
if a physical police attendance is required.  It is Police force policy to attend with a 
‘routine response’ grading (within 24 hrs) if any of the following criteria apply; 
 
1) a suspect may be identified; 
2) there may be a witness to the offence; 
3) a vehicle description/ registration number may be supplied; 
4) violence/ weapons have been used/ threatened; 
5) a person is considered vulnerable e.g. an elderly victim; 
6) a number of similar crimes have occurred in the area in a short space of time; 
7) SOCO, forensic, or other material evidence available e.g. CCTV; 
8) property is of high value, abandoned, or presents a danger to the public; 
9) unusual or significant M.O. (Modus Operandi); 
10) premises insecure or unattended by owner; 
11) unable to communicate due to language differences. 
 
5.4.1 Characteristics of non-emergency incidents 
The greater majority of alerts were raised by individuals from within the burgled 
premises (89%).  There were significantly more logged by the police at the beginning 
of the week (chi-sq=13.242, p=0.000) and especially in the morning, with over one 
third of incidents logged between 0700hrs and 1000hrs (chi-sq=102.418, p=0.000).  
Given the nature of the majority of the premises involved within this study this is to 
be expected because such premises will be mostly unoccupied at weekends, and so 
the burglary will tend to be discovered upon arrival at work at the beginning of the 
week, and reported by someone from within the burgled premises.  As such, the scene 
of the crime itself will tend to be ‘cold’ and is therefore more likely to be afforded a 
non-emergency response grading. 
 
On a more general level, working hours were also found to be influential, with 
significantly more alerts from individuals within the burgled premises during this time 
(chi-sq=101.136, p=0.000) and hence, an increased number of non-emergency 
responses (chi-sq=98.869, p=0.000).  If we assume that a generous working day might 
fall between the hours of 6.00 a.m. and 7.00 p.m., taking into account duties 
performed by cleaners, security etc before and after work, it can be seen in Table 
5.4.1 below that more responses occurred during the day, as one would expect, from 
contact by the IP/ employee. 
 
 Within business hours (0600-1900) 
Method of Alert Yes % No % 
DIR from IP/ employee 4972 87.2 730 12.8 
DIR from external 323 50.2 321 49.8 
DIR from alarm 63 13.4 406 86.6 
 
Table 5.4.1 Response directives during business hours 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
 
Conversely, outside of ‘normal’ working hours, significantly more responses occurred 
through alarm activations at the burgled premises and through external individuals 
(chi-sq=87.689, p=0.000).  This is expected given that very few business premises 
will be occupied outside working hours. 
 
5.4.2 Screening for police attendance 
Members of the crime bureau are responsible for the screening of non-emergency 
reports in order to decide if a police presence is required.  The following therefore 
considers criteria upon which cases may be filtered out purely for telephone 
investigation and those that warrant a police attendance. 
5.4.2.1 Was a suspect seen 
It was more likely that the police would attend if a possible suspect had been seen 
(chi-sq=8.456, p=0.004), with a routine attendance made in 99.4% of incidents in 
which a suspect was seen.  This is extremely good practice because, as will be shown 
in later chapters, there is an increased chance of a ‘primary detection’ when a suspect 
information is available, but there has been no arrest made at the time (chi-sq=14.147, 
p=0.000). 
5.4.2.2 IP/ Victim distress 
Telephone investigations were not conducted with anybody who was shaken, 
annoyed, angry or distraught.  In all cases, the victim’s level of distress was either 
calm or mildly upset.  This would tend to suggest that in cases where the distress of 
the victim was considered to be more serious, then a police attendance would be 
made. 
5.4.2.3 Useful information available 
There was an increased chance that a police attendance would be made when useful 
information was considered to be available (chi-sq=11.710, p=0.001).  There would 
also appear to be a tendency for a police attendance when there are several items of 
information available (chi-sq=4.695, p=0.060).  This is also good practice given that 
later chapters show the value of obtaining as much information from as many sources 
as possible. 
 
Overall, with the screening methods in place, it was found that a police attendance 
was made in 87.2% of cases, with the remainder being dealt with purely by way of 
telephone investigation. 
 
5.5 Emergency incidents 
 
All emergency (999) contacts will first go through the Force Control Room.  It is here 
that the first step in the filtering system occurs.  That is, the following criteria are 
applied to all contacts and a decision made as to whether an emergency response is 
warranted. 
 
An ‘early response’ grading will be merited if it can be ascertained that an early 
attendance would be of worth with regard to the ‘protection of evidence likely to lead 
to the arrest of an offender’.  As such, a police attendance will be required within 30 
minutes of the initial alert.  An ‘immediate response’ grading will be merited if it can 
be ascertained that any of the following criteria apply: 
 
1) there is a danger to life and limb; 
2) the offence is ongoing; 
3) the offender is still in the vicinity. 
 
Once the alert has been logged, it is then passed on to the DIR (Divisional 
Information Room) of the relevant OCU (Operational Command Unit).  It is at this 
stage that the amount of police resources available at the time of the alert, the form of 
the alert itself and the information available, will dictate the attendance level allocated 
to any emergency incident. 
  
It is essential to note however, that it is the prerogative of both the Force Control 
Room and the DIR operators to decide whether a report merits an emergency 
response.  If it is not deemed necessary at either stage, then the response will be 
downgraded to a non-emergency response and dealt with by the Crime Bureau/ Call 
Handlers.  
 
5.5.1 Characteristics of emergency incidents 
Unlike non-emergency incidents, the majority of emergency alerts were raised either 
by an individual external to the burgled premises (21.1%) or from an alarm activation 
(49.4%), and especially over the weekend period (chi-sq=21.954, p=0.000), with an 
average 57.2% of incidents dealt with as emergencies over this two day period.  
Sundays were particularly responsible for emergency incidents (chi-sq=13.582, 
p=0.000), accounting for almost one quarter of all emergencies logged (23.6%).  The 
majority of these emergency incidents were met with an immediate response grading 
(chi-sq=21.669, p=0.000).  These findings are of little surprise given that, as stated 
above, the majority of premises considered will be unoccupied during this period, and 
more so on Sundays.  As such, they will be especially reliant upon alarms and witness 
alerts.  Figure 5.5.1 displays the methods of alert for all emergency incidents upon 
which data was available. 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1 Method of alert for emergency incidents 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
 
During the weekday period, more emergencies occurred later on in the night and 
earlier in the mornings, though there were an increased number of emergency 
responses during rush hour periods, and especially between 1700-1800hrs (chi-
sq=3.986, p=0.046).  Such time periods are characterized by more general ‘traffic’, 
whether cars or people, on the streets and hence may mean more chance of any 
burglary being witnessed ‘in progress’.  However, this finding might suggest that 
burglars are aware of this busier period and use it precisely because the increased 
levels of ‘traffic’ might ease escape.  This may especially be the case if any attending 
police units have to contend with the increased congestion. 
 
This suggestion is borne out to some extent by the increased travel times displayed by 
the first attending unit during this time period, though the difference is not significant.  
During rush hour, the average travel time was 4.9 minutes (trimmed at 5%) compared 
to 4.0 minutes (trimmed at 5%) outside rush hour (M-W, p=0.182).  Police units are 
therefore taking longer to attend incidents during busier periods of the day. 
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5.6 Influences of property types on alert 
Significantly more residential shed and garage incidents (70.5%) were dealt with as 
non-emergencies (chi-sq=11.780, p=0.001), and especially by telephone investigation 
(58.3%) alone (chi-sq=30.922, p=0.000).  If the rationale behind making an 
attendance at non-emergency incidents is considered (availability of a promising line 
of enquiry) these findings make sense.  In most cases, sheds and garages are more 
likely to be dirty with few smooth surfaces (no SOCO evidence), entry can often be 
gained easily, and items stolen will rarely be of great value or can be easily resold i.e. 
not distinguishable.  As such, a physical response may often be wasted, unless the 
circumstances specifically dictate otherwise e.g. where a suspect is seen at the time of 
the incident.  In such cases however, the incident will be dealt with in another manner 
entirely.  Such incidents are covered in the following chapter. 
 
In contrast, more isolated premises such as warehouses/ industrial premises (chi-
sq=6.371, p=0.012) and schools (chi-sq=7.159, p=0.007) tended to receive fewer non-
emergency responses.  This was because both types of property, and especially 
schools, tended to result from alarm activations.  This is quite marked for schools, 
with almost three times as many alarm activations at schools/ colleges (chi-
sq=34.023, p=0.000) than there were at the remaining property types (40.8% and 
13.9% respectively).  
 
5.7 How the police respond 
Having considered the various methods by which the police can deal with non-
residential burglary, and the characteristics of the various incident types, the 
following considers those characteristics of the physical police attendance and the 
comparison between response types.   
 
The strength and speed of the police response depended on whether the burglary was 
considered to still be ‘in progress’ (immediate response) at the time of the report for 
those emergency incidents and whether the incident could be graded as a ‘non-
emergency’ routine response after having been screened by the crime bureau. 
 
 
5.7.1 Strength of police response 
 
 Routine Early Immediate 
Mean Tr mean Mean Tr mean Mean Tr mean 
No. of Units 1.05 1.00 2.53 2.36 3.44 3.29 
Officers 1.79 1.59 4.15 3.91 5.74 5.46 
 
Table 5.7.1 Breakdown of police strength by response 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.7.1 above, immediate responses afforded the strongest 
response by the police with routine responses affording the weakest.  Early responses 
sat between these two extremes. 
 
A police attendance was made by only a single unit in 95.4% of cases graded as 
‘routine response’, with the majority attended either by a single standard patrol 
mobile (panda) or foot patrol (86.3%).  There were no more than two officers in 
attendance in over 90% of such responses.  In comparison, early responses were 
found to be stronger, both in terms of the average number of officers and units in 
attendance, and in the use of faster and more ‘attack oriented’ vehicles such as zulus 
(fast response vehicles) and dog vans.  Unlike routine responses, zulus attended in 
50% of early incidents whilst dog patrols attended just under one third of incidents 
(30.3%).  Although there were instances of single unit attendances (37.9%), 
approximately one fifth of cases received either a two (22.7%) or three-unit response 
(18.2%), with up to seven officers in attendance. 
 
It is of little surprise to see a major shift in the pattern of the strength of response 
afforded to immediate response incidents, when compared to both routine and early 
response gradings.  The majority of incidents (87.2%) received up to a maximum of 5 
units, although incidents occurred where up to eleven units attended.  On average 3.4 
units were despatched (3.3 trimmed) to all immediate response gradings, with 5.7 
officers attending (5.5 trimmed).  The full breakdown for number of units attending 
can be seen in Figure 5.7.1a below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.1a Percentage of units in attendance at immediate response incidents 
 
It is clear from Figure 5.7.1b below however, that there are most definitely some 
incidents that appear to have ‘everything thrown at them’. 
 
Figure 5.7.1b Percentage of officers in attendance at immediate response incidents 
 
Needless to say, there was a significant increase in the number of faster and ‘attack 
oriented’ vehicles, with greater numbers of both zulu rapid response vehicles (chi-
sq=6.263, p=0.012) and dog vans (chi-sq=10.653, p=0.001) attending the scene of 
immediate response incidents.  Given the response remit with regard time to attend, it 
is of little surprise that there is an increase of zulus attending.  Likewise, given that 
the aim of an immediate response is primarily to try and catch an offender at or near 
the scene, then the increase in dog van attendances makes sense, both with regard to 
the trailing and chasing down of any offenders.  
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The other notable difference with immediate responses is that both the force 
helicopter (AO1) and personnel carriers were also used in some instances.  Although 
not used to a great extent, (4.6% AO1, 4.1% carrier), it is notable that these units were 
not used in any of the other two response group categories.  This places further 
emphasis on the fact that ‘immediate response’ incidents require getting officers to 
the scene fast, and in as large a number as possible, with a view to the search/ trail 
and apprehension of those offenders, should they not be in the building upon arrival. 
 
5.7.2 Speed of police response 
 
 
 Routine Early Immediate 
Mean Tr mean Mean Tr Mean Mean Tr mean 
Pre-despatch 111.09 51.54 6.22 3.75 1.24 0.91 
Travel 21.53 18.81 6.75 5.83 3.84 3.47 
Total arrival 129.88 72.21 12.95 9.53 5.13 4.55 
 
Table 5.7.2 Figures for speed of police response 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.7.2 above, immediate responses also afforded the fastest 
response by the police with routine responses affording the slowest.  Once again, 
early responses sat between these two extremes though, given their response remit, 
they were more in line with immediate responses than routine responses. 
 
The mean pre-despatch time for routine response incidents was 52 minutes (trimmed 
at 5%), with one third of all units despatched within eight minutes of the report 
(33.6%) and just under two thirds despatched in approximately three-quarters of an 
hour (47 minutes).  Responding units were taking, on average, 19 minutes (trimmed at 
5%) in travel time to reach the incident, though half had a travel time of 11 minutes or 
less.  Three quarters of all units (75.6%) were taking less than 30 minutes to travel to 
the scene. 
 
The average pre-despatch time of the first unit for early response gradings was 
considerably less than those routine response incidents (3.8 minutes, trimmed at 5%), 
with almost 70% (68.3%) despatched within 3 minutes.  Needless to say, units were 
also taking less travel time (5.8 minutes, trimmed at 5%), with over three-quarters of 
all first units to arrive (76.8%) taking less than seven minutes to arrive at the scene 
once despatched.  This picture is fairly consistent across units, with approximately 
two thirds of first, second and third units having a travel time of 6 minutes or less. 
 
As one would expect, the emphasis with immediate responses is in getting to the 
scene as fast as is possible.  As such, the mean delay between report of the incident 
and the despatch of the first unit was 0.9 minutes (trimmed at 5%), with just over one 
quarter of units despatched without delay (26.2%) and 82.7% of units despatched 
within one minute.  This is considerably faster than either of the other two responses.  
The full breakdown for first unit despatch times can be seen in Figure 5.7.2a below. 
Figure 5.7.2a Pre despatch times of first units at ‘immediate response’ incidents 
 
As expected, this urgency is reflected in the time taken to reach the scene once 
despatched, with a mean travel time for the first unit to arrive at the scene of 3.5 
minutes (trimmed at 5%).  These figures compare to a mean travel time of 4.62 
minutes (trimmed at 5%) for the second unit to arrive, and 6 minutes (trimmed at 5%) 
for the third unit to arrive.  Overall, it was found that just fewer than 90% of all first 
units to arrive at the scene of immediate incidents (88.7%) did so within seven 
minutes.   
 
Given the above, it was found that the average response time from alert to arrival was 
4.6 minutes (timed at 5%) for all immediate response gradings.  Figure 5.7.2b below 
shows the total response times for 95.8% of all immediate response gradings.  As can 
be seen, over three-quarters of all immediate responses (76.5%) had a first unit 
arriving at the scene within six minutes of the initial burglary alert.  The larger 
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proportion of this was taken up between the two and five minute boundaries, with just 
over two-thirds (66.9%) of first units arriving within 5 minutes of the initial alert. 
Figure 5.7.2b Total response times for ‘immediate response’ gradings 
 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
It is clear that there are distinct variations in the mode and timing of the alert and 
hence, variations in how the alert will be treated by the police.  These findings sit 
quite nicely with the considerations made with regard to property types, both in this 
and the previous chapter, in so far as predictable levels of occupancy and site location 
and surveillability are clearly important, and intimately linked with these timings and 
methods of alert.  It is largely within this context that we have to consider how the 
police response varies and how the timing and method of alert, influenced by the 
environment, impacts the method and success of any police response. 
 
Essentially, five generic conclusions can be drawn from the above findings. 
 
1) the majority of police alerts come from within the burgled premises during 
business hours,  especially mid-morning at beginning of week; 
2) outside of business hours, external individuals (neighbours / passers-by) and 
especially alarms are largely responsible for police alerts; 
3) external individuals are more influential in raising alerts in people rich 
environments whilst alarms were of noted importance on more isolated 
property types;   
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4) alerts from witnesses and alarms are more likely to be met with emergency 
response as they will tend to be more indicative of a burglary in progress; 
5) the mode of alert, timing of the alert, and environmental characteristics are all 
intimately related and will largely dictate how the police can and do respond. 
 
Having considered the various ways in which the police do respond, the following 
chapter will therefore look at specific influences upon, and differences between, the 
response characteristics of those incidents where there is the greatest scope for the 
primary detection of ‘Burglary Other Building’ incidents.  That is, those emergency 
incidents where there is the best chance of apprehending an offender, either at or near 
to the scene of the burglary, at the time of the incident. 
 
6. CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSES WHERE 
ARRESTS WERE MADE 
 
6.1 Summary 
35.9% of all detections considered within this study were directly attributable to the 
apprehension of the offender at the time of the incident, either at, or near to, the scene 
of the burglary itself.   
 
The majority (31.5%) of these cases involved direct police actions regarding 
attendance at emergency incidents, and the catching of the offender whilst either still 
on the premises, whilst leaving the premises, or immediately after the committing of 
the act at up to a mile or more from the scene.  The remaining incidents concerned 
those cases where either the IP themselves or a member of staff at the burgled 
premises apprehended the offender and called the police after the event. 
 
Successfully catching offenders at or near the scene was found to hinge upon a 
number of inter-related factors: 
 the strength of the police response; 
 the stage of the burglary when the offender was first seen; 
 who reported the burglary and the method of alert; 
 the nature of the burgled premises and the type of environment. 
 
The police were found to be particularly successful within residential environments 
when the alert had come from a witness who could supply pertinent information 
regarding the offence.  This is largely a reflection of the nature of such people rich 
environments that often afford better surveillability and, therefore, offer greater 
potential for an individual to witness the act. 
 
When a suspect was seen, the chance of an arrest was greatly increased, especially if 
they were seen at an earlier stage of the burglary, and this in turn affected where the 
police caught the offender.  The earlier the burglar was seen, the greater the chance of 
catching the offender in the act, whilst the later the burglar was seen, the greater the 
chance of catching the burglar near to the scene, when a stronger police response is 
required.  The police were found to respond accordingly, sending more officers and 
units to the scene of those incidents where suspects had been seen.  No advantages 
were found however with regard to the use of either single or double manned Panda 
or Zulu units. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
Previous studies have highlighted findings concerning the rapidity of the police 
response to crime.  The majority of these studies have found that in only a minority of 
cases (Clarke and Hough 1984, cite 3%) did a fast police response have any impact.  
Further to this, even where a rapid response was found to be beneficial, other factors 
have been shown to be critical in determining that rapid response (Pate et al 1976).  
However, even though a fast attendance does not, in its own right, influence the 
primary detection of cases, a rapid response still contributes significantly to the 
apprehension of offenders.  Burrows (1986) attributed forty three per cent of all 
primary detections at ‘in progress’ incidents to a fast response, with thirty per cent 
directly attributable to catching the offenders on the act.  Although not quite reflecting 
these figures, this study did, nonetheless, show that over one-third of all primary 
detections were attributable to catching the offender at or near to the scene and 
highlights the importance of a rapid response.  Nevertheless, other characteristics of 
the crime itself (especially the availability of witness evidence) and police response 
were found to be instrumental in influencing the success or failure of any single 
police response to emergency incidents. 
 
This chapter therefore explores those features of the police response that impact upon 
offenders being arrested either at or near the scene at the time of the incident, 
including those cases where the suspect had been detained prior to police arrival.  
Furthermore, it identifies those factors that are considered as being outside of the 
direct control of the police but yet influence the success, or lack of, apprehending a 
suspect.   
 
The identification of those influential aspects of both the burglary act and police 
practices, that have the most favourable impact on apprehending burglars, is 
particularly useful.  It is important to identify the types of incident where a strong and 
more rapid response would be most productive, so that police resources can be 
utilised to their best potential, and so improve the chances of making an arrest whilst 
not wasting resources.  The staffing of patrols and the type of vehicles responding are 
also considered, as these aspects of the response can have significant resource 
implications.  The following therefore considers aspects of the police response and the 
characteristics of the incident to look in detail at those non-residential burglary 
incidents treated as emergencies. 
  
6.3 ‘Immediate ‘in progress’ Response’ incidents 
Arrests were made at the time of the incident in 139 cases out of the 218 sample 
incidents that received an ‘immediate response’ grading (on which we have data).  
These consist of 38.1% where the suspect/s was caught in the act, 53.2% where a 
suspect/s was caught at or near the scene, and 8.6% where the suspect/s was 
apprehended one mile or more from the scene.  With regard to the definition of at or 
near the scene, all arrests made up to one mile from the scene and not caught in the 
act (CIA) have been placed within this category.   
 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of response times and strength, including foot patrols.  
Foot patrols were the first police unit to arrive at the scene in just 5.1% of ‘immediate 
response’ incidents. 
 
 ARREST NO ARREST 
 mean Tr mean mean Tr mean 
Units 3.68 3.54 3.03 2.86 
Officers 6.18 5.91 4.96 4.67 
Pre-despatch 1.52 1.06 1.07 0.97 
Travel 3.81 3.41 4.06 3.67 
Total arrival 5.24 4.51 5.02 4.63 
Distance 0.78 0.72 1.18 1.12 
Table 6.3 Overview of essential ‘immediate response’ figures 
6.3.1 Response times and number of officers attending 
There were no significant differences in response times of the first arriving unit when 
an arrest was made at the time (4.5 minutes, trimmed at 5%) compared to cases where 
no arrest was made at the time (4.6 minutes, trimmed at 5%) (M-W, p=0.420).  This 
would largely appear to support the findings of previous studies (Clarke and Hough 
1984).  Figure 6.3.1a below shows the full breakdown of response times for incidents 
where arrests were made and where no arrests made. 
 
Figure 6.3.1a Total response times at ‘in progress’ incidents 
 
N.B. The chart covers responses made within the first ten minutes only as, in all cases, over 90% of first units had arrived within 
this time. 
 
There were a larger number of responses made within three minutes when an arrest 
was made (41.9% compared to 34.4%), and just over twice as many units with a 
response time of one minute or less when an arrest was made (13.3% compared to 
6.6%).  However, these differences were not found to be significant.  Further to this, 
no significant differences were found between the time taken by the first police unit to 
attend and whether the offender was caught in the act (CIA) or not (M-W, p=0.990, t-
test, p=0.611).  In fact, the CIA response times were slightly slower than the non-CIA 
response times (4.59 minutes compared to 4.44 minutes) when trimmed. 
 
These overall response timings are reflected in both pre-despatch and travel times for 
the first units, with the majority despatched within one minute and arriving in less 
than four minutes.  Even though almost twice as many units had travel times of 0.5 
minutes where an arrest was made, in comparison to those incidents where no arrest 
was made (15.1% and 8.1% respectively), this difference was not found to be 
significant (M-W, p=0.573, t-test, p=0.466).  Therefore, although underlining the 
contribution of a particularly rapid response on success, it is not predictive, in its own 
right, of an arrest being made at the time of the incident. 
 
There were more officers in attendance when an arrest was made (5.9, trimmed at 
5%) when compared to those cases where no arrest was made (4.7, trimmed at 5%) 
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(M-W, p=0.001).  As such, it is of little surprise that more units were in attendance at 
those incidents where arrests were made (3.5, trimmed at 5%) compared to where the 
offender evaded apprehension (2.9, trimmed at 5%) (M-W, p=0.008).  Figure 6.3.1b 
below displays the spread of numbers for officer attendance. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.1b Number of officers in attendance when arrest made 
 
N.B. The chart covers the frequency of officers up to a maximum of ten for both arresting and non-arresting incidents, as the 
number of incidents receiving more than this number of officers is negligible. 
 
Somewhat counter intuitively however, is the finding that there tended to be fewer 
officers and units in attendance when an offender was caught in the act (5.3 officers, 
3.1 units, trimmed at 5%) compared to those cases where an offender was not caught 
in the act (6.3 officers, 3.8 units, trimmed at 5%) (M-W, p=0.008, t-test, p=0.011 for 
officers, M-W, p=0.001, t-test, p=0.001 for units). 
 
Although these findings do at first appear to be counterintuitive, when taken in the 
context of the above CIA response timings, some sense can be found.  Once an 
offender has left the premises, the opportunities for making an arrest are greatly 
decreased as the area requiring police focus increases.  As such, a quicker and more 
thorough response would be required to restrict the offenders’ movement, as much as 
possible, away from the property.  In short, the faster and stronger the response, the 
more chance of limiting the escape radius surrounding the burgled premises that the 
offender has at their disposal.  As will be shown later in this chapter, apprehension 
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away from the scene is also heavily reliant upon the availability of witness 
information.   
6.3.2 Distance of first arriving unit from scene 
Two methods of measuring distance were calculated where data was available, 
between the location of the patrols prior to despatch, and the location of the burgled 
property.   
 
The first estimate was calculated along a straight-line (crow-fly) distance between the 
location of the police unit when they were notified of the incident, and the location of 
the property.  The second measure was estimated along what appeared to be the most 
direct route using recognised roads.  There was found to be a strong positive 
correlation between these two measures (pearson=0.984, p=0.000, spearman=0.986, 
p=0.000).  This would suggest that the police response, in the main, was not deviating 
too greatly from a straight line route to the scene. 
 
More arrests were made at the time of the incident when the first police unit to arrive 
had a shorter straight-line distance to the scene from its point of despatch (M-W, 
p=0.038).  The first unit to arrive had an average travelling distance of 0.72 miles 
(trimmed at 5%) when arrests were made, compared to 1.12 miles (trimmed at 5%) at 
those incidents where no arrest was made at the time.  The majority of all first units 
travelled no further than 2.5 miles, with more first units at arresting incidents 
responding from closer to the scene across all distance categories.  Table 6.3.2a below 
displays pertinent information. 
 
 Cumulative % units travelling from within 
distance 
First unit distance (miles) Arrest No arrest 
0.25 28.2 11.4 
0.50 42.3 28.6 
0.75 57.7 48.6 
1.00 74.6 57.1 
2.00 93.0 74.3 
 
Table 6.3.2a Distance from scene of first arriving unit when arrest made 
 
No significant differences were found, however, in the straight-line distance travelled 
by the first unit to arrive at the scene and whether the suspect was CIA or not (M-W, 
p=0.164, t-test, p=0.079).  Although more first units to arrive at CIA incidents were 
travelling in from closer to the scene of the incident across all distance boundaries, 
with almost twice as many first units attending a CIA incident travelling from within 
0.25 miles, this difference was not found to be significant (chi-sq=3.403, p=0.065).  
The frequency breakdown of first unit distances to CIA and non-CIA incidents can be 
seen in Table 6.3.2b. 
 
 Cumulative % units travelling from within 
distance 
First unit distance (miles) CIA No CIA 
0.25 40.7 20.5 
0.50 48.1 36.4 
0.75 66.7 52.3 
1.00 81.5 70.5 
2.00 96.3 90.9 
 
Table 6.3.2b Distance from scene of first arriving unit when offender CIA 
 
In short, there was an increased chance of an arrest being made when the first unit to 
attend responded from closer, but it did not influence where the suspect would be 
apprehended even though more first units at CIA incidents were travelling less 
distance to reach the scene of the burglary. 
6.3.3 Officer knowledge of patrol area and route to scene 
There was not an increased chance of an arrest being made if the officers in the first 
attending units had either a good or very good knowledge of his/ her patrol area (chi-
sq=3.534, p=0.060) or if the officer had better knowledge of the route to the scene 
(chi-sq=1.515, p=0.181).  Tables 6.3.3a and 6.3.3b below provide information on all 
responses regarding officer knowledge. 
 
Area patrol knowledge  Suspects arrested at time 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
Poor 5.1 4.2 
Satisfactory 23.9 12.7 
Good 34.2 36.6 
Very good 36.8 46.5 
Total 117/ 100% 71/ 100% 
 
Table 6.3.3a Influence on arrests of officer knowledge of patrol area 
 
 
Route knowledge Suspects arrested at time 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
Very poor 2.6 5.9 
Poor 1.7 2.9 
Satisfactory 27 13.2 
Good 27 26.5 
Very good 41.7 51.5 
Total 115/ 100% 68/ 100% 
Table 6.3.3b Influence on arrests of officer knowledge of route to scene 
 
6.4 Characteristics of immediate response incidents outside of police control 
The following need to be considered as they are integral to the way any single 
incident may unfold and, consequently, play an extremely important role in the 
apprehension of suspects at ‘in progress’ burglary other building incidents.  It will 
become clear that, rather than being able to see each of these elements as solitary 
influences, they are all, in fact, intimately linked.  The following section therefore 
deals with how the alert was raised, whether any suspects were seen and where, the 
availability of information and the influences that the various environments may have 
on these factors. 
6.4.1 Alert method and source of information 
A suspect was seen in 55.9% of all immediate response incidents, with the greater 
majority seen either entering (38.8%), inside (26.7%) or leaving (24.8%) the premises 
and arrests were made at the time of the incident in over one-third of all such cases 
(37%).  This compares to the 5.1% of cases where an arrest was made but no suspects 
were seen.  There was an increased chance of an arrest being made at the time of the 
incident if a suspect was seen (chi-sq=58.136, p=0.000 one tail) and the alert had 
come from an individual external to the burgled premises i.e. a witness (chi-
sq=16.657, p=0.000), with arrests made in 45.1% of cases where the alert came via 
this route.   
 
These findings would make sense given that a witness may well be able to provide 
information regarding offender direction and descriptions if they are clearly visible as 
well as providing notification of the offence.  As such, more information is likely to 
be available to the police with regard to identifying features of the offence and the 
offender.  
This suggestion is reinforced by the finding that the major source of any information 
cited when arrests were made was an ‘individual external to the burgled premises’.  In 
only 39.1% of cases, did the information come from ‘an individual linked to the 
burgled premises’.  Further to this, it was found that the most common information 
available to the police was an offender description and offender direction. Table 6.4.1 
below shows the full breakdown of information cited as aiding the arrest.   Attending 
officers cited the use of prior information as aiding the arrest in 54.3% off the 139 
cases where arrests were made at ‘in progress’ incidents. 
 
INFORMATION Frequency % Incidents 
Offender description 51 68.0 
Vehicle description 4 5.3 
Offender direction 23 30.7 
Surveillance 2 2.7 
LIO package 2 2.7 
IP/ staff detention 12 16.0 
Identity information 8 10.7 
Table 6.4.1 Information used in aiding arrest 
(LIO: Local Intelligence officer;  IP: Injured Party/ Victim) 
N.B. The frequency totals and percentage totals do not add up to either the seventy-five cases where information 
aided the arrest, or up to 100% of incidents.  This is due to the fact that, as one would expect, combinations of factors 
were used at times in the arrest of any single offender. 
 
Conversely, there were notably fewer arrests made (10.9%) at the time of the incident 
when the alert came from alarm activations (chi-sq=33.807, p=0.000).  Given the 
above, it is reasonable to assume that this is primarily the result of a lack of 
information over and above the initial notification of an offence. 
6.4.2 Influence of property type 
There were significantly more suspects arrested at the time of the incident when the 
burgled property was within a residential environment i.e. sheds and garages (chi-
sq=14.117, p=0.000).  In fact, of those immediate responses within a residential 
environment, arrests were made in 80.8% of cases.  This finding is reflected in the 
availability of information across all of the more ‘people rich’ environments.  The 
more isolated facilities such as schools/ colleges (40%) and warehouse/ industrial 
(43.5%) premises all had a significantly reduced number of incidents where 
information aided the arrest of a suspect (chi-sq=8.126, p=0.004).  This compares to 
an average 69.3% of incidents where prior information aided the arrest either within 
more people rich environments such as town centres or residential areas. 
6.4.3 Where seen, where caught and availability of information 
Where the suspect is first seen also impacts on whether there is an increased chance of 
arrest.  Although there are several categories available for where the suspect was first 
seen, it is only where they were seen either entering or inside the building that there is 
an increased chance of an arrest being made at the time of the incident (chi-sq=8.028, 
p=0.005 one tail), and an improved chance of catching the suspect in the act (chi-
sq=10.059, p=0.001 one tail).  Conversely, there was a reduced chance of an arrest 
being made if the suspects were first seen near to or leaving the scene (chi-sq=3.785, 
p=0.042 one tail), with arrests made in 23.8% of such incidents (compared to 36.7%).   
 
These findings have to be disentangled from the particular nuances of the provision of 
information by witnesses, where available information really became useful once the 
offender had left the premises.   
 
If the police fail to apprehend the offender whilst on the premises, the chances of 
arrest are reduced unless pertinent information can be provided.  This was indeed 
established, with the finding that an alert from an individual did in fact increase the 
chance of an arrest being made near to the scene at the time of the incident (chi-
sq=7.099, p=0.008) upon provision of an offender description and direction 
information (chi-sq=6.502, p=0.011).  This would seem to corroborate the earlier 
suggestions that the truth worth of witness information comes into play once the 
offender has left the scene, when description and offender direction information 
become more relevant, and more information is required for a successful arrest.  The 
findings concerning the lack of success for alarm activations would appear to 
reinforce this suggestion. 
6.4.4 Tailoring of police response when suspects seen 
It has become clear from the above that witness information and associated 
descriptions are extremely influential in the apprehension of offenders.  As such, it is 
essential to understand whether the police do respond accordingly, by tailoring the 
response to those cases where the chances of securing a primary detection are 
increased.  This was found to be the case. 
 
Significantly more officers and units attended those immediate incidents where a 
suspect was seen (5.9 officers, 3.5 units, trimmed at 5%) when compared to those 
incidents where no suspect was seen (4.2 officers, 2.7 units, trimmed at 5%) (M-W, 
p=0.000, t-test, p=0.000 for officers, M-W, p=0.004, t-test, p=0.005 for units).  The 
breakdown of the percentages of officers in attendance can be seen in Figure 6.4.4 
below.  
Figure 6.4.4 Number of officers attending when suspect seen 
N.B.  The chart covers up to ten officers only as the number of cases receiving more than ten is minimal. 
 
6.4.5 The influence of Day/ Night operation 
Data was collected concerning the times of sunrise and sunset for each incident that 
occurred during the data collection period.  This was then matched with the despatch 
and arrival times of the first police unit to arrive at the scene.  As such, we have three 
distinct categories of operation. 
 
1) operating during daylight ‘sun up’; 
2) operating during darkness ‘sun down’; 
3) crossover period (operating within the transition between day and night).   
 
There was a significant improvement in the success rate at immediate response 
incidents when the first unit to arrive was operating during ‘sun up’ (chi-sq=5.274, 
p=0.015 one tail), with Arrests made in 31.8% of incidents.  This is in comparison to 
20.3% of incidents in which the first unit to arrive was operating after the sun had set. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 off 2 off 3 off 4 off 5 off 6 off 7 off 8 off 9 off 10 off
% 
suspect seen no suspect seen
6.4.6 Section summary 
The availability of witnesses and witness evidence is clearly extremely influential in 
the way the police are able to approach any single immediate response burglary 
incident.  In short, people rich environments are likely to show an increased chance of 
arrests primarily because there is likely to be an increased chance of available 
witnesses and hence, an increased opportunity of useful information being provided.  
As such, this combination of incident features proves to be successful, especially if 
the offender is seen at an earlier stage in the burglary proceedings.  However, even if 
the offender is seen later in the burglary proceedings, the availability of witness 
descriptions still greatly improves the chances of an arrest being made further away 
from the scene.   
 
Given the significant role of witnesses, and the increased capacity for making an 
arrest, the police do respond accordingly, both when witness evidence is available and 
according to the stage in the burglary at which the offender is seen.  The response is 
therefore stronger when witness evidence is available and even stronger when that 
evidence suggests the offender has left the scene.  This necessarily dictates that an 
appropriate response is required to restrict the offenders escape options. 
 
6.5 Other incidents where arrests were made 
There were a total of twenty-one incidents in which either the injured party (IP) or a 
member of staff caught the burglar at the premises prior to notifying the police.  Nine 
of these cases were graded as ‘early response’ (‘attend within thirty minutes’) whilst 
the remaining twelve were graded as ‘immediate response’ (‘attend within ten 
minutes’).  In addition, there were a further twenty-one ‘early response’ incidents at 
which the police alone made the arrest. 
  
There was a significantly increased chance of IP/ staff catching burglars during 
working hours (chi-sq=3.867, p=0.049), with 66% of such incidents taking place 
between the hours of 6.00 a.m. and 7.00 p.m.  This is in direct contrast to the majority 
of emergency incidents which have already been shown to be concentrated between 
the hours of 8.00 p.m. and 5.00 a.m. (chi-sq=106.599, p=0.000).   
 
The speed of response given to those early incidents where the offender was already 
held did not differ significantly either from those cases early incidents where arrests 
were made by the police alone, (M-W, p=0.640), or those where no arrest was made 
at all (M-W, p= 0.604).  However, at those immediate response incidents where the 
burglar was detained prior to police arrival, the response times were faster (5.8 
minutes, trimmed at 5%) than corresponding early incidents (9.1 minutes, trimmed at 
5%), but still comparable to immediate responses as a whole (M-W, p=0.313). 
 
Response resourcing was clearly adjusted in such circumstances, with significantly 
fewer officers (M-W, p=0.003) and units (M-W, p=0.007) attending those ‘early 
response’ incidents where the offender was already held by a member of staff, when 
compared to those cases where the arrest was made solely by the police.  An average 
2.5 officers (trimmed at 5%) attended in 1.5 units (trimmed at 5%) when the offender 
was held, compared to an average 5.6 officers (trimmed at 5%) attending in 3.4 units 
(trimmed at 5%) when the police made the arrest in their own right.  These figures 
compare further to the response at non-arresting early response incidents where there 
were significantly fewer officers in attendance (M-W, p=0.043). 
 
With regard to those twelve ‘immediate response’ cases where the burglar was 
detained prior to police arrival, there was found to be more officers (3.2, trimmed at 
5%) and units (1.8, trimmed at 5%) in attendance than the early cases, but 
significantly fewer than comparable immediate response incidents where arrests were 
made (M-W, p=0.000).  Again, given that the offender is already detained, it seems 
fruitless to send a full strength immediate response to the scene, even though an 
appropriately fast response is afforded. 
 
6.6 Influence of arrival ranking of patrols on arrests 
As might be expected, patrols arriving earlier at the scene were especially successful 
in making the arrest.  The first arriving unit was responsible for 70.6% of arrests 
across all incidents when an arrest was made at the time of the incident, the second 
responsible for 15% and the third and fourth units responsible for a further tenth of 
cases where offenders were arrested.  Figure 6.6 shows the percentage of burglars 
caught by order of arrival of police unit. 
Figure 6.6 Arrival ranking of arresting patrols 
 
This pattern alters slightly with regard to where the offender was actually 
apprehended, though the findings are not surprising.  When the offender was CIA, the 
first car to arrive was responsible for just fewer than 80% of all arrests made (79.4%), 
with 11.1% attributable to the second unit and 6.3% to the third.  For those incidents 
where the offender was caught near to the scene, there was an increased number of 
second arriving units responsible for the arrest (17.8%), with a fifteen per cent 
reduction in the number of first arriving units responsible for making the arrest 
(64.4%).  Given that the offender has left the scene in these incidents, there would be 
an increased chance for later arriving units to make the arrest, largely depending upon 
the direction in which the offender has left the scene and the direction from which the 
police unit is arriving.  There was, however, no significantly increased chance of later 
arriving units apprehending more burglars after they had left the scene (M-W, 
p=0.123), nor was this influenced by the method of alert (chi-sq=1.36, p=0.28). 
 
6.7 Speed and strength of motorised police units 
The response times of foot patrols were comparable to those of motorised units, 
except within a town centre environment where they held a distinct speed advantage 
over vehicles.  That is, foot patrols attended on average in 3.3 minutes compared to 
7.7 minutes for motorised units.  Given the increasingly pedestrianised nature of 
many town centres this is of little surprise, given that access to anything other than a 
foot patrol would be restricted in many instances.  Therefore, in some town centre 
environments and under certain limited circumstances, it is likely that foot patrols 
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could prove a superior response method for some ‘Burglary other Building’ incidents.  
Due to the small number of cases involved however, it is not possible to test the above 
statistically. 
 
At the majority of burglary incidents where a vehicle was first to attend, the use of a 
motorised police unit was essential for the successful apprehension of the offender.  
The remainder of the chapter therefore deals specifically with the response of 
motorised police units, and the interactions that influence the police response. 
6.7.1 Number of units and response time 
The overall response time from alert to the arrival of the first attending motorised unit 
was found to be more rapid when there were more patrols in attendance (ANOVA, 
f=4.942, p=0.000), and this will inevitably hinge upon the availability of resources at 
the time of the alert.  This can be seen in Figure 6.7.1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7.1 Number of units responding by response time 
 
As can be seen, as the number of units despatched to the scene increases, so the total 
response time of the first attending unit is reduced, up to five units, where there is a 
small increase in the response time.  Response times of the first unit to attend ranged 
from an average six minutes when only a single unit was despatched down to an 
average 2.7 minutes when between six and nine units were despatched to the scene.  
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6.7.2 Number of units and distance travelled 
Just as the total number of motorised units despatched influenced the response time of 
the first unit to attend, so the distance travelled of the first unit to attend was affected, 
though not to a significant level (ANOVA, f=1.276, p=0.289).  That said however, a 
distinct trend emerges, whereby as the number of units despatched increases, so the 
straight-line travel distance of the first attending unit decreases.  This can be seen in 
Figure 6.7.2 below.  
 
Figure 6.7.2 Number of units responding by first unit distance 
 
In essence, when a single unit is despatched, the average straight-line travel distance 
of the first unit to attend is 1.44 miles compared to an average distance of 0.42 miles 
when between five and eight units are despatched to the scene.  As such, the first unit 
to attend is over two-thirds the distance closer if more than five units attend than 
when a single unit responds, or half the distance closer when either three or four units 
respond.  Given earlier findings, that the straight-line travel distance of the first 
arresting unit to attend is significantly shorter (M-W, p=0.038) in those cases where 
arrests are made (0.72 miles compared to 1.12 miles), the distance from the burglary 
scene of the first arriving patrol clearly exercises an important influence over the 
successful apprehension of the offender, as does the strength of response. 
6.7.3 Distance travelled and travel time and speed of first unit 
It is of little surprise to find that first units responding from closer to the scene of the 
burglary reached the scene faster than those units responding from further away 
(ANOVA, f=7.931, p=0.000).  Needless to say, as the travel distance of the first unit 
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to attend increased, so did the travel time of the unit.  This can best be seen in Figure 
6.7.3a. 
Figure 6.7.3a Response distance by response time 
 
Despite the above influence of distance exerted over travel times, these differences 
are not similarly reflected in the speed of the first unit to attend.  It can be seen in 
Figure 6.7.3b that the speeds of the first attending unit increase as their distance from 
the burglary scene increases. 
 
 
Figure 6.7.3b Response distance by speed 
 
This may at first seem somewhat puzzling, yet if a mobile police response is 
considered, these findings will make sense.  As it is the aim of an immediate response 
to attend the scene in as short a time as possible, it makes sense that mobile units will 
try to find the straightest and fastest routes between their point of despatch and the 
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scene of the burglary.  If the unit is attending from further away, this will entail longer 
stretches of straight road, encompassed by slower periods at both the start and end of 
the journey, when the unit will have to get to the main road, and then find the site 
upon arrival.  As such, when the first arriving unit is closer, much of the travel time 
will be taken up by these slower periods of the normal journey to the scene from the 
point of despatch, and inevitably involve less time on the faster main roads. 
6.7.4 Response time and arrest 
Although there was not found to be any significant differences in total response time 
and whether an arrest was made, primarily because at some incidents, later vehicles 
are making arrests, there is a definite trend visible regarding the response times of the 
first motorised unit to attend and the percentage of cases where offenders were 
arrested at or near the scene.  As can be seen in Figure 6.7.4 below, across all time 
boundaries, the longer the total response time of the first attending unit, the less the 
chance of apprehending the offender. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7.4 Response time by arrest 
 
6.7.5 Number of patrols and officers 
The number of patrols attending was found to be more important than, and somewhat 
independent of, the number of officers in influencing capture.  There is some evidence 
of this fact when looking at the differences between those incidents where a suspect 
was arrested and where no suspect was arrested.  The trend indicates that an increase 
in the number of cars in attendance improves the arrest rate (chi-sq=12.352, df=8, 
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p=0.136) over an increase in the number of officers in attendance (chi-sq=18.396, 
df=15, p=0.242). 
 
The true worth of this finding though is evident when looking at those incidents in 
which the offender was not CIA.  Regarding just these incidents, an increase in the 
number of cars attending significantly improved the chance of capture near to the 
scene as opposed to the offender making good their escape (chi-sq=14.821, df=7, 
p=0.038).  This is in contrast to an increasing number of officers, which failed to 
influence the arrest in similar cases (chi-sq=19.703, df=13, p=0.103).  This is best 
displayed in Table 0. 
 
No. cars arriving % Caught near 
scene 
% Escape 
2 11.8 60.0 
3 31.8 30.0 
4 38.6 24.1 
5 58.3 12.5 
Table 0 Effects of number of police cars on arrests 
 
6.8 Patrol type and manning levels 
6.8.1 Single officer versus two officer patrols 
There were twice as many two officer units as single officer units in attendance at all 
‘burglary other building’ incidents, though the double crewed units outnumbered the 
single crewed units 4:1 when looking at first arriving unit at the scene.  This is best 
displayed in Table 6.8.1a. 
 
 Order of arrival at scene (%) 
No. of officers 1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  4
th
  5
th
-9
th
  Total 
1 18 34 43 35 51 32 (188) 
2 78 61 55 62 47 65 (378) 
3 3 5 2 3 2 3 (19) 
Total 100/ 198 100/ 163 100/ 106 100/ 63 100/ 55 100 (585) 
Table 6.8.1a Manning levels of vehicles and arrival ranking 
 
At ‘in progress’ incidents, two officer vehicle units represented just under two thirds 
(63.9%) of all police patrols attending the scene of ‘non-residential burglary’ 
incidents, and were found to be the first attending unit in over three-quarters (77.9%) 
of all such incidents.  Further to this, two officer vehicles were responsible for the 
apprehension of the offender in 90% of incidents where it was the first unit to arrive 
that actually made the arrest either at, or near to, the scene of the burglary.  However, 
as will be shown, it is not simply the case for arguing that more two-officer vehicle 
units should be placed on patrol duties, as there are subtle interactions at work 
regarding both the type of unit involved, and the distances over which certain patrols 
will travel to reach the scene. 
 
Significant differences were found with regard to the influences of the number of 
officers in police patrols sent to the scene of ‘immediate response’ burglary incidents 
and the response timing categories (as opposed to total number of officers in 
attendance). 
 
Across all attending vehicle patrols, twin crewed units were found to have a faster 
overall response time in reaching the scene once the burglary alert had been made 
(ANOVA, f=16.461, p=0.000), with an average response time of 5.4 minutes 
compared to 6.7 minutes for single crewed units.  This is the result of both a tendency 
to be despatched faster (ANOVA, f=3.519, p=0.061) with an average pre-despatch 
time of 1.8 minutes compared to 2.2 minutes, and a significantly reduced travel time 
in reaching the scene (ANOVA, f=11.505, p=0.001).  That is, twin crewed units were 
one minute faster in reaching the scene, with an average travel time of 3.7 minutes 
compared to 4.7 minutes for single crewed units.   
 
However, this apparent advantage of twin crewed units reflects, as has been shown 
above, the larger number of two officer units on patrol.  This means that a two-officer 
unit is twice as likely to be the closest to the scene and so will tend to reach the scene 
first.  This is borne out by the above figures that show a twin crewed unit was four 
times more likely to arrive first at the scene, and also that it will be travelling in from 
significantly closer to the scene from its point of despatch (ANOVA, f=8.861, 
p=0.004).  Thus, when a twin crewed unit arrived first, it was travelling a mile less on 
average than a single crewed unit (1.1 miles compared to 2.3 miles respectively).   
 
Twin crewed units arriving first also had a shorter pre-despatch time (1.4 minutes) in 
comparison to single crewed units (1.8 minutes), but these were offset by a longer 
average travel time of 3.2 minutes compared to 2.6 minutes for the single crewed 
units.  As such, the total response times for the first attending units were not found to 
be significantly different (ANOVA, f=0.019, p=0.890) when looking at one and two 
officer influences.  Table 6.8.1b below shows all relevant timings for all units and for 
first arriving unit at the scene. 
 
ALL UNITS Pre-despatch Travel Total response Distance 
One officer 2.2 (mins) 4.7 6.7 1.6 (mile) 
Two officer 1.8 3.7 5.4 1.2 
 
FIRST UNIT Pre-despatch Travel Total response Distance 
One officer 1.8 2.6 4.4 2.3 
Two officer 1.4 3.2 4.4 1.1 
    
Table 6.8.1b Manning levels of vehicles and response times and distances 
6.8.2 Type of patrol unit 
 
The earlier arrival at the scene of twin crewed units was also partly attributable to the 
type of units in which officers were responding.  Almost half of the two-officer 
patrols responding were zulus (fast response vehicle), whilst virtually every single-
officer unit in attendance was a panda (routine patrol unit).  Because the zulu is a fast 
response vehicle, they will tend to be on uncommitted patrol unless engaged 
elsewhere on another emergency incident.  This means that they are able to attend 
almost immediately in the majority of cases, whereas panda units will tend to be tied 
up with ‘routine response’ incidents.  As such, zulu units reached the scene more 
quickly than panda units (ANOVA, f=6.654, p=0.010), with an average total response 
time almost one minute quicker than the panda units (4.9 minutes compared to 5.8 
minutes respectively).   
 
However, this is more a reflection of their tendency to be despatched to the scene 
faster than the panda units (ANOVA, f=3.275, p=0.071), with an average pre-
despatch time of 1.7 minutes compared to 2.0 minutes.  This is borne out by the 
values for the first arriving units at the scene, when again, there was a tendency for 
zulus to have been despatched faster (ANOVA, f=3.145, p=0.078) with an average 
pre-despatch of 1.3 minutes compare to 1.6 minutes for pandas.   
 
Once on the move however, there is very little difference between the travel times of 
pandas and zulus for all units attending (ANOVA, f=0.477, p=0.490) and first 
arriving units (ANOVA, f=0.253, p=0.616), even though the travel times of the zulus 
was slightly faster (3.5 minutes compared to 3.6 minutes).  This is partly a reflection 
of the distances from which each unit type travelled, where there is some indication 
that pandas tended to be travelling in from closer to the scene than the zulu units 
(ANOVA, f=3.072, p=0.082) (1.1 miles compared to 1.5 miles respectively).  The 
above findings are best displayed in Table 6.8.2a. 
 
ALL UNITS Pre-despatch Travel Total response Distance 
Panda 2.0 (mins) 3.6 5.8 1.1 (mile) 
Zulu 1.7 3.5 4.9 1.5 
 
FIRST UNIT Pre-despatch Travel Total response Distance 
Panda 1.6 3.1 4.5 1.0 
Zulu 1.3 3.3 4.6 1.4 
Table 6.8.2a Patrol type and response times and distances 
 
In essence, the above findings show that any advantage initially displayed by twin 
crewed units is offset by the predominance of twin crewed zulu units travelling to the 
scene of the immediate response burglaries from further out.   
 
Although this still equates to a faster pre-despatch time of 1.7 minutes for the twin 
crewed zulus compared to 2 minutes for twin crewed pandas (ANOVA, f=2.736, 
p=0.044), this advantage is not reflected in a significantly different overall response 
time (ANOVA, f=2.292, p= 0.078).  This finding is more pronounced for the first 
arriving units where twin zulus had an average total response time of 4.6 minutes and 
double pandas an average time of 4.5 minutes (ANOVA, f=0.052, p=0.984).  Again, 
this is due to the increased distance from which the twin crewed zulus are travelling in 
order to reach the scene first (ANOVA, 4.172, 0.009), with an average of 1.4 miles 
travelled compared to 1.0 miles for a twin panda.   
 
However, given that zulus are faster vehicles and are travelling in from further out, 
there is increased opportunity for travelling along a main road (as stated above).  As 
such, the twin crewed zulus did in fact show a 4 m.p.h. speed advantage over the twin 
crewed pandas, with average speeds of 23.6 m.p.h. and 19.4 m.p.h. respectively.  
Essentially though, once at the scene of the burglary, two officer units were found to 
be no more successful than single officer units in apprehending the offender, either in 
the act or at or near the scene (chi-sq=0.67, p=0.50).  The figures for first arriving one 
and two officer units and offenders apprehended can be seen in Table 6.8.2b. 
 
Patrol type Caught at scene Caught near scene Escaped Total % 
One officer 16 38 46 100 
Two officer 21 32 47 100 
Table 6.8.2b Influence of vehicle manning levels and arrests made 
 
Therefore, neither zulu units nor twin manned units displayed any intrinsic advantage 
in dealing with ‘immediate response’ incidents, offering no significant speed benefits 
at the distances from which the patrols had to respond in order to apprehend the 
offender.  Although some advantages were apparent, these were inevitably offset by a 
combination of distance and patrol type.  The greater success of twin manned units in 
arriving earlier at the scene and in apprehending more offenders is more due to the 
role allocated to two officer zulu units, and the decision to deploy more twin crewed 
units to the scene of ‘in progress’ non-residential burglary incidents than either single 
crewed units, or panda units, which will inevitably be tied up with routine incidents.  
As such, any benefits that may have been expected from the use of faster two manned 
units did not materialise. 
 
These findings largely contradict previous conclusions (Chelst 1981, Kaplan 1979) 
that found single officer patrols to be faster in response and have a lower waiting time 
for a free unit.  However, these earlier studies failed to consider the interactions 
between the types of vehicle in which the officers were placed, and the roles and 
responsibilities attributed to the use of each type of vehicle.  This study, in looking at 
these interactions goes some way to improving the body of research on one and two 
officer patrols.  
 
6.9 Discussion and policy implications 
36% of the detections within this study attributable to attending and investigating 
non-residential burglary cases were due to catching the burglar at or near the scene.  
26.5% of these arrests involved police patrols catching the offender either on the 
premises, while leaving them, or shortly afterwards mainly within one mile of the 
scene.  There were further cases (4.4%) where arrests were made at the time of the 
incident that involved the IP/ member of the burgled premises detaining the offender 
prior to police arrival.  A further 5% of incidents involved the arrest of a suspect 
shortly after the incident at the offender’s home after the provision of witness 
evidence.   
 
If the times taken from despatch to arrest, and despatch to giving up any searches 
made at the scene, with different numbers of officers are calculated, and related to the 
number of incidents where burglars were caught at or near to the scene, then the 
average time taken for a detection of this nature is 6.2 hours.  Therefore, detections 
resulting from arrests made at ‘in progress’ incidents proved to be particularly 
effective, despite the extra officers and units typically despatched to the scene of the 
incident. 
 
At incidents where the offender had not been previously detained, the successful 
catching of offenders at or near the scene primarily depended upon: 
 
  how quickly and in what numbers the police responded; 
  who reported the burglary or the method of alert; 
  offender behaviour: 
 the stage of the burglary when the offender was spotted; 
 the time of day that the burglary was committed; 
 whether the suspect was detained prior to police arrival. 
  characteristics of the environment: 
 surveillability of the target property; 
 type and location of the property itself.  
 
The likelihood of an arrest being made was, therefore, dependent on both the nature 
of the police response to the alert and also significantly affected by the characteristics 
of the incident itself, over which the police were unable to exercise any control. 
 
With regard to the nature of the police response, both numbers of units in attendance 
and response times played an important role in influencing whether an offender was 
caught or not, though a rapid response in its own right did not significantly improve 
the chances of apprehension.  More arrests were made when the police response was 
stronger, with 40% more burglars caught when three or more units attended than 
when there were fewer than three patrols.  Similarly, when units reached the scene in 
less than three minutes, there were a third more arrests made than when the response 
had taken over six minutes.   
 
However, this speed of response hinged on the number of patrols attending each 
incident, with a faster response occurring when more patrols were despatched to the 
site of any one burglary, which itself is a reflection of the number of units available to 
be despatched to the scene.  With more patrols available, the first arriving unit was 
just that, primarily because it was consequently closer to the scene, therefore it had a 
shorter travel distance and time, and was therefore more likely to make the arrest.  
Despite this influence on travel times, being closer to the scene did not result in such 
marked contrasts in total response times.  As a result, the number of patrols attending 
was proven to be more important than response times in determining which patrols 
made the arrest. 
 
The proportion of officers in single or double manned vehicles can also play an 
important role in the distance of the nearest patrol to the scene, whilst the numbers of 
pandas and zulus operating can also have an effect on response times.  However, any 
advantages displayed by either the two officer units or the faster zulus were inevitably 
offset by other factors which nullified any anticipated advantage.  As such, neither 
zulu or panda units had any advantage over the other in dealing with emergency 
incidents, with no speed advantages apparent from the distances from which these two 
patrol types operate.  Similarly, two officer units displayed no real advantages over 
the single officer units, primarily because of the role allocated to the use of two-
officer zulu patrols at immediate response incidents.  Perhaps most important 
however, once at or near the scene of the burglary, two officer units were no more 
successful than single officer units.  The findings of this study therefore contradict 
some of the earlier work conducted on the relative efficacy of one and two officer 
patrols (Chelst 1981, Green and Koselar 1984) that found one officer vehicles would 
provide quicker responses to ‘in progress’ incidents.  
       
So, despite the fact that a faster and stronger response proved to be more successful, it 
did not guarantee success.  This was because the characteristics of the burglary itself 
interacted with the deployment of police units in dictating which responses resulted in 
an arrest. 
   
Features of the burglary outside of the polices’ control such as the method and route 
of alert, the stage in the burglary at which the offender was spotted and a good 
description, all determined how long the police had to reach the scene of the incident.  
If the burglar was reported leaving or left quickly after an audible alarm, the police 
had little, if any, time to intercept them at the scene, so improving the chance of the 
offender escaping.  Similarly, if there was a poor description of a burglar leaving the 
scene, a strong and fast response may at times prove to be fruitless.  Burglary 
circumstances and the burglar’s behaviour therefore exerted an important influence 
over whether the police were successful or not.  Figure 6.9 best displays the 
interaction of factors involved in a successful, or otherwise, ‘in progress’ response. 
 
The above findings indicate that there is potential to catch more burglars at or near the 
scene, primarily by ensuring that sufficient patrols attend more often.  More 
specifically, where feasible, it is important that there is a level of patrol availability 
that would enable a unit to be located sufficiently close to the scene to get there 
quickly, particularly to catch offenders who have left the crime scene but are still in 
the vicinity.  It may therefore be useful to have a sufficient pool of uncommitted units 
available to ensure the required number is available to be despatched.  This may mean 
that, at times, units are not engaged in dealing with routine incidents and are 
apparently under-utilised. Alternatively, this might be achieved by prioritising the 
most promising immediate incidents, most notably, where witnesses are available and 
where the burglar is first seen entering or inside the premises. 
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Figure 6.9 Influencing features of emergency responses  
7. INTITIAL POLICE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED AT THE SCENE 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
Differences were found in the questioning of neighbours and other individuals, with 
more neighbours questioned when burglaries occurred within a residential 
environment.  However, neighbours were questioned less if the incident occurred at 
night, though there was no difference in the provision of useful evidence.   
 
Neighbours were questioned more if the police attended immediately at the end of the 
working day, as were other individuals.  Similar to the above however, this did not 
translate into increased information.  Although longer was spent on questioning when 
information was available, questioning more neighbours did not improve either the 
availability, or quality, of information.  There is some suggestion however, that the 
police do still continue to question neighbours in an effort to gain further information.   
 
Although MO evidence was not found to be available in many cases, it did still play a 
role in the detection of some cases, especially where the MO was indicative of a 
specific suspect.  SOCO attended fewer residential and warehouse/ industrial 
premises, mainly as a result of force policy or too much dirt, respectively. This feature 
meant that the latter were more likely to provide footwear evidence at the scene.  
However, there was found to be no significant reduction in the availability of 
evidence at residential properties, where police force policy is in action, in 
comparison to other property types.   
 
SOCO mainly collected fingerprint evidence, especially from those ‘people rich’ 
buildings such as schools and shops, whilst dirtier premises tended to provide more 
footwear evidence.  The most important evidence appeared to be that which could 
irrefutably identify a suspect such as fingerprint or DNA evidence, even though in the 
majority of cases SOCO evidence played a supporting role in the detection of any 
single case. 
 
7.2 Introduction 
 
The way the police respond to non-residential burglary can be split into a series of 
distinct processes: responses to emergency incidents, initial investigations, additional 
activities and follow up investigations.  This chapter therefore considers the initial 
investigations conducted at the scene.   
 
Part of the role fulfilled by the initial police visit to the scene of any ‘Burglary other 
Building’ incident is the questioning of the burglary victim and other people who may 
have been witness to the burglary.  This questioning is most often conducted in an 
effort to collect information and evidence that may aid in the detection of the offence.  
In addition, any Modus Operandi (MO) and forensic evidence e.g. fingerprint, 
footwear, will be collected by uniformed officers and Scenes of Crime Officers 
(SOCO). 
 
These initial police and SOCO activities at the scene are particularly important as they 
will often provide the best and, in all probability, only opportunity to collect any 
evidence that may enable the successful detection of the offence.  Previous studies 
have shown this to be the case, with Gill et al (1996) concluding that this initial stage 
of police investigation is the most important, since it is the primary source of 
information for subsequent investigations.  Further to this, Burrows and Tarling 
(1987) found that most of the available information in criminal investigations came 
from members of the public i.e. witnesses, and in the case of burglary, mostly from 
the victims themselves (Greenwood 1980). 
 
This chapter therefore considers the role of both the crime scene and activities 
conducted by the police and SOCO at the scene of the burglary, as it is evident that 
this initial visit plays an integral part in the investigation process. 
 
7.3 Importance of the Scene of the Burglary 
 
Figure 7.3 below shows the sources of evidence available in both those detected and 
undetected cases when no arrests were made.  The specifics of those cases where 
offenders were arrested at the time of the incident have been considered in the 
previous chapter. 
 
 
 Figure 7.3 Sources of evidence when no suspects arrested 
N.B. Figures from the above chart will not sum to 100% as most cases involved the use of a variety of sources of evidence. 
 
It is clear from the above that the burglary scene itself was found to be the most 
fruitful source of evidence, irrespective of whether the case was eventually filed 
‘detected’ or ‘undetected’.  Evidence was available from the scene in over half of all 
detected cases (51.2%), and in 42.2% of undetected cases.  This finding is not 
surprising given past research that has looked at sources of evidence in investigations.   
 
Several studies have drawn similar conclusions, finding that the scene is indeed the 
richest source of evidence and, as such, greater use should be made of this first visit to 
the scene (Greenwood et al 1977, Zander 1979).  However, there was not significantly 
more evidence from the scene available in those cases that were filed detected (chi-
sq=3.587, p=0.058), indicating that it is not simply the case for using availability of 
evidence at the crime scene as predictive of detections. 
 
The importance of the crime scene is further reinforced if the findings of Steer (1980) 
and Burrows (1986a) are considered, with both studies finding that a significant 
majority of crimes are cleared either from catching the offender at the scene or as a 
result of evidence acquired from the scene.  However, although studies have reviewed 
the more general sources of detections, few have considered the actual actions that 
take place at the scene and the individual sources of evidence and information. 
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7.4 Importance of time spent at the scene 
 
This study found that officers employed an average 2.32 investigative strategies in 
detected cases compared to an average 1.81 in undetected cases (t-test, p=0.001).  If 
those incidents where arrests were made at the time are removed, this picture remains 
the same.  It would appear then, that the more factors uncovered, the greater the 
chance that the case undergoing investigation would be detected.  Therefore, time 
spent at the scene and the collection of accurate and relevant information and 
evidence, would appear to be critical in the successful detection of non-residential 
burglary cases.   
 
7.5 Questioning of neighbours 
 
Neighbours were questioned in 25.6% of all BOB incidents.  This figure sits between 
previous studies that have found figures ranging from less than 20% (Eck 1983) and 
over 50% (Coupe and Griffiths 1996).  On average, two neighbours were questioned 
for thirteen minutes in total.  The breakdown of neighbours questioned by response 
grading can be seen in Table 7.5 below.  It is of little surprise to find that there was a 
significantly reduced chance of neighbour questioning if the incident was dealt with 
by the Crime Bureau/ Call Handlers by way of ‘telephone investigation’ (chi-
sq=9.975, p=0.002). 
 
 
Response Grading 
Questioned Crime bureau Routine Early Immediate 
Yes 0.2% 84% 9.2% 8.3% 
No 22.1% 64.9% 4.8% 7.2% 
Table 7.5 Percentage of neighbours questioned by response type 
 
In 35.9% of cases where neighbours were not questioned, it was because there were 
no nearby neighbours to be questioned by the police.  This means that there were just 
over 38% of incidents where neighbours could have been questioned but were not.   
 
7.6 Disparity in questioning neighbours 
7.6.1 Property type 
Differences were found with regard to property types and the questioning of 
neighbours.  There was a greatly increased chance of neighbours being questioned 
when a burglary had occurred within a residential environment i.e. sheds and garages 
(chi-sq=34.995, p=0.000).  Neighbours were questioned in 46% of all residential shed 
and garage burglary cases, compared to an average 19% of cases for the remaining 
property types.  This increased rate of questioning is largely a reflection of the nature 
of the environment and increased opportunities for observation.  It is of little surprise 
to find that these figures are similar to those found in the residential burglary project 
where neighbours were questioned in 52% of cases (Coupe and Griffiths 1996).  This 
level of questioning within residential environments appears to be justified, with 
useful information provided in almost three times as many incidents when compared 
to other property types (chi-sq=9.632, p=0.002). 
 
In contrast it was found that two-thirds less neighbours were questioned when the 
burgled property was a school or college (chi-sq=9.540, p=0.002).  Again, it may be 
suggested that this is the result of schools often being located away from more 
densely populated areas or situated within their own extensive grounds and hence, 
more reliant on alarm activations (see chapter 5). 
7.6.2 Day of the week 
No significant differences were found with regard to the day of the week and whether 
neighbours were questioned or not (chi-sq=3.660, df=6, p=0.723).  Neighbours were 
questioned on an average 22.8% of incidents that occurred across all weekdays, 
including weekends.  This varied from 19.5% of incidents on Mondays through to a 
maximum of 28.8% on Fridays. 
 
7.6.3 Number of officers attending 
There were no significant differences found in the questioning of neighbours and the 
number of officers in attendance (M-W, p=0.530, t-test, p=0.359).  3.53 officers, on 
average, attended those incidents where neighbours were questioned (3.2 trimmed) 
compared to 3.28 officers, on average, where the neighbours were not questioned (2.9 
trimmed).  Interviewing neighbours therefore did not depend on there being more 
officers available. 
7.6.4 Time incident logged 
Differences were found regarding the time the incident was logged and whether any 
neighbours were questioned. 
 
There was an increased chance of neighbours being questioned if the incident was 
logged between 9.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. (chi-sq=9.555, 0.002) compared to the 
remainder of the twenty-four hour period.  In short, neighbours were questioned at an 
average 31% of incidents reported within this time frame compared to an average 
19% of incidents occurring in the remainder of the day.   
 
Crucially however, there was no significant difference in the provision of useful 
neighbour evidence if the incident was logged outside of these hours (chi-sq=1.786, 
p=0.181), nor in the quality of evidence provided by neighbours outside of these 
hours (chi-sq=0.280, p=0.597).  In fact, neighbours provided useful information in 
25.6% of those cases logged between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. compared to 39.5% of cases 
logged outside of these hours.  It therefore appears that there is some scope for 
improving the questioning of neighbours, especially if the incident is logged outside 
of this 0900-1800 period.   
 
There are also signs that there is a reduced tendency to question neighbours if the 
incident is logged between the hours of 9.00 p.m. and midnight (chi-sq=3.570, 
p=0.059).  Between these times, 16.9% of incidents received neighbour questioning 
compared to 27.4% of incidents outside of these times.  As with the above findings 
however, there was no significant difference in the provision of useful neighbour 
evidence if the incident was logged between these times (chi-sq=0.619, p=0.432), nor 
in the quality of evidence provided (chi-sq=0.376, p=0.540).  Overall, the signs are 
that more questioning of neighbours at incidents logged after 6p.m. at night, and 
especially after 9p.m. at night, could prove fruitful in the provision of evidence. 
 
However, care must be taken in drawing specific conclusions, as the provision of 
evidence outside of this 0900-1800, and post 9 p.m. period may largely reflect 
increased selectivity in the choice of scenes at which questioning should be 
conducted.  If this is so, it may well be the case that less selectivity and more 
questioning may well result in a reduction in the amount of useful information.      
7.6.5 Time attended 
Significant differences were found as to when neighbours were questioned and how it 
related to the time of day that the police actually arrived at the scene.  There was over 
twice as much chance of neighbours being questioned by the police between the hours 
of 1700-1900 (chi-sq=6.884, p=0.009).  That is, an average 58.3% of neighbours were 
questioned in comparison to an average 24.5% of incidents attended outside of this 
time frame.  
  
However, these times merely reflect when the police attended.  As such it appears that 
the police actively match their attendance at some incidents to coincide with people’s 
return from work.  This would make sense given the preponderance of neighbours 
questioned within a residential environment.  It would make further sense to optimise 
manpower, and attend when there is a greater chance of there actually being someone 
available to question, as opposed to allocating resources to incidents where the 
provision of evidence is greatly reduced by there not being anybody available to 
question. 
 
7.7 Number of neighbours questioned  
 
Figure 7.7 below shows the percentages of number of neighbours questioned at each 
incident, where neighbours were questioned. 
Figure 7.7 Percentage of neighbours questioned 
 
In just over two-thirds of all cases (69.0%) where neighbours were questioned, there 
tended to be no more than two actually interviewed by the police.  Given the 
preponderance of questioning amongst residential premises, it would make sense that 
a single neighbour either side of the burgled property would be questioned.  However, 
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it is clear that a single neighbour was questioned in just over 10% more cases than 
two neighbours (39.7% compared to 29.3%).   
 
That said, there were still a recognizable number of incidents where anywhere up to 
six people from neighbouring premises were questioned, suggesting that in some 
cases, door to door enquiries are merited. 
 
7.8 Time spent questioning neighbours 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7.8 below, at almost 95% of incidents where neighbours 
were questioned (92.9%), the police spent no more than thirty minutes interviewing 
for any information, with a mean questioning time of 16.68 minutes (12.71 minutes 
trimmed).  
 
 
Figure 7.8 Length of time neighbours questioned 
 
Just less than two-thirds of neighbours (64.3%) received between five and fifteen 
minutes of questions, with the largest single majority of incidents (30.4%) receiving 
just five minutes. 
 
7.9 Information provided by neighbours 
 
Where neighbours were questioned, the police considered that useful information was 
provided in just over one-third of all cases (33.7%).  That is, neighbours provided 
information on either a definite suspect, a possible suspect, a suspect vehicle, or 
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further intelligence concerning the incident.  The full breakdown of information 
provided can be seen in Table 7.9 below. 
 
Information Frequency % Cases 
where 
available* 
Assisted a 
primary 
detection 
Assisted a 
secondary 
detection 
Undetected 
Definite suspect 45 24.3 84.4% 15.6% 0.0% 
Possible suspect 72 38.9 16.7% 38.9% 44.4% 
Suspect vehicle 64 34.6 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Further intelligence 216 89.7 19.5% 18.4% 62.1% 
Table 7.9 Information provided by neighbours 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
* Figures represent column percentages 
The percentages in the above table do not add up to one hundred as, with previous 
findings, there are often combinations of factors at work that aid the police.  This is 
borne out by the finding that in the majority of incidents where neighbours provided 
useful information, two items of information were most often available (64.3% of 
incidents). 
 
It is clear from the above figures that neighbours were able to provide further 
intelligence in the majority of cases where information was available (89.7%).  
Further to this, it would appear that this further intelligence would be in combination 
with some form of information regarding the suspect, with the majority providing 
possible suspect information. 
 
Specifically, ‘further intelligence’ was identified primarily as a suspect description, 
though it included information such as vehicle number plates, the location of stolen 
property and previous dealings with the suspect.  These were all identified from the 
police questionnaires. 
 
7.10 Influences of neighbour information 
7.10.1 Length of time questioned 
A significant difference was found in the length of time spent questioning neighbours 
when the police considered there to be useful information available (t-test, p=0.014).  
Where useful information was considered available, neighbours were questioned for 
an average 31.29 minutes (27.94 minutes trimmed).  This compares to an average 
10.31 minutes where no useful information was considered to be available (9.68 
minutes trimmed).  The full spread of times spent questioning neighbours can be seen 
in Figure 7.10.1 below. 
 
Figure 7.10.1 Length of time neighbours questioned when information available 
 
It is important however, that the above findings are not misinterpreted.  That is, it is 
probably not the case that the police were able to gather useful information if longer 
was spent questioning, merely that more time was spent questioning neighbours 
where useful information was considered to be available at the time. 
7.10.2 Usefulness and Quality of evidence  
The police did have a tendency to spend longer questioning neighbours, when they 
were in a position to provide better quality evidence (t-test, p=0.056).  Where 
neighbours could provide information regarding either a definite suspect, or definite 
suspect information backed up by further intelligence, the police spent an average 
47.47 minutes questioning neighbours (46.07 minutes trimmed).  This compares to 
12.88 minutes (12.47 minutes trimmed) when the neighbours were not able to provide 
such information. 
 
However, it would appear that questioning more neighbours did not increase the 
likelihood of better quality evidence (M-W, p=0.419, t-test, p=0.714).  An average 
1.92 neighbours (1.74 trimmed) were questioned where information concerning a 
definite suspect was available, in comparison to an average 1.70 neighbours (1.67 
trimmed) when no information regarding either a definite suspect or a definite suspect 
backed up with further information was available.  
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 Unusually however, there were significantly fewer neighbours questioned when 
useful information was provided (M-W, p=0.024, t-test, p=0.031).  An average 1.82 
neighbours (1.64 trimmed) were questioned when useful information was provided, 
compared to an average 3.14 neighbours (2.81 trimmed) when no useful information 
was provided.  This may suggest that the police actively question more neighbours in 
an effort to gain any useful information if it is not immediately forthcoming from the 
first questioned, whether this extra effort proves to be fruitful or not. 
 
7.11 Availability of neighbour information in detections 
 
Info available Detected Undetected 
Yes 48.7% 51.3% 
No 9.4% 90.6% 
 
Where neighbours were questioned and useful information was provided, a greater 
number of detections resulted (chi-sq=15.988, p=0.000).  Useful information was 
provided in 34% of detected cases where neighbours were questioned.  This compares 
to provision of information in only 7.2% of cases that were undetected and 
neighbours were questioned.  Further to this, where useful neighbour information was 
available, and the case was detected, ‘witness evidence’ was cited by investigating 
officers as playing a role in the detection of the case.  It would appear therefore that 
useful neighbour information does indeed hold some influence over the detection, or 
lack of, some burglary other building incidents.  This finding confirms the work of 
previous studies (Eck 1983) that have found that neighbours can be a useful source of 
information.  This finding however, must be taken in within the context of the 
differing environments that, as has been shown, tend to dictate the availability of 
neighbours.  The availability of information in those detected cases can be seen in 
Table 7.11 below. 
 
 
 
Information Frequency % Assisted 
primary 
% Assisted 
secondary 
Definite suspect 45 84.4 15.6 
Possible suspect 40 30.0 70.0 
Suspect vehicle 48 0.0 0.0 
Further intelligence 70 51.4 48.6 
Table 7.11 Availability of neighbour information in detections 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
The most common form of neighbour information in detected cases was ‘further 
intelligence’.  Given the preponderance of suspect related information (i.e. 
opportunity for further intelligence on either a definite or possible suspect) it is of 
little surprise that this is the case.   
 
It is of little surprise to find that there was an increased chance of the case being filed 
as detected if there was better quality evidence available (chi-sq=4.480, p=0.034).  
That is, of all cases where neighbours were questioned and useful information was 
provided, 24.3% of detected cases had information regarding a definite suspect 
available.  This is in stark contrast to those undetected cases where definite suspect 
information was unavailable in all cases. 
 
7.12 Questioning of other individuals 
 
The police questioned other individuals in 41.1% of cases.  This amounts to 68.5% of 
incidents where an individual from the burgled premises was questioned (IP/ member 
of staff/ security) and 31.5% of cases where another witness was questioned (MOP/ 
security other building). 
7.13 Disparity in questioning other individuals 
7.13.1 Property type 
The police, on average, questioned individuals in just over 90% of all incidents.  
There were however some variations within this general pattern of questioning.  
Victims were questioned at an average 95% of incidents dealt with by either the 
Crime Bureau/ Call Handlers or by a ‘routine response’ grading, whilst passers-by 
and victims were questioned at just over one third of emergency response incidents 
(35.7%).  
Having already seen that the police are more likely to question neighbours within a 
residential environment, so they are more likely to question other individuals if the 
burglary had occurred either within an office or leisure facility environment (chi-
sq=6.741, p=0.009).  Individuals were questioned in an average 56.3% of incidents 
occurring within these environments, compared to an average 35.4% of incidents 
occurring within the remaining environments.   
 
It would appear that these findings also, at least to some extent, reflect the nature of 
the environment within which the burglary has occurred.  Indeed, just as residential 
properties are more likely to provide neighbours, and hence neighbours with useful 
information, so leisure facilities are less likely to.  As such, the police would have to 
question other individuals at the site in an effort to gather any available useful 
information.  Given that such premises are often ‘people rich’ this would make more 
sense.  This suggestion is borne out to some extent by the fact that shops, schools and 
leisure facilities, all ‘people rich’ environments, tended to provide more useful 
information than the remaining property types (chi-sq=6.760, p=0.009).  These 
property types provided useful evidence in an average 39.5% of incidents compared 
to an average 26.9% of incidents across the remaining property types. 
7.13.2 Day of the week logged 
Unlike the questioning of neighbours, significant differences were found in the 
pattern of questioning other individuals. 
 
There was less chance of other individuals being questioned at weekends (chi-
sq=7.049, p=0.008).  Across this two-day period, individuals were questioned in an 
average 33.8% of incidents, compared to an average 50% of incidents for the 
remaining days of the week.  However, at weekends, there was not significantly less 
information provided, although there was a reduced amount compared to the 
remainder of the week.  Useful individual information was provided, on average, in 
28.4% of incidents compared to a slightly increased average of 31.3% for the 
remaining weekly period (chi-sq=0.257, p=0.612). 
7.13.3 Number of officers attending 
No significant differences were found with regard to the questioning of other 
individuals and the number of officers in attendance (M-W, p=0.224, t-test, p=0.670).  
On average, 5.19 officers attended (4.88 trimmed) when other individuals were 
questioned regarding the burglary compared to 5.36 officers (5.11 trimmed) where no 
individuals were questioned. 
7.13.4 Time incident logged 
If the incident was logged between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. there was an increased chance 
of other individuals being questioned (chi-sq=5.795, p=0.016).  Further questioning 
took place in 64% of incidents occurring within this time frame in comparison to 
39.1% of incidents occurring outside of this time frame.  However, this did not 
translate into an increased chance of gathering useful information (chi-sq=0.065, 
p=0.799).  This suggests that some police effort may be wasted in pursuing such a 
task between these times. 
7.13.5 Time attended 
If the police attended the incident between 5.00 p.m. and 7.00 p.m., there was an 
increased chance of further individuals being questioned (chi-sq=7.400, p=0.007), 
with other individuals questioned in 65% of incidents attended by the police within 
this time frame.  This is in comparison to individuals being questioned in 39.5% of 
incidents when the police attended outside of this time frame.  Given that in the 
majority of cases, it was the IP/ member of staff who was questioned, it is reasonable 
to assume that the increase in questioning between these times is also a reflection of 
the close of business.  As such, staff members would not need to cut into their 
working day to aid the police with their enquiries. 
7.14 Information provided by individuals 
 
Where other individuals were questioned at the scene, the police considered that 
useful information was provided in 20.8% of cases.  Again, this constituted 
information regarding either a definite suspect, a possible suspect, a suspect vehicle or 
further information.  The full breakdown of information provided can be seen in 
Table 7.14 below.  The total percentages will not total one hundred, as individuals 
most often provided two items of information (56.3% of incidents). 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Frequency % Cases 
where 
available* 
Assisted a 
primary 
detection 
Assisted a  
Secondary 
detection 
Undetected 
Definite suspect 189 19.5 80.0% 14.3% 5.7% 
Possible suspect 403 41.6 44.0% 12.0% 44.0% 
Suspect vehicle 112 11.6 50.0% 33.0% 16.7% 
Further intelligence 890 91.8 60.3% 12.8% 26.9% 
Table 7.14 Information provided by other individuals 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
* Figures represent column percentages 
 
91.8% of individuals questioned were in a position to provide ‘further intelligence’ 
(primarily suspect descriptions), definite suspect information was provided in 19.5% 
of incidents and possible suspect information in 41.6% of incidents where questioned.  
Suspect vehicle information was available in only a minority of such incidents 
(11.6%). 
7.15 Availability of individual information in detections 
 
More detections resulted when the individual questioned was able to provide useful 
information (chi-sq=19.680, p=0.000), with 38.6% of cases filed detected when useful 
information was made available.  This compares to 13.5% of cases that were filed 
‘undetected’.  The information provided by individuals in those detected cases can be 
seen in Table 7.15 below. 
 
Information Frequency % Assisted 
primary 
% Assisted 
secondary 
Definite suspect 125 72.8 27.2 
Possible suspect 53 60.3 39.6 
Suspect vehicle 48 41.7 58.3 
Further intelligence 272 68.9 31.1 
 
Table 7.15 Availability of other individual information in detections 
 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample 
 
There was also an increased chance of the case being filed detected if there was better 
quality evidence available (chi-sq=14.002, p=0.000), with definite suspect 
information available in 53.3% of subsequent detections.  This compares to similar 
information being available in just 9.1% of those cases that were filed ‘undetected’. 
 
Two items of information were available in the majority of detected cases (56.7%), 
with ‘further intelligence’ as the most common. 
7.16 The availability and role of all witness information in detections 
 
There is a significantly increased chance of a case being filed ‘detected’ where useful 
‘witness’ information is available (chi-sq=25.507, p=0.000).  In all detected cases, 
information was available in 45.1% of incidents compared to 18.8% of undetected 
cases.   
 
Further to this, there was a significantly increased chance of an arrest being made at 
the time if this ‘witness’ information was available (chi-sq=41.268, p=0.000), with 
arrests made at 82.1% of incidents where useful information was available compared 
to availability in 30% of incidents where no arrest was made.  Where no arrest was 
made at the time, ‘witness’ information was cited by the officers as being used in the 
detection of over 95% of cases, including those primary detected incidents. 
 
7.17 Collection of physical evidence at the crime scene 
Details were also collected from both officers and Scenes of Crimes Officers (SOCO) 
concerning the availability and collection of physical evidence that may help in the 
detection of non-residential burglary cases.  Previous studies have shown that whilst 
the collection and availability of physical evidence can aid the detection of crime, it is 
often used as supporting evidence (Steer 1980, Ramsay 1987).  As a result, physical 
evidence is rarely directly responsible for the detection of any single crime.  However, 
it is important not to underestimate the corroborative role played in the use of such 
evidence, especially if we consider that certain physical evidence can irrefutably 
identify particular individuals.  
7.18 Collection of MO (Modus Operandi) evidence from the scene 
 
Information concerning either an unusual ‘modus operandi’ (MO) (23.6%) or an 
indicative MO (76.4%) was available in 208 cases (adjusted), with both available in 
just 3% of cases.  39% of the cases where MO information was available were 
detected, 15.9% of which were primary detected.  Crucially however, there was found 
to be a particularly high rate of detection where ‘indicative MO’ evidence was 
available at the scene. 
 Discounting those cases where arrests were made at the time, MO evidence was 
available in 9% of cases and was the pivotal item of evidence available from the scene 
in just nine cases, representing 1.9% of all primary detections.  There is no indication 
that any subsequent contact after the initial police response aids in the gathering of 
information regarding an offender’s MO (chi-sq=0.801, p=0.371).  Therefore, the 
initial police visit to the scene is the best opportunity to collect MO evidence, but MO 
information was rarely available or used in investigations and when it was, it was 
often used as supporting evidence. 
7.19 Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) 
7.19.1 Interviews 
As well as collecting documented primary data from Scenes of Crimes Officers, an 
informal, unstructured interview took place with the four Senior SOCO officers 
across the study OCU’s concerning their opinions on the way that the role of Scenes 
of Crime Officers is defined, and the problems faced within the everyday work 
environment. 
   
The most common problem cited was the inability of many attending officers to 
adequately assess the worth of SOCO attention.  It is essential, especially with 
‘volume crime’ such as burglary that the attending officer is in a position to make the 
correct decision.  Given the sheer number of incidents, it is of paramount importance 
that SOCO attention is made where there is available evidence, and that no attention 
is made where there is either no evidence, or poor quality evidence.  Allied to this, it 
is particularly important, given the inevitable delay in SOCO actually getting to the 
scene, that journeys are not wasted, given the current time constraints that many 
officers are working under.   
 
However, it would appear that attending police officers often fail to properly assess 
the worth of evidence or lack thereof, generally being insufficiently discriminating 
and calling for forensic assessment in unpromising cases.  These findings support 
those of Tilley and Ford (1996), who concluded that, in general, the first attending 
officer did not have sufficient knowledge about the discriminatory potential of 
physical evidence. 
Even where evidence was found to be available, a general failure on the part of the 
attending officers to adequately preserve the scene/ secure evidence was noted by 
SOCO.  The most frequently mentioned problem was the preservation of broken 
glass, which tends to be of particular importance as it is often crucial in the collection 
of fingerprints.  In the winter months, this factor is essential given the more extreme 
nature of the elements, and the increased likelihood of evidence being destroyed. 
 
As a result of the above problems, West Midlands Police have produced a ‘pocket 
card’ that all officers are required to carry, regarding SOCO guidelines, offering 
advice on scene preservation.  The following 10 points have been identified by SOCO 
as aiding the security of evidence; 
 
1) preserve broken glass by picking up by edges, bring inside, and prop up against an 
internal wall; 
2) board broken windows up on the outside so as to protect any ‘climbing in’ marks 
which may be available; 
3) don’t tell the IP that fingerprints are visible; 
4) tell the IP what can be cleared away (cushions, clothes etc) as shiny surfaces are 
often the surface for developing fingerprints; 
5) any small items for fingerprinting can be put to one side; 
6) do not remove items for fingerprinting from the scene, as this causes two SOCO  
visits;  
7) don’t touch items with gloves; use bare hands and tell the IP to inform SOCO so 
prints can be eliminated; 
8) look out for torn papers, envelopes or bin liners left by the offenders as they are 
often a good source of fingerprints; 
9) forensic samples such as blood and footprints also need preserving; SOCO don’t 
just collect fingerprints; 
10) don’t provide ETA’s (estimated time of arrival) for the IP as it is almost 
impossible for SOCO to keep to them. 
 
However, the same problems are still arising, especially as many of these pocket cards 
are not used or are lost. 
7.19.2 Findings from interviews 
Across all OCU’s, a lack of training was stated as the major reason for failure to 
either identify or preserve evidence adequately on the part of the attending officers.  
Currently, there is no SOCO input into the basic training received by officers, as the 
emphasis has shifted more towards community policing.  Even in those cases where 
the SOCO officers have run courses themselves for uniformed officers, there has been 
little or no turnout to such training sessions.  If, as the Audit Commission (1996) 
showed, that the training of officers can, and does, appear to provide an effective 
response, then attendance at such courses needs to be enforced to some degree.  
Although detectives were receiving training in SOCO techniques and the value of 
evidence/ scene preservation, there is very little emphasis or understanding on how 
SOCO evidence per se fits into the investigation procedure as a whole.  As such, some 
available evidence is being missed or the value and worth of other evidence is being 
misinterpreted.   
 
On a more practical level, further problems were cited with regard to appointments, 
missing/ incorrect details, crime misclassification and availability of information on/ 
access to police computer systems (CRIMES and MDIS).   
 
The problem with the misclassification of crimes creates an unnecessary workload for 
SOCO.  The main issue relates to the mistaken classification of shed burglaries as 
‘Burglary Dwelling House’ (BDH).  All BDH incidents will receive a SOCO visit, 
whereas a shed break should be classified as BOB.  As such, SOCO are mistakenly 
attending breaks because it is force policy at BDH incidents, even though it is 
currently West Midlands police force policy not to attend shed breaks unless there are 
obvious evidential signs.  This means that by misclassifying such crimes, two separate 
force policies are being counteracted, with the opposite result achieved.  
 
In so far as there are problems regarding appointments and incorrect details, journeys 
are being wasted / not being made because information is not made available as to 
when the IP will be at the premises.  This is compounded by incorrect or incomplete 
addresses.  As such, it is left to SOCO to try to chase up IP’s or find out the correct 
addresses in order to make a visit.  This means that time and resources are being 
consumed which could be better spent at the crime scene.   
 
The above is not helped by the fact that all SOCO jobs (names, addresses etc.) are 
retrieved from the MDIS computer system first thing in the morning, yet access to 
MDIS is limited.  In some cases, there is no immediate access to MDIS at all.  Allied 
to this, any new SOCO jobs should be paged through to the officers when they are out 
on the road.  However, this was stated as a further problem, often requiring either a 
return to a police station to access MDIS, or actively ringing in on a regular basis to 
ascertain if any new jobs had come through.   
 
In short, valuable time is being wasted that could be better spent at crime scenes 
where evidence is actually available.  The result is that there are more jobs to 
complete, yet less time to complete them in.  As such, it may be the case that evidence 
rich scenes are not being visited, or evidence at visited scenes is being missed due to 
the limited time available to complete the day’s SOCO jobs. 
7.20 SOCO attention 
 
SOCO can be requested either by the attending officer, or by the Crime Bureau 
operators upon initial screening of the non-emergency report.  Where the Crime 
Bureau requested SOCO, evidence was available in 33.3% of cases compared to a 
slightly reduced 32.7% of cases when the officer in attendance requested SOCO.  
Although this may indicate the Crime Bureau/ Call Handlers are able to assess the 
worth of SOCO attention equally as well as an attending officer, this finding should 
not be taken at face value.  The Crime Bureau operators are in a position to request 
SOCO input into their decision making process prior to making a request for SOCO 
attendance.  This is not the case for attending officers. 
 
Slightly less than half of all incidents received SOCO attention (47.8%).  However, 
there were significant differences between property types and whether SOCO 
attended (chi-sq=54.611, p=0.000).  Only 23% of shed and garage burglaries received 
such attention compared to an average 56% of incidents across the other property 
types (chi-sq=46.916, p=0.000). 
 
The main reason cited by first attending officers for not requesting SOCO attention, 
across all properties, was the considered lack of any suitable evidence (66.2%).  
However, this too varied with property type.    
 
Excluding residential sheds and garages, lack of suitable evidence was cited in 83% 
of cases across the remaining properties.  With residential buildings, police force 
policy was the major reason for SOCO not being requested in 40% of instances (chi-
sq=68.254, p=0.000).  This policy has resulted from such premises often failing, in 
the past, to provide any physical evidence, largely as a result of the characteristics of 
such buildings i.e. made of wood, easy to break into, few smooth services.  Currently, 
unless there are extenuating circumstances, SOCO attention will not be merited.  
 
For warehouse and industrial premises the main reason for not requesting SOCO in 
35% of cases was the amount of dirt within the premises (chi-sq=29.405, p=0.000).  
This is of little surprise given that this type of premises will inevitably contain dust, 
dirt, large amounts of grease and oil, and very few smooth surfaces from which to 
collect evidence. 
7.21 Collection of Evidence 
 
Cases have to be considered where both a physical SOCO attendance was made, and 
where evidence was removed from the scene by the attending officer, for SOCO 
examination.  In both instances, there is a propensity for the collection of definite 
evidence.   
 
Evidence was collected from a third (32.7%) of all BOB crime scenes.  Although this 
is not particularly low, it does tend to indicate that there may be some scope for 
improving the screening process that dictates whether SOCO attendance is necessary, 
especially by attending officers.  If taken in the context of the findings from the 
interviews, this would make sense.     
 
Only shops, schools/ colleges and leisure facilities tended to provide SOCO evidence 
in the majority of crime scenes (39%) compared to the remaining four property types 
(25%) (chi-sq=5.297, p=0.021).  Most notable however, was the fact that when 
residential sheds and garages did receive SOCO attention, there was not significantly 
less evidence collected from the scene (chi-sq=1.658, p=0.198), even though there 
was a reduction in the number of cases where evidence was actually available.  This 
might possibly reflect either an effective use of policy, or more stringent assessment 
by the attending officer, with regard to the availability of useful evidence. 
7.22 Number and type of evidential items 
 
Three quarters of all crime scenes that provided any SOCO evidence provided only a 
single item of SOCO (75.2%).  The most common form of evidence collected from 
crime scenes, either on its own or in combination with other evidence, was fingerprint 
evidence (44.5%).  A comparable amount of footwear evidence (39.4%) was also 
collected.  Chemical evidence was only half as important (20%), whilst sample 
evidence (e.g. paint flakes) and DNA evidence both fell around the 6% mark (6.4% 
and 5.9% respectively). 
7.23 Influence of property type and SOCO evidence 
 
It is important to recognise here that although certain premises will provide larger 
amounts of certain evidence, it is by no means a reflection on either the quality of that 
evidence, or any further use of that evidence. 
 
Schools and colleges were more likely to provide fingerprint evidence for testing (chi-
sq=7.996, p=0.005).  Given the number of people that are likely to be using such 
buildings, this is of little surprise.  Warehouse and Industrial premises were more 
likely to give up footwear evidence (chi-sq=11.283, p=0.001).  Although on a wider 
scale they were less likely to receive a visit from SOCO because the premises were 
often too dirty, by the same merit, such premises will be more amenable for picking 
up footprint evidence, primarily because of the dirt and grime. 
 
The full listing for the frequency of SOCO evidence collected from the various 
property categories can be seen in Table 7.23 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 f/ print forensic chemical footwear DNA sample 
Offices 10.8 0.0 10.5 12.0 12.0 3.2 
Shops 12.0 11.1 15.8 22.0 32.0 38.7 
Ware/ ind 15.7 22.2 36.8 36.0 12.0 19.4 
Resident 7.2 11.1 0.0 4.0 4.0 6.5 
School/ coll 26.5 22.2 21.1 8.0 16.0 12.9 
Leisure 19.3 11.1 5.3 10.0 16.0 12.9 
Other 8.4 22.2 10.5 8.0 8.0 6.5 
 
Table 7.23 Influence of property type on SOCO evidence 
 
N.B.  All figures are column percentages 
7.24 SOCO and Detections 
 
53.3% of all incidents that were subsequently detected received SOCO attention.  
This is slightly higher in comparison to the overall picture for SOCO attention, where 
47.8% of all incidents received a visit. 
   
SOCO evidence was collected in just under twice as many detected cases (47.9%) in 
comparison to those undetected cases (29.2%).  This compares further to the 32.7% 
across all BOB incidents.  So, although fewer detected cases received SOCO 
attention, evidence was collected in a larger proportion of those cases that were 
subsequently filed as detected (chi-sq=22.797, p=0.000). 
7.24.1 SOCO use in cases filed as Detected 
 
SOCO evidence was actively used in the detection of 105 cases that were filed 
‘detected’ (population adjusted), including 57 incidents that were ‘primary detected’.  
In 91.4% of these primary detections (52), it was only a single item of SOCO 
evidence that played a role in the detection of the offence.     
The most important piece of evidence was fingerprint evidence, which accounted for 
37.5%, followed by DNA evidence, which was the single most important piece of 
evidence in 28.1% of cases.  In short, it appears that in those cases where the only 
form of evidence available from the scene is SOCO, the most influential types of 
evidence are those that could irrefutably identify a single offender. 
 
Although evidence collected by SOCO did play a part in the detection of cases, in the 
main, it rarely provided enough proof in its own right for detection.  However, most 
often, evidence collected by SOCO was of greatest use in corroborating evidence 
already available from the scene.  These findings have been shown in previous 
studies, most notably by Steer (1980) and in findings from the Audit Commission 
(1993). 
7.25 Discussion and policy implications 
 
The scene of the burglary, in common with past research, has been shown to be the 
richest source of evidence.  Excluding those cases where the burglar was apprehended 
at the time of the incident (for discussion on this see chapter 6), the majority of 
detections arose from evidence gathered from witnesses at the scene.  Once officers 
had arrived, their activities included the questioning of all relevant parties and the 
collection of MO evidence, whilst SOCO officers were responsible for the collection 
of physical evidence.     
 
It can be seen, again, that the diversity of the environment within which the burglary 
occurs influences both police actions undertaken at the scene, and the availability of 
any evidence from the scene.  Both the questioning of neighbours and other 
individuals, at the scene was affected by property type, with more neighbours 
questioned and more information provided within a residential environment.  
Conversely, other individuals were more likely to have been questioned and provided 
more evidence at incidents occurring within the more isolated, yet people rich 
premises (as opposed to environments). 
 
Overall, information from neighbours was a factor in the detection of 10% of 
burglaries that were solved, with an average 5.9 hours used per burglary detected as a 
result of evidence provided by neighbours.  As such, the interviewing of neighbours 
was found to be effective, especially since the majority of useful neighbour evidence 
was picked up at the initial visit to the scene.  In only a small minority of cases was 
any useful information gathered during subsequent contact (see chapter 9).  
  
That said, there might still be some scope for increasing the number of detections, 
particularly amongst the 38% of cases where neighbours could have been questioned, 
and where the circumstances of the burglary matched those where evidence from 
neighbours proved most useful.  Although limited by environment, there is reason to 
believe that certain improvements can be made. 
 
There may be grounds for improving the questioning of neighbours, especially at 
incidents logged after 6.00 p.m. at night, and particularly between the hours of 9.00 
p.m. to midnight, when there was found to be no difference in either the provision, or 
quality of, evidence provided by neighbours within these time periods.  Even though 
it would appear that the police are targeting neighbours at specific times of the day 
when they are more likely to be available for questioning, it may be more fruitful to 
question neighbours at more evening and night time incidents, especially those 
occurring within residential environments. 
 
Further to this, there is some indication that a certain amount of police effort is not 
being used as effectively as possible.  Although longer was spent questioning when 
good information was available, increasing the number of neighbours questioned did 
not improve the availability or quality of information.  Although it is indeed possible 
that ‘neighbouring premises’ further away from the burgled premises could supply 
useful information, especially within residential environments, the indications are that 
valuable police time is being wasted questioning more neighbours when there is very 
little hope of gathering any useful information.  In most cases, it would seem likely 
that immediate neighbours are more likely to provide any useful information, 
especially given the fact that the police were getting their information when, in the 
majority of cases, no more than two neighbours (one either side) were questioned.  
Some of this time, as stated previously, may therefore be better spent assessing the 
crime scene itself, either for potentially valuable SOCO evidence, or any signs of an 
offender’s MO. 
 
There are signs therefore that, although questioning neighbours was effective and 
proved to be a useful source of information, some gains could be made by questioning 
neighbours at a greater number of night time incidents, and decreasing the amount of 
questioning when useful information is not immediately forthcoming from those 
neighbours contiguous to the burgled premises.   
 
Useful information from the questioning of other individuals (IP, owners or other 
staff, members of the public) contributed to the detection of 4.2% of all cases.  On 
average, first officers spent 36 minutes at the burgled premises questioning witnesses 
and assessing the burglary site.  This equates to 12.5 hours of officer effort for each 
burglary where evidence from other individuals made an important contribution to the 
detection of the case.   
 
The scope for questioning victims at the scene is limited by the fact that incidents will 
inevitably occur during the night or over the weekend period, to be discovered either 
the following morning or anything up to two days after the event.  In these cases, if 
the alert is not raised at the time of the incident, there will be a poor chance of 
gathering any evidence, let alone any good quality evidence.   
 
There may be some scope for improvement however, especially at those premises 
found to supply more witness information.  Further to this, there is some scope for 
improvement in the questioning of other individuals at incidents occurring over the 
weekend period.  Although a reduced amount of information was collected, it was not 
significantly low enough to warrant reduced questioning over this two-day period.   
 
In general, the findings regarding witness information further reinforce the worth of 
questioning and the role of witness information in detections.  Although the 
contribution was found to be comparatively low, extending questioning in the correct 
circumstances could still prove fruitful, especially given the fact that it does not 
require extra visits to the scene. 
 
Regarding the collection of physical evidence, SOCO information assisted in the 
detection of just under 2% of non-residential burglaries, with officers spending an 
average 26 minutes at each incident attended.  This represents a total of 1476 hours 
used to obtain evidence that led to detections, representing 22 hours per detected case.  
When the contribution of SOCO evidence to those cases where suspects were arrested 
for other offences are considered, these figures are reduced to quite a large extent, 
with an estimated 12 hours of staff resource per detected case.  
 
Assessing the scope for improving the use of SOCO visits is more difficult, primarily 
because in the majority of incidents, somebody else decides whether SOCO attention 
is required.  That is, apart from those incidents dealt with by the Crime Bureau/ Call 
Handlers, it will be the first attending officer who assesses the worth of the site for 
any forensic evidence. 
 
The main issues concerning any scope for improvement must first focus upon the use 
of a force policy that restricts SOCO attention, and secondly, the assessment abilities 
of the Crime Bureau/ Call Handlers and the assessment and scene preservation 
abilities of the first attending officers.  This study has already shown that telephone 
operators are no worse than attending officers at assessing the availability of valid 
evidence at the scene.  Even though, as stated, the call handlers can refer to a relevant 
officer, it is hard to believe that this happens on every occasion, especially when the 
call handlers themselves have clearly defined guidelines as to when SOCO attention 
is merited.  Perhaps, as stated in the interviews conducted, uniformed officers should 
receive compulsory training regarding such matters.  In this way, there may be some 
scope for improving both the collection of evidence, and the reduction of wasted time 
and effort at worthless burglary scenes. 
 
The second issue raised is the use of force policy in directing whether SOCO should 
attend.  A substantial proportion of shed and garage burglaries were not referred to 
SOCO because of ‘force policy’, yet when officers did attend, there was found to be 
no significant difference between these residential buildings and the remaining 
property types with regard to the collection of useful evidence.  Again, perhaps, this is 
more a reflection of the attending officers not being willing to ask for SOCO 
attendance knowing that a policy is in place that directs officers not to ask for SOCO 
attention.  Were the officers able to adequately assess the scenes however, there 
would be no need for such policy implementation. 
 
In short, although not conclusive by any means, the above suggests that more 
selective use of SOCO could help in increasing the number of detections.  This could 
be achieved through better training of uniformed officers in assessment and scene 
preservation techniques.  By doing so, there should be an increase in the number of 
valid burglary cases visited and a corresponding decrease in SOCO attendance at 
worthless sites.  In this way it may be possible to increase the time spent at 
worthwhile scenes, and so increase the propensity for gaining more evidence. 
 
The implications for policy from all of the above findings on this initial police visit to 
the scene would seem to dictate that, although the success rate of the main 
investigative strategies was not particularly high, best use must be made of this initial 
opportunity to collect evidence. 
8. FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES 
8.1 Summary 
As well as conducting more reactive initial investigations at the scene of the crime, 
the police make use of several other more proactive methods, often in combination 
with the investigative activities discussed in the previous chapter.  These pro-active 
techniques tended to be used more infrequently but were effective when they were 
used, especially when used after evidence has been built up from across a number of 
sources.  This use of multiple sources of evidence would appear to be integral to the 
detection of the many non-residential burglary cases. 
8.2 Introduction 
Having looked at those police activities conducted at the scene of the burglary in the 
preceding chapter, the following considers those additional investigative police 
actions that take place.  These include the use of general intelligence, special 
operations and crime pattern analysis.  These activities will often complement and run 
in parallel to those more reactive police actions taken in response of any burglary 
alert. 
8.3 Evidence from general intelligence 
The use of ‘general intelligence’ involves, either in isolation or in combination, 
intelligence on local or travelling criminals, vehicle stop-checks, registered 
informants, and the use of any local knowledge or contacts. 
 
Intelligence was used in 22.3% of sample BOB cases for which data was available, 
representing 6% of all burglary cases (population adjusted).  It led to useful 
information being collected in 75% of cases where it was put to use, contributing to 
36.7% of all primary detections and 32.6% of secondary detections.  The available 
‘general intelligence’ information can be seen in Table 8.3 below. 
 
General intelligence Frequency % 
Travelling criminals 3 2.1 
Stop-check 18 12.3 
Registered informants 12 8.2 
Local knowledge/ contacts 94 64.4 
Offender identity info 44 30.1 
Table 8.3 The availability of ‘general intelligence’ information 
N.B. The above figures will not total 100% as there are instances where more than one form of intelligence was available. 
 
The majority of available general intelligence had come from the officers’ local 
knowledge (64.4%), either of criminals themselves or from contacts known to the 
officer.  This is followed by ‘tip-off’ information regarding the identity of the 
offender (30.1%).  Both ‘stop check’ information (12.3%) and the use of registered 
informants (8.2%) also feature.  Understandably, the smallest contribution to general 
intelligence is made by information on travelling criminals (2.1%).     
 
It was found that there was a significantly improved chance of detection when 
‘general intelligence’ information was available (chi-sq=70.088, p=0.000).  This 
finding may largely be explained by the number of different investigative methods 
that are covered under this umbrella term, especially when, as will be shown later in 
this chapter, it is considered that the more sources of information, the greater the 
chances of any one case being detected.   
8.3.1 Information on travelling criminals 
Information on travelling criminals was available in only three cases, all of which 
were filed ‘detected’.  This may be a result of either; 
  
a) very few burglars operating outside of their own ‘turf’; 
b) poor inter-force communication regarding travelling criminals; 
c) few criminals being considered ‘serious’ or prolific enough to merit force wide 
information. 
 
In all cases, information / evidence was available from other sources, be it MO 
evidence or SOCO evidence. 
8.3.2 Information from stop-checks 
Of the eighteen cases in which information from a stop-check was available, 
seventeen (94.4%) were filed ‘detected’, with five arrests made at the time of the 
incident.  In all cases where the arrest was made at the time, information concerning 
the offender, the vehicle or the stolen property was available.  Of the remaining 
detected cases, there was stolen property, suspect and vehicle information available 
from the scene in the majority of cases.  In the cases where evidence was not available 
from the scene, information was available from other burglaries. 
 
In the single undetected case, although information was provided as to the identity of 
the offender prior to the stop check, there was no other evidence available from 
elsewhere, i.e. description, property details, SOCO etc.  When taking account of 
population figures, stop checks were actually carried out in less than 1% of all 
burglaries and assisted in just 3.5% of all detected cases. 
8.3.3 Use of registered informants 
All twelve cases where registered informant information was used were filed 
‘detected’, reflecting a population incidence of 3% where the use of informant 
information assisted detection.  An arrest was made in a single case, when police saw 
the suspect near to the scene after an alarm activation at the burgled premises.  It must 
be assumed that the informant information placed the police in the right place at the 
right time.   
 
In three cases, evidence was used from the scene of the burglary, including a 
combination of a vehicle description, SOCO, identifiable property, and a suspect 
description.  In the remaining cases, no other information was cited as being used in 
the detection of the offences, although there was minimal information available 
concerning previous breaks and property details at two further offences.  Most notable 
however, is that four of these remaining incidents were admitted to during interview. 
 
This effective use of informants has been noted by the Audit Commission (1993), 
who estimated that detections arising from the use of such sources were extremely 
cost effective, averaging just £57 per detection. 
8.3.4 Use of local knowledge or contacts 
Of the 94 cases where the officer’s local knowledge or contacts was cited as being 
used, ninety-two were filed ‘detected’.  This equates to assisting in over 20% of 
detections when population allowances are made.  Thirty-six arrests were made at the 
time of the incident, fifteen of which were CIA. 
 
As above, where local knowledge was cited, it was often used in combination with 
other factors, either the availability of other evidence either from the scene, other 
burglaries or from other general intelligence. 
8.3.5 Information regarding offender identity 
Forty cases out of the forty-four incidents where information regarding the identity of 
the offender was cited were detected.  Twelve arrests were made at the time of the 
incident, leaving thirty-two cases.  Of these cases, information was available from 
several sources in the majority of incidents.  Most often, suspect descriptions had also 
been provided, though SOCO evidence was also available in some of these cases.  
The provision of information regarding offender identity proved to be useful, assisting 
in 10% of all detections when allowing for population figures. 
8.4 Use of ‘special operations’ 
The use of ‘special operations’ essentially involves the surveillance or observation of 
an area, a specific person, or a specific building. 
 
Special operations such as surveillance were used in 1.2% of incidents.  All cases 
were filed ‘detected’.  The operations mounted can be seen in Table 8.4 below. 
 
Special operation % 
Area surveillance 10.0 
Person surveillance 50.0 
House surveillance 10.0 
Premises surveillance 30.0 
Table 8.4 Type of ‘special operations’ utilised 
 
There are few indications of the circumstances in which operations would be mounted 
though surveillance, per se, was not used in isolation in gaining the detection.  All 
cases where police surveillance was undertaken had made use of other sources of 
information.  Where scene information was used, it was quite comprehensive, with 
suspect and witness descriptions available, property details, and further witness 
information.  Indeed, some cases made use of all available sources of information.  
That is, SOCO, vehicle and suspect descriptions were available at the scene, SOCO, 
suspect descriptions, M.O. information and pattern information relating to both a 
suspect and an area were available from other burglaries, and use of local contacts and 
informants were used from ‘general intelligence’. 
 
The above tends to suggest that any surveillance operations mounted will be based on 
sound evidence, often accumulated from a variety of sources.  Most important 
perhaps is that 88.9% of cases where a surveillance operation was employed were 
‘primary detected’.  Crucially, when surveillance operations were mounted, a suspect 
was more likely to have been seen (chi-sq=4.847, p=0.028).  In 80% of incidents 
suspects were seen when surveillance was used, compared to 45.1% when it was not. 
 
It is apparent that the use of such operations can be extremely successful when 
correctly targeted.  Although perhaps not accounting for many detections, assisting in 
only 3% (adjusted) of all detections, mounted operations will inevitably display a high 
success rate when implemented.  This is often because such operations will be based 
upon a lot of good information from various sources. 
8.5 Evidence from other burglaries 
 
There was significantly more evidence available from other burglaries in detected 
cases than in undetected cases (chi-sq=11.652, p=0.001).  Evidence was available 
from other burglaries in 16.5% of cases eventually filed ‘detected’.  This is in 
comparison to those undetected cases where evidence was available in just 6.0% of 
incidents.  However, this may be a reflection of the reduced numbers of cases where 
evidence from other burglaries was available.  In the main, this would involve 
evidence used to link incidents together according to either MO evidence or patterns. 
8.5.1 Use of Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) 
Patterns relating to a suspect, an area, a series of burglaries, or in combination, were 
available in twenty cases.  70% of these cases were filed ‘detected’, with six arrests 
made at the time of the incident.  In total, CPA assisted in just 0.2% of non-residential 
burglary detections (adjusted).  Discounting those cases where an arrest was made, 
the differentiating feature of those cases that were detected from those that were 
undetected would again appear to be the availability of evidence from other sources.  
There was found to be no difference between property type and establishing a pattern 
(chi-sq=2.022, df=6, p=0.918).  Not surprisingly however, there was an increased 
chance of establishing a pattern if there was MO evidence available at the scene of the 
burglary (chi-sq=3.970, p=0.046).  That is, when MO evidence was available from the 
scene of the burglary, patterns were established from other burglaries in 43.8% of 
incidents.  This is in comparison to the establishing of patterns from other burglaries 
in just 16.7% of cases when there was no MO evidence available from the scene of 
the burglary. 
 
It would appear however, that patterns within the non-residential burglary domain are 
identified infrequently, and used in detections even less, and not at all in their own 
right.  It is of little surprise therefore that the Audit Commission (1993) found few 
resources, if at all, were allocated, let alone dedicated, to crime pattern analysis.  
8.6 Number of sources of evidence 
Given the findings from all of the above, the indications are that in the majority of 
cases, and especially those successfully detected cases, several sources of information 
were available and utilised.  This was indeed found to be the case. 
 
Including all cases, officers used an average 1.09 sources for information in detected 
cases compared to an average 0.51 in undetected cases (t-test, p=0.000).  Similarly, 
more sources of information were available in primary detected cases (t-test, 
p=0.000).  Evidence was available, on average, from 1.23 sources in primary detected 
cases compared to an average 0.52 sources in secondary detected cases.  If those 
incidents where arrests were made at the time are removed, this picture remains the 
same.        
8.7 Discussion and policy implications  
 
‘Proactive policing’ played a role in a significant minority of cases.  However, it may 
well prove difficult to substantially increase its use as, often, proactivity depends 
upon the availability of locally based information and sources.  As such, its use will 
be limited by the extent to which criminals from outside any particular police force 
area commit burglaries.  As stated earlier, there was little incidence of information 
available on travelling criminals.  Allied to this, the application of such techniques on 
a wider scale may also be limited by the dependence upon a thorough build-up of 
evidence from a number of sources.  This would appear to fall into line with the 
conclusions reached by Maguire and John (1995) who found that the use of proactive 
techniques would continue to make only a marginal contribution to crime control until 
a fully integrated, strategically informed approach was taken. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the above that police use of more proactive techniques 
can prove to be of use in the detection of ‘Burglary other Building’ incidents, 
especially in those cases where ‘special operations’ are mounted.  Even though such 
operations will tend to be resource intensive, they are often based upon particularly 
solid evidence from a number of sources and, as such, stand a good chance of proving 
successful.  It is important that such procedures are mounted on strong foundations, as 
failed operations result in a waste of both large amounts of police resources and 
effort.  With careful targeting however, based on an accumulation of good evidence 
from as many sources as possible, such operations can prove extremely effective.   
 
Similarly an officer’s use of ‘general intelligence’ would also appear to be of value, 
especially given that the majority of such intelligence will come about as a result of 
‘normal’ patrol duties, and as such, does not require any special input.  While this use 
of registered informants may require some form of monetary reward and take time in 
cultivating any trusting relationship, the payoff would appear to be worth it.  As such, 
the utilisation and successful use of ‘general intelligence’ creates a strong argument 
for keeping officers within the same areas.  As well as being of use within the 
investigative framework, it would undoubtedly be of value with regard to the public 
relations side of policing and the idea of the ‘community policeman’.  
 
Although the availability of crime pattern information and the analysis of such 
information would appear to be restricted, it is clear that the use of such a technique 
can be of great value.  As with the above, it is particularly effective and resource 
efficient because such evidence can be picked up as part of an officer’s initial 
investigations at the crime scene, which will inevitably be visited as part of the police 
investigation.   
 
Overall, it is clear that great use can be made of more proactive investigation 
techniques, especially those that do not involve much extra effort on the part of the 
police, especially in terms of resourcing.  It is also makes clear however, the value of 
the accumulation of evidence, as in the majority of cases cited above, a number of 
items were available, and often from a variety of sources.  As such, there is a large 
amount of overlapping and interaction of evidence both within and between cases, 
specifically concerning pattern analysis.  However, unless such information is being 
stored effectively and made easily accessible to, and by, all officers to whom it has 
relevance, then some potential for further detections may well be lost. 
9. ADDITIONAL POLICE CONTACT 
9.1 Summary 
Additional police contact was made in a substantial minority (19%) of all non-
residential burglary cases, in 35% of cases by a visit, and 23% via telephone, on 
average, nine days after the incident.  An average 51 minutes was spent when further 
contact was made through a visit.  Contact made by letter accounted for the largest 
proportion of all incidents that received any form of further contact, though the bulk 
of victims, 81%, received no subsequent contact after the first officer visit, and a 
significant minority did not even receive that.     
 
Uniformed officers were responsible for making contact in the majority of cases, 
more often if the burglary had occurred within a residential environment, and more 
often through a visit if the burglary had occurred at a school.   
 
There are indications that visits tend to be made when evidence is available, and that 
CID will be responsible for any further contact when useful information is available.  
However, there appears to be no systematic screening method for the value of such 
items, and the evidential worth of any such subsequent contact was found to be 
negligible in terms of detections. 
9.2 Introduction 
Further contact was made in a number of non-residential burglary cases following the 
initial police response and set of investigative activities.  This chapter considers how 
worthwhile this additional contact was.   
 
The chapter first looks at the initial decision making process concerning whether to 
make any form of additional contact or not, and then goes on to evaluate the worth of 
such contact.  In order for any additional contact to be worthwhile and effective, this 
contact needs to provide useful information over and above that already collected 
from the initial police response. 
 
9.3 Disparities in subsequent contact 
 
Of those 1440 cases (population adjusted) where additional contact was made, arrests 
were made at the time of the burglary in 27.6% incidents.  Of the remaining cases, 
telephone contact was made in 17.1% of incidents, a visit was made in 35.8%, and 
contact was made via a letter in 47.1% of cases.   
 
It was more likely that further contact would be made to premises within a residential 
environment (chi-sq=6.119, p=0.013), with 30% of shed and garage breaks receiving 
follow up contact compared to an average 18.7% of remaining property types. 
 
Allied to this, there was an increased chance that offices or schools would receive a 
visit to the premises as opposed to a telephone call or a letter (chi-sq=4.029, p=0.045).  
On average, where subsequent contact was made, offices and schools received a visit 
in 48% of cases compared to an average 31% of other premises receiving visits. 
9.4 Screening for subsequent contact 
 
Previous research has considered the practice of crime screening (Greenwood 1980, 
Gill et al 1996), though very little has been made of the effectiveness of the screening 
process and the differentiation between those cases that would merit further contact 
and those that would not.  Indeed, although Eck (1983) identified what was termed an 
‘implicit triage system’, which differentiated between 1) those cases that cannot be 
solved with reasonable effort, 2) those cases that can be solved circumstantially and 
3) those that may be solved through reasonable investigative effort, very little was 
made of the criteria that would actually place cases within these groupings, nor the 
effectiveness of the screening decisions.  The following section assesses the screening 
process in place during the study period and considers the criteria by which screening 
may occur, and the effectiveness of this process. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that there is any systematic screening process that 
dictates whether subsequent contact will be made across all possible critical screening 
criteria.  There was no more chance of further contact being made if the case was 
detected (chi-sq=0.028, p=0.867), with contact made in 21.1% of detected cases 
compared to a slightly reduced 17.7% of undetected cases.  Nor was there found to be 
any increased chance of subsequent contact being made if an arrest had been made at 
the time of the incident (chi-sq=1.485, p=0.223).     
 
Discounting those cases where a suspect was arrested at the time of the incident, there 
was no more chance of subsequent contact being made where; suspects were seen at 
the time of the incident (chi-sq=0.102, p=0.749); anything was stolen (chi-sq=1.238, 
p=0.266); the distress of the victim was greater (chi-sq=2.039, df=6, p=0.916); any 
forensic evidence was collected at the scene if SOCO had attended (chi-sq=0.012, 
p=0.914); either a neighbour or other individual had provided any useful evidence 
(chi-sq=0.186, p=0.666, chi-sq=0.117, p=0.732 respectively) at the time of the initial 
police response. 
 
These findings fall somewhat into line with those of Greenwood (1980), providing 
some evidence of a more subjective screening process as opposed to one based upon 
defining criteria.  Given that Eck (1983) found that follow up interviews were not 
related to the making of arrests, this may make more sense, especially, as was the case 
in this research, when experienced officers are making the screening decisions.  
However, a lack of a clearly defined screening process may mean that some 
burglaries with apparently good initial evidence may be discarded without 
investigation whilst others with less useful evidence may be being investigated 
further. 
9.5 Mode of contact 
 
The majority of tests conducted, failed to show any significant values regarding 
whether the contact was made via telephone or through a visit to the scene.  However, 
some significant values were available, and there are some indications that the mode 
of contact is, in some cases, targeted towards specific incidents. 
 
There was an increased chance that if the alert had come from the burgled premises, 
then any subsequent contact would be made through a visit (chi-sq=4.095, p=0.043).  
Where subsequent contact was made after an alert from the burgled premises, it was 
made through a visit in 37% of cases.  This is in comparison to 23% of cases where 
the alert had come from another route. 
Similarly, when forensic evidence was available from those cases that had received 
SOCO attention, there was an increased chance that any subsequent contact would be 
made through a visit rather than through a telephone call (chi-sq=4.188, p=0.041).  
76.2% of incidents that received subsequent contact received a visit when SOCO had 
an input into the case and evidence was collected from the scene. 
 
There are also indications that when useful neighbour or individual information was 
available, the majority of subsequent contacts would be made through a visit to the 
scene.  That is, when information was available and subsequent contact was made, 
visits were made in 60% and 73.3% of incidents respectively.  Further to this, if items 
were stolen and identifiable, then the cases tended to receive a visit from an officer 
rather than a telephone call, with visits made to the scene in 53.2% of cases where 
something was stolen and in 62.5% when the property stolen was marked or easily 
identifiable. 
9.6 Contacting officer 
 
When an alarm activation was responsible for the alert, there was a tendency for 
uniformed officers to conduct any further contact (chi-sq=3.462, p=0.063), with 
84.6% of such incidents receiving contact by a uniformed officer.  This may reflect 
earlier findings regarding alarms, and the little worth attached to them over and above 
the initial alert, which inevitably produces fewer arrests, than at other emergencies, at 
the time of the incident.  As such, it would seem of negligible value for trained 
investigative officers in CID to make any further contact if there is no tangible basis 
upon which to launch any further investigations. 
 
It would also appear that there is a tendency for uniformed officers to conduct any 
further contact when property was stolen, with 62.9% of incidents where property was 
stolen and further contact made, being made in this way (chi-sq=3.075, p=0.080).  
Again, this possibly reflects the nature of the contact being more of a ‘detail taking’ 
exercise rather than an active investigative procedure.  The following finding perhaps 
reinforces this, showing that in 62.5% of cases where the stolen property was marked 
or easily identifiable, a uniformed officer made subsequent contact. 
 
There was a significantly increased chance of CID making further contact if the 
burgled property was an office or a leisure facility (chi-sq=5.490, p=0.019) with an 
average 64.7% of offences within these environments receiving contact from CID.  
This is in comparison to CID contact in 33.3% of incidents across the remaining 
property types.  In contrast, shops and schools were more likely to have further 
contact made by uniformed officers (chi-sq=4.444, p=0.035), with an average 80% of 
cases compared to 53.3% for other property types.   
 
If the incident received SOCO attention, the majority of cases provoking a subsequent 
contact (58.5%) were dealt with by uniform.  However, if there was actually SOCO 
evidence available at the scene, further contact from CID was slightly more likely 
(52.4%).  Furthermore, CID made the majority of subsequent contacts (60%) in those 
cases where useful neighbour information was available. Therefore, although there 
are no definite findings, there are indeed indications that CID tend to be allocated to 
those incidents where there may be some worth in sending an officer trained in 
specific investigative techniques.  This is opposed to those cases where the purpose of 
the subsequent contact appears to be a ‘form filling’ exercise. 
 
Crucially, there was an increased chance of the case being filed detected when CID 
were responsible for any subsequent contact (chi-sq=14.747, p=0.000).  However, 
given the above findings, this may be explained in two ways.  Firstly, it does not 
necessarily suggest that it is the investigative techniques of CID officers that are 
paying off, but perhaps more the case that CID officers are tending to conduct 
subsequent contact in those cases where there is the possible availability of some 
further leads or evidence.  As such, there will be an increased chance of the case 
being detected anyway.  Alternatively, it may simply be a reflection of the fact that a 
uniformed officer will make the majority of subsequent contacts and so will naturally 
attend to more undetected cases.  Given that 92% of undetected cases that received 
subsequent contact did so via a uniformed officer, this is a reasonable assumption. 
 
Although, then, there is little evidence to suggest that CID contact positively 
influenced the detection of cases, there is evidence that contact, to some extent, was 
targeted. 
9.7 OCU variation 
 
There was an increased chance of subsequent contact being made on F2 and F3 
OCU’s both when the alert had come from an individual external to the burgled 
premises (chi-sq=10.179, p=0.001), and consequently, when useful information was 
available from that individual (chi-sq=5.986, p=0.014).   
 
In those cases where the alert had come from an individual, F2 and F3 OCU’s were 
making some form of subsequent contact in 53.8% of cases on average.  This 
compares to an average of just 15.2% of cases where the alert had come from 
elsewhere.  Allied to this, when useful individual information was available, contact 
was made in an average 44.4% of incidents compared to an average 16.4% when 
there was no individual information available.   
 
Given earlier findings on the worth and effectiveness of both information available at 
the scene and the value of the alert coming from an individual external to the burgled 
premises, there would seem to be some logic to this criteria on these two OCU’s.  
However, it is not reflected in an increased detection rate.     
9.8 Value of subsequent contact 
 
It is essential here to discount those cases where contact was made via letter, as there 
is no propensity for gaining any further information through further contact.  This 
leaves 764 (population adjusted) cases where direct contact was made by a police 
officer, 39.6% over the telephone, and 60.4% by a visit.  Only visiting proved to be of 
worth, in terms of gaining any further information. 
9.8.1 Neighbour Information 
Subsequent visits where neighbours were questioned increased the number of cases 
with information available by 13.6%, all of which contributed to a detection.  
However, information was also found to be available from other sources in the 
majority of cases, mainly from the initial police response. 
9.8.2 Injured party (IP) information 
Where information was gathered by the first attending officer, subsequent visits 
increased the information in 23% of cases, with the majority of these filed detected.  
The information concerned possible suspects and stolen property information.  As 
before however, information was gathered from other sources in the majority of these 
cases, providing either definite suspect information, or information that directly 
indicated the identity of the offender. 
 
Overall however, less than 2% of all subsequent visits to neighbours and victims 
provided any information that resulted in extra detections. 
9.9 Discussion and policy implications 
 
It can be seen that there is indeed some variation in relation to the method, mode and 
contacting officer at those cases that ‘merit’ subsequent contact. 
 
There was an increased chance of burgled residential buildings receiving subsequent 
contact.  Premises where the alert had come from within the burgled premises were 
more likely to receive a visit, as were schools, especially from a uniformed officer.  
Also, there was a tendency for any subsequent contact to be made by uniformed 
officers if the alert had come from alarm activations or in cases where some property 
was stolen.  In contrast, CID officers were more likely to make any further contact 
within office or leisure environments, whilst also showing a tendency to concentrate 
on those cases where more evidence was available from the initial police response.   
 
In short, it would appear that when uniformed officers are responsible for making any 
further contact, it was more a ‘form filling’ or public relations exercise rather than 
part of the investigative procedure per se.  In contrast, there would appear to be some 
tendency for CID to stick to those cases that may need some more substantial 
investigative technique or training.  However, that said, there are no clear indications 
of any systematic screening process in place that dictates either which cases merit any 
subsequent contact, how that contact will be made or who will make that contact. 
 
Although the OCU variation displayed may provide some evidence for a more 
systematic process in use in some areas, especially where useful individual 
information was available, it was not reflected in an increased chance of detection. 
 
Given the above findings, it appears that there may well be potential to extend the use 
of subsequent contacts in appropriate circumstances, to witnesses who did not receive 
such visits.  However, it also appears to be the case that much of the perceived 
evidential ‘value’ in the subsequent contacts is somewhat misplaced, and more a case 
of duplicating effort rather than gathering new useful information.   
 
There could be some worth in selectively increasing the number of subsequent visits 
that the police make to the burglary scene, but only in those more promising cases 
where there is already some evidence, though insufficient in strength to produce an 
immediate conviction.  However, if the primary objective behind any subsequent 
contact is the collection of further evidence in the hope of it leading directly to an 
arrest, it would appear that resources could be better allocated to other tasks.  If 
however, the main aim of subsequent contact is to reinforce existing evidence or 
update any relevant parties involved, it would appear beneficial for many more of the 
81% who received no form of further contact to at least receive a letter, either 
specifying Police contact telephone numbers or indicating the progress in the case. 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 Research formulation 
Despite clearly being a considerable problem, non-residential burglary, or ‘Burglary 
other Building’ has generally been ignored, often because it has been perceived as a 
crime that affects ‘abstract businesses’.  Although true to an extent, this type of 
viewpoint clearly underestimates the nature of the problem.  The result is that, as an 
area of study, there is currently a paucity of research-based material within this field.   
 
Although some previous individual studies have addressed certain aspects relevant to 
this area of study, the majority have tended to be especially specific in the focus of 
their research, concentrating on particular types of premises, such as shops or 
warehouses.  By confronting the problem from an investigative perspective however, 
it becomes clear that it is not simply a case of ‘business’ victimisation, but that a 
diversity of targets are affected, including many types of premises that might not 
ordinarily be recognised as non-residential.  Further to this, by appreciating the sheer 
scale and diversity of the problem, influencing features of the differing environments 
can be better appreciated. 
 
Allied to this largely blinkered outlook alluded to above, the evaluation of police 
effectiveness has been shown to be problematic, as no perfect metric or system of 
metrics exists, with the majority of the commonly used, or proposed measures, 
displaying several inherent problems.  The result is that the assessment of policing has 
been made very difficult, through the use of inappropriate measures that encompass 
many more influencing features over and above policing, per se.  The result is that 
often, many of the reasons identified for the differences between measures have little 
to do with the actual investigative effectiveness of the police force in question.  Those 
more specific studies that have tended to concentrate on particular areas have also 
often produced little research on the actual effectiveness of those specific police 
activities under investigation.  Fewer studies still have attempted to look at all the 
elements of the activities analysed to determine those features that are effective and 
those that are not. 
 
This research assessed how the police investigated non-residential burglary and 
considered those activities that proved to be successful in securing detections.  A 
sample of burglaries was drawn from the 7070 committed over a six-month period in 
four OCU’s (Operational Command Units) of the West Midlands Police.  The study 
set out to measure all aspects of the investigative activities and actions in relation to 
these burglaries by considering the crime holistically.  Data were therefore collected 
on the police’s response and the activities conducted in relation to the burglaries 
sampled. 
 
During the study, the police solved 15.3% of the ‘Burglary Other Building’ incidents 
recorded.  This figure is reduced however if those cases that were ‘detected’ through 
means other than police activities and directed investigations are removed.  That is, 
6.8% of incidents were detected as a result of direct police operations conducted into 
the investigation of any single case, whilst the majority of the remaining 8.5% of 
incidents were ‘secondary detected’ through offender admissions (TIC’s), or prison 
‘write-offs’. 
 
It is the 6.8% of cases that are considered as ‘primary detected’ however that are best 
used to identify the most effective methods of police investigation into non-residential 
burglary and are likely to offer the greatest scope to improve those primary detection 
rates.  The research design allowed the relative effectiveness of police activities to be 
evaluated both in terms of detections and the variety of investigative techniques 
invoked.  The following sections discuss each aspect of the police investigations into 
residential burglaries in these terms. 
10.2 Analytic approach 
 
The analytic approach adopted was to decompose the investigation of burglary 
incidents into component activities and operations, such as an emergency response by 
the first officer, questioning neighbours, or a SOCO visit.  Together with the use of 
officer questionnaires to collect data ‘contemporaneously’, this makes it possible to 
assess the contribution of each type of operation to detection, and understand the 
factors that influence whether or not these crimes are successfully solved, and, hence, 
meet the objectives of the thesis.   The collection of data ‘contemporaneously’ also 
has an indispensable part in providing appropriate data on, for example, the 
information gathered from neighbours, as well as details from the officers themselves, 
that is not routinely stored in police records. 
 
The police selectively undertake a number of operations and activities in order to 
attempt to solve cases.  These can be viewed as activities carried out sequentially but 
quite selectively, so that in effect, there are different potential paths through the 
burglary investigative process.  At only a limited subset of cases, for instance, will the 
burglar be spotted in the act and be allocated an emergency response.  If the burglar is 
caught, then there will be little or no need to carry out the subsequent activities 
associated with some other cases, though a SOCO visit may still take place.  If he is 
not caught, then it is likely to be worthwhile questioning witnesses, either neighbours 
or the victims themselves.  In other cases, where a burglary is reported when 
occupants arrive at premises the next day or after the weekend, it may not be even 
worthwhile sending an officer to the scene.  If it is worthwhile, there may or may not 
be scope to question neighbours who might have seen something if the offence was 
carried out in a non-residential area dominated by schools or factory estates.  Hence, 
the particular circumstances of a case will determine which activities the police carry 
out.   
 
It would be expected that more promising cases that remain unsolved would tend to 
receive greater attention involving more activities than those with a slimmer chance 
of detection.  It is possible to view the activities and operations that cases may 
selectively undergo as part of the process of investigation in terms of a ‘flow’ of 
events.  This thesis might have examined the components of the investigation process 
with this perspective, so as to provide the reader with an appreciation of the varying 
partial sequences of activities carried out by the police to try to solve burglary cases.  
Only in a limited number of cases, however, would most activities be implemented in 
connection with a single incident, most notably where an ‘in progress’ case or an 
incident with high quality eye witness evidence appeared to show particular promise 
for detection.  In practice, the bulk of the cases that are solved involve emergency 
responses and good eyewitness evidence.   
 
The feasibility study and the full study showed that the bulk of cases are, in fact, 
solved within the first few days, and involve the key activities of the emergency 
response and the questioning of victims or neighbours.  Therefore, relatively few 
cases would be subjected to every operation and activity.  Such an approach would be 
interesting, and would ‘paint’ a picture of the activities applied to different cases, up 
until their solution or being filed undetected.  It would also allow for the effects of 
combinations of activities on successful detection or otherwise, to be presented.  It 
would highlight the fact that most of the activities making up the later part of the 
investigation process offer much poorer chances of success than the earlier ones since, 
in general, if the burglar is not caught in the act, or if there is not clear and high 
quality witness evidence that implicates a particular offender, then there is little 
chance of the case being solved. 
   
However, this approach would not in itself enable an adequate measure of 
effectiveness to be applied, since this necessarily requires evaluation on the basis of 
distinctive individual activities and operations.  Combining activities would obscure 
the task of pinning down which operations and activities were most effective, that is, 
contributed to producing the most detections.  Therefore, a summary description of 
burglary investigation along these lines was not undertaken, because it would not in 
itself assist in meeting the thesis objectives, namely assessing the effectiveness of 
different types of investigative activity under different circumstances.  If this is 
accurately assessed, then the appropriate activities can be carried out to investigate 
different types of cases.   
 
A ‘sequential’ approach would, however, enable an appreciation of the extent to 
which applying additional activities to a case appeared to bear fruit or whether they 
provide   evidence of diminishing returns, since most cases are solved within the first 
seven days of the offence occurring.  In general, if the burglar is not caught in the act, 
or if there is not clear and high quality witness evidence that implicates a particular 
offender, then there is little chance of the case being solved.  The study therefore 
shows that most of the activities making up the later part of the investigation process 
offer much poorer chances of success than the earlier ones. 
 
The statistical analyses employed therefore reflected the types of data, with inferential 
significance testing using variable control.  Data summarising the importance of each 
operation or activity for successful detection were cross-related to incident or police 
response circumstances using inferential significance tests that matched the data level. 
10.3 Responding to the burglary alert 
 
The police had a number of ways in which to respond to any single incident of non-
residential burglary, though it was those emergency incidents that offered the best 
initial chance of securing a primary detection.  ‘Immediate response’ alerts, where 
there was an opportunity to catch the burglar at or near to the scene, proved to be 
particularly successful when compared with most other detection methods.  Fewer 
offenders were caught at ‘early response’ incidents, though they did provide a 
significant minority of arrests.    
 
The police arriving quickly and in sufficient numbers of patrols notably improved 
capture rates, though these were higher when the suspect was spotted at an earlier 
stage in the burglary and their location was reported.  The earlier the offender was 
seen also largely dictated where they would be caught, with more apprehended in the 
act when first seen entering the premises.  Catching the offender in the act was less 
likely if they were seen at a later stage in the burglary, though successful arrests were 
made near to the scene in a number of incidents when the response was sufficiently 
faster and stronger again.  The speed of response was not found to be influential in its 
own right however, as a number of interrelated factors involved in the availability and 
deployment of vehicles determined this speed of response.  Capture rates were also 
significantly lower when an offender had not been seen, and generally reduced in 
more isolated environments and properties that would be more reliant on alarm 
activations. 
 
Improving responses to emergency incidents has the potential to increase detection 
rates.  Ensuring the police responded to burglaries quickly and with sufficient 
numbers would be likely to show benefits in most of the police areas studied.  Where 
feasible, five or more units should be available for despatch, as this level of response 
would improve the time to attend but particularly reduce the distance from which the 
first unit would be responding.  Having larger numbers of units despatched would 
also be of particular importance in those cases where the offenders had left the scene. 
 
Where offenders had left the scene, success was particularly dependent upon the 
availability of witness information and the use of that information, particularly 
offender description and direction information when suspects were seen.  This 
underlines the importance of trying to gain such information from any witnesses when 
the report of the burglary is made.  When suspects were seen, the police prudently 
prioritised such responses, and this undoubtedly enhanced the success at these 
incidents.  Even when less promising incidents occur, a strong response should still be 
made as, although the prospects are worse, they will still be as good as, if not better 
than, detections from subsequent investigations based upon evidence and information.   
 
There may be some justification in suggesting that patrol resourcing be adjusted to 
match periods with high demand for emergency ‘in progress’ incidents.  At peak 
periods of demand for help at emergencies, it would be better if a sufficient pool of 
uncommitted units were available.  Although at times this may mean that units would 
be under-utilised, it would enable a quicker and more thorough response, and is more 
likely to return an increase in detection rates.  Although there were not any inherent 
advantages in the use of one or two manned panda and zulu units, increasing the 
number of single-crewed patrol units might be a way of achieving the extra density of 
cover required to bring down response times by putting the first unit closer to the 
scene of the crime at emergency incidents. 
10.4 Investigative activities conducted at the scene 
 
The burglary scene was the principal source of evidence and made an extremely 
important contribution in the solving of burglaries.  Although evidence from the scene 
in its own right did not often provide sufficient evidence to ensure detection, it was 
often the foundation upon which the majority of successes would be made, with a 
variety of other sources contributing to the detection.  The majority of detections 
however, were reliant upon evidence from these initial investigations at the scene, and 
so obtaining all available information during this stage of the investigation was 
imperative. 
 
Attending officers conducted interviews with both the victims and any witnesses or 
neighbours, in an attempt to gather information about the incident.  Modus Operandi 
(MO) evidence was also collected where available, and Scenes of Crimes Officers 
(SOCO) also collected evidence when requested.   
 
Questioning the victim, neighbours and witnesses often proved to be practical as 
separate journeys were not generally required.  Neighbours were seen at only a 
quarter of all incidents, partly due to the nature of the various environments, where 
some premises simply did not have any neighbours to speak of, and partly due to less 
questioning taking place at night.  At incidents where more neighbours were 
questioned, there was no more valuable information collected, suggesting that if the 
first two or three most promising neighbours contacted provided little or no 
information, then additional questioning is unlikely to prove fruitful.  Where useful 
and better quality information was considered to be available however, the police 
were sensibly spending longer interviewing relevant parties.  Other individuals such 
as the victim and witnesses were questioned in approximately two-fifths of incidents, 
and especially in more people rich environments. 
 
There may be some scope for the improvement of questioning both at weekends and 
later at night, as there are currently indications that valuable time is being wasted in 
the pursuit of information that will not be forthcoming, or in the misdirection of 
interviewing at certain times of day.  Some of this time may be better spent in the 
collection of any available MO evidence, even though it was relatively infrequently 
obtained, or in the assessment and preservation of the scene for SOCO.  However, 
these other activities should not occur to the further detriment of interviewing, as the 
value of information is paramount in the successful detection of cases. 
 
SOCO attention was limited to around half of all incidents.  Attending officers 
generally displayed reasonable discriminatory skills, with fewer requests for SOCO at 
sheds and garages, and where the scene was dirty or contaminated.  However, in the 
majority of shed and garage cases, it was force policy that was cited as the major 
reason as opposed to a lack of evidence.  This may indicate that some valuable cases 
may be being missed more as a result of policy than an actual lack of evidence.  
Nevertheless, senior officers expressed unanimous concern over receiving requests at 
unpromising cases and the failure to preserve the scene properly at promising cases.  
If first officers were more discriminating, and received compulsory training in 
relevant techniques, SOCO attention could be made more selective and effective, 
which in turn suggests that there may be some scope for an increase in the number of 
detections.  This would arise primarily as a result of being able to spend more time at 
the more worthwhile and properly assessed scenes, and a corresponding decrease in 
the amount of time spent at worthless scenes.  Where possible, the number of cases 
requiring SOCO attention should therefore be reduced. 
10.5  Further investigative activities 
 
The majority of burglaries provided little or no evidence, therefore the use of further 
investigative techniques and activities were also utilised to some extent.  These 
include the use of intelligence, informants, crime pattern analysis and special 
operations.  Given that more items and sources of information proved to be of the 
greatest worth, the use of all available techniques is indeed wise.   
 
The pro-active gathering of information and use of pro-active operations were 
conducted by the police infrequently but proved to be successful when they were 
used.  Although selectively utilised, the use of such activities were key in an 
important minority of cases.  The use of operations especially relied on a build-up of 
evidence, often from a number of sources and, as such, were mounted upon strong 
foundations.  Therefore, although fairly resource intensive, such operations are 
generally very effective.  These activities could therefore be usefully extended in 
carefully selected cases where there was a sufficient weight of evidence to justify the 
use of pro-active techniques.  Unlike special operations, the use of intelligence is not 
as resource intensive as the officers can pick up information as part of their normal 
patrolling activities.  As such, this would appear to be an extremely useful tool at the 
disposal of the police and greater use should be made of cultivation of useful contacts 
and information sources.    
 
More generally however, the use of such activities could only realistically be 
extended to any great extent once the wealth and worth of information is fully 
appreciated and integrated into a force wide information system that all officers have 
ready access to.  Until such time, some potential detections may well be lost. 
 
Making subsequent visits to question individuals was also employed selectively and 
resulted in some additional information, though the screening process involved 
appeared to lack any form of systematic approach over and above the subjective 
opinion of the screening officers.  However, relatively few detections resulted as a 
consequence of additional police contact.  The focus was, appropriately, more on 
cases where evidence and information was already available and CID officers were 
especially involved at such cases.  Nevertheless, in the main the majority of follow up 
contacts would appear to be little more than PR and form filling exercises conducted 
by uniformed officers.  As such, there is a considerable amount of duplicated effort.   
 
That said, there might be some scope for extending the use of subsequent contact to 
those cases where witnesses may not have received a visit from an officer, and those 
more promising cases where some evidence is already available, though insufficient 
for detection.  On the whole however, it would appear to be more prudent to restrict 
subsequent contact to a formal communication by letter or some other such method 
whereby some form of automation could be employed to good effect. 
10.6 Conclusion 
 
Many detections resulted from more than one activity or type of evidence.  A majority 
were attributable to activities carried out at the burglary scene, whilst over one third 
were due to catching the offender at the time of the incident.  Police operations and 
the use of criminal intelligence also played a role, often complementing evidence 
from the crime scene in solving cases.  Forensic evidence resulted in fewer detections, 
though it generally enabled cases to be solved with certainty, whilst both SOCO 
attention and subsequent contact were appropriately selective.  However, a number of 
factors outside of police control can also impact and influence the effectiveness of 
police actions and activities, especially those environmental features and associated 
influences on the investigation procedure.  Figure 10.6 below, shows the various 
factors that impact upon burglary detections. 
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Figure 10.6 Factors impacting on burglary investigations 
 
It is clear that a number of methods are therefore utilised.  Table 10.6 below displays 
this well by showing the percentage of principle methods and operations used that 
influenced the primary or secondary detection of all non-residential burglary 
incidents.  It is important to note that the totals for those primary and secondary 
detected do not correspond, as they have been adjusted to take into account 
population figures.  Further to this, the total percentages do not equal one hundred, as 
the figures are a reflection of the number of cases in which a role was played and not 
a reflection of when any one particular method or operation was the major factor. 
 
 Primary Secondary 
Methods and Operations % % 
Prior catch 4  
Caught in act / near scene 27  
Early incident arrest 5  
Questioning witnesses at scene 44 24 
Collection of SOCO evidence 11 8 
Intelligence from contacts / informants 24 5 
Surveillance and stop checks 5  
MO evidence 2 4 
Crime pattern analysis 3  
Total 480 608 
 
Table 10.6 The role of methods and operations in detected cases 
N.B.  The figures displayed are population estimates from the sample. 
 
Generally, it would appear that the police perform well with regard to the 
investigation and detection of ‘Burglary other Building’ incidents.  It is clear however 
that there is still some scope however for adjusting current police operating 
procedures to improve the primary detection rate for non-residential burglary, and this 
thesis has shown that a holistic study of police investigations into a specific crime can 
reveal a number of areas where those adjustments can be made.  Such improvements 
can be made without major adjustments or innovations, by simply applying ‘best 
practice’ across all investigations.     
  
APPENDIX 1: POLICE QUESTIONNAIRES
HOME OFFICE / ACPO:BURGLARY OTHER BUILDING INVESTIGATION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPLETION OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
This Research does not need to be disclosed in normal court papers 
 
Questionnaire 1:FIRST POLICE VISIT;  to be completed in ALL cases where a visit to the scene of the 
burglary has occurred.  The first officer to attend the scene should complete the questionnaire accordingly.   
 
If this visit was graded as ‘ROUTINE RESPONSE’ complete ‘A’ ( 2 sides) 
 
If this visit was graded as ‘IMMEDIATE RESPONSE’ complete ‘B’ ( 2 sides) 
 
A copy of the incident log should be attached 
 
 
Questionnaire 2: SUBSEQUENT CONTACT;  to be completed in ALL cases where further contact (visit/ 
telephone/ negative letter) was made concerning the burglary incident.  If a visit was made, to be completed 
by attending CID or Uniform Officer only. 
Complete ‘C’ ( 1 side) 
 
Approximately 10% of investigating officers will be approached to complete the remaining 
questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire 3:  DETECTED CASE;  to be completed for ALL cases where a detection has been achieved.   
Complete ‘D’ ( 2 sides) 
Questionnaire 4: FILED (UNDETECTED) CASE;  to be completed in ALL cases where  there has been no 
detection. 
Complete ‘E’ ( 2 sides) 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Questionnaires must be fully complete 
within 24 hours of visit/ contact/ filing 
 
 
Please return completed questionnaires once a week in an 
envelope using the labels provided 
 
THANKYOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION IN THIS MATTER 
RESEARCH; DOES NOT NEED TO BE DISCLOSED IN 
NORMAL COURT PAPERS—Please attach incident log 
FIRST POLICE VISIT TO SCENE–Burglary Other Building Only 
 
ROUTINE RESPONSE 
Please complete the following.  Tick the appropriate answer(s) where the question gives a choice. 
 
Crime number:  . . . ./. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ./ .98. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Incident log no:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Officer Name and Number:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Date and Time that the incident  was reported:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Date and Time that you arrived at the scene:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Name and address of burgled property:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………………….  
Type of property: OFFICE     SHOP     WAREHOUSE     FACTORY/INDUSTRIAL     OTHER 
 If OTHER, please specify:……………………………………………………………………….. 
Was this an attempted burglary:  YES  NO 
Is your knowledge of your patrol area:     POOR SATISFACTORY GOOD     V.GOOD 
Which department are you from:     UNIFORM     CID      
If applicable, are you using:      ’ONE STOP’ SYSTEM  BIO SYSTEM         NEITHER 
 
1. Was this response a result of:  I.P REQUEST   TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION   DIR  ACTION 
 
2. Was there an alarm activation:   YES  NO  DON’T KNOW 
 
3. Has the response been downgraded as a result of previous false alarms:   
YES NO   DON’T KNOW 
 
4. How many officers attended the scene:……………………………………………………………………. 
 
5. Were your investigations shortened due to other demands: YES  NO 
If YES, briefly describe these other demands:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
6. If applicable, were neighbours questioned:  YES  NO 
If YES, how many and for how long :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
  
7. Did the neighbours provide any useful information:     
  YES       NO   NO NEARBY NEIGHBOURS  
If YES, does this information provide: 
                            DEFINITE SUSPECT     POSSIBLE SUSPECT     SUSPECT VEHICLE      
                                                           FURTHER INTELLIGENCE 
Please explain:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
8. Was any useful information provided by any individual at the scene: YES  NO 
If YES, does this information provide: 
                           DEFINITE SUSPECT POSSIBLE SUSPECT     SUSPECT VEHICLE  
                                                           FURTHER INTELLIGENCE 
Please explain:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. Was a suspect/s seen at the incident:  YES  NO 
If YES, how many, and by whom:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 
      
A 
10. From the description given could there be a:    POSITIVE I.D.   POSSIBLE I.D.                     
 POSSIBLE I.D. OF A KNOWN OFFENDER KNOWLEDGE OF GENDER 
 
11. Is SOCO attending/ will SOCO attend :  YES  NO 
If NO, why not:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
12. Was anything stolen:  YES  NO 
If YES, were:     NO ITEMS RECOVERED     SOME RECOVERED     ALL RECOVERED 
 
13. Was the property marked, recorded or distinctive in any way: 
SERIAL NUMBERS  INVISIBLE MARKING PHOTOGRAPHS 
NOTHING RECORDED OTHER (Please describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
14. Degree of distress of the victim: CALM MILDLY UPSET   
 SHAKEN DISTRAUGHT OTHER (Please describe)  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
15. Will there be any subsequent contact:   YES  NO 
If YES, will it be via:  TELEPHONE  NEGATIVE LETTER        VISIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH; DOES NOT NEED TO BE DISCLOSED IN NORMAL 
COURT PAPERS—Please attach incident log 
FIRST POLICE VISIT TO SCENE–Burglary Other Building Only 
 
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE/ ‘IN PROGRESS’ 
Please complete the following.  Tick the appropriate answer(s) where the question gives a choice. 
 
Crime number:  . . . ./. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ./ .98. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Incident log no:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Officer Name and Number:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OCU . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Date and Time that the incident  was reported:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Date and Time that you arrived at the scene:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  
Name and address of burgled property:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………………….  
Type of property: OFFICE     SHOP     WAREHOUSE     FACTORY/INDUSTRIAL     OTHER 
 If OTHER, please specify:……………………………………………………………………….. 
Was this an attempted burglary:  YES  NO 
Is your knowledge of your patrol area:     POOR SATISFACTORY GOOD     V.GOOD 
Which department are you from:     UNIFORM     CID      
 
1. Was this response a result of an alarm activation:  YES  NO 
 
2. What information did you initially receive from the D.I.R. :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
3. Knowledge of route to, and area surrounding burgled premises: 
V.POOR     POOR     SATISFACTORY     GOOD     V.GOOD 
 
4. Were any suspects seen: A) entering the building: YES  NO 
B) inside the building: YES  NO 
C) leaving the building: YES  NO 
D) other (please describe): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
5. Was the suspect(s) seen by: A)employer/employee: YES  NO 
B) a neighbour:  YES  NO 
C) other:  YES  NO 
If C), please explain further: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
6. If applicable, were neighbours questioned:  YES  NO 
 
7. Was anything stolen:  YES  NO 
If YES, were:     NO ITEMS RECOVERED     SOME RECOVERED     ALL RECOVERED 
  
8. Degree of distress of the victim: CALM MILDLY UPSET   
 SHAKEN DISTRAUGHT OTHER (Please describe) ………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. How many people are believed to have committed the offence:……………………………………. 
 
10. How many A), pandas attended: . . . . .   B), zulus: . . . . .   C), dog vans:..…….D), foot patrol(s)………  
E), helicopter……… 
 
11. How many officers were present in this/these patrol(s): M………..  Z………..  D……. …  
FOOT………  AO1………… 
 
12. Did any other vehicle/ officer attend, not shown on the incident log (please give officer no. and vehicle 
type)…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
B 
 13. How were the officers present  deployed at the site (please describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………. . . . 
….. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . ……… 
…………….. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……… 
14. Did any units search the surrounding area:  YES  NO 
 If YES, how many………………….and for how long………………………… 
 
15. How long in total was spent at the scene:………………………………………………………………… 
 
16. Is SOCO attending/ will SOCO attend :  YES  NO 
If NO, why not:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
17. Were any suspects arrested: YES  NO 
 
IF ARREST MADE, GO TO QUESTION 18 
 
IF NO ARREST WAS MADE, GO TO GRID BELOW AND COMPLETE FOR 
THE FIRST PATROL(S) TO ARRIVE AT SCENE 
 
18. How many suspects were arrested:……………………………………………………………………… 
 
19. Were the suspects arrested at the scene: YES  NO 
 If NO, estimate distance from scene as accurately as 
possible:…………………………………. 
:…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
20. Did the use of any security measures lead to/ aid the arrest:  YES  NO 
If YES, please explain: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  
21. Did the use of any prior information lead to/aid the arrest: YES  NO 
If YES, please explain: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
IF AN ARREST WAS MADE, PLEASE COMPLETE GRID FOR ARRESTING PATROL(S) 
 
IF NO ARREST MADE, PLEASE COMPLETE GRID FOR  FIRST PATROL(S) TO ARRIVE  
  PATROL 1 PATROL 2 PATROL 3 PATROL 4 
OFFICER SURNAME/ 
COLLAR NUMBER 
 
(………..…………) 
 
(………..…………) 
 
(………..…………) 
 
(………..…………) 
PATROL TYPE M  Z  D  T 
AO1      FOOT 
M  Z  D  T 
AO1      FOOT 
M  Z  D  T 
AO1      FOOT 
M  Z  D  T 
AO1      FOOT 
NO. OF OFFICERS 
IN PATROL 
1    2    3    4 
>4 
 
1    2    3    4 
>4 
1    2    3    4 
>4 
1    2    3    4 
>4 
EXACT LOCATION PRIOR 
TO DESPATCH 
(road to nearest junction/ 
police station) 
……………………
……………………
……………………
…………………… 
…………………… 
…………………... 
……………………
……………………
……………………
…………………… 
…………………… 
…………………… 
……………………
……………………
……………………
…………………… 
……………………. 
……………………. 
……………………
……………………
……………………
…………………… 
……………………. 
……………………. 
WERE YOU 
REDEPLOYED FROM 
ANOTHER INCIDENT 
 
YES    NO 
 
 
YES    NO 
 
 
YES    NO 
 
 
YES    NO 
 
 
ARRIVAL DELAYED YES    NO 
If YES, why:………. 
……………………
……………………
……………………
……………………. 
YES    NO If 
YES, why:………. 
……………………
……………………
……………………
……………………. 
YES    NO 
If YES, why:………. 
……………………
……………………
……………………
……………………. 
YES    NO 
If YES, why:………. 
……………………
……………………
……………………
……………………. 
 
RESEARCH; DOES NOT NEED TO BE DISCLOSED IN 
NORMAL COURT PAPERS 
SUBSEQUENT CONTACT-Burglary Other Building Only 
 
Where the question gives a choice of options please tick the answer you feel best describes this incident  
Crime Number:. . . . . ./ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /.98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Incident Log no. . . . . . . . . .  
Officer(s) Name(s) and Number(s):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OCU. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 
Date of the burglary:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Was this contact via:  TELEPHONE  NEGATIVE LETTER  VISIT 
If  VISIT, which dept. are you from:     UNIFORM        CID  SOCO 
 
PLEASE COMPLETE APPROPRIATE SECTION 
 
ONLY UNIFORM OR CID SHOULD COMPLETE ‘VISIT’ SECTION 
 
VISIT: 
1. Date and time that you visited the scene:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
2. Number of visits that were required to see the injured party:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
3. Number of officers revisiting the scene:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
4. Time spent at the scene:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
5. Were neighbours questioned:    YES  NO 
If YES, how many:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
6. Was any useful information obtained from the neighbours:  YES  NO 
If YES, does this evidence provide:  DEFINITE SUSPECT POSSIBLE SUSPECT 
      SUSPECT VEHICLE FURTHER INTELLIGENCE 
(Please Describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
7. Was any further information/evidence gained from the injured party: YES  NO 
If YES, does this evidence provide:  DEFINITE SUSPECT POSSIBLE SUSPECT 
      SUSPECT VEHICLE FURTHER INTELLIGENCE 
(Please Describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
8. Was any further information/ evidence gained from anywhere else:  YES  NO 
If YES, does this evidence provide:  DEFINITE SUSPECT POSSIBLE SUSPECT 
      SUSPECT VEHICLE FURTHER INTELLIGENCE 
(Please Describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
9. Degree of distress of the victim (where applicable): CALM       MIDLY UPSET 
  SHAKEN DISTRAUGHT OTHER:(Please describe) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
10. How do you rate the chance of recovering the items stolen:          ALREADY RECOVERED 
VERY POOR     POOR    AVERAGE    GOOD    VERY GOOD    EXCELLENT 
 
11. How do you rate the chance of a primary clearance for this case: ALREADY CLEARED 
VERY POOR     POOR    AVERAGE    GOOD    VERY GOOD    EXCELLENT 
 
12. What factors lead you to this conclusion (Please describe):. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …………..  
 . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
13. Will any further visits be required?  YES  NO 
If YES, why and by who:……………………………………………………………………… 
…...…….……………………………………………………………………………….…………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
C 
TELEPHONE: 
14. Was any further information gained: YES  NO 
 If YES,  what information was provided:……………………………………………………… 
…………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
15. Will any further contact be required: YES  NO 
If YES, will it be:       TELEPHONE       NEGATIVE LETTER       VISIT  
 
If a further visit is required, who will be making it: UNIFORM      CID      SOCO 
 
 
 
DETECTED CASE: SIDE 1- Burglary Other Building Only 
 
Crime Number:   /  /98   Incident log no (URN):       Officer collar no.  OCU: 
Date of Offence:   Date Detected:    Date Questionnaire Completed: 
For each grid (A-E) please number the boxes to indicate the order of importance of the main factors that led to a suspect being charged or processed. 
A B C D E 
Evidence gathered at the scene Evidence obtained from other 
burglaries 
General Intelligence Special Operations Admissions by the prisoner 
Not Applicable Not Applicable  Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Forensic (Please describe) 
…………………………………
……………………………… 
Forensic  (Please describe) 
…………………………………
………………………………. 
 Intelligence on local criminals  Surveillance/Observations 
of an: 
The prisoner admitted the 
offence during interview 
………………………………….. ………………………………… Intelligence on travelling Area   The offence was admitted 
………………………………….. …………………………………      criminals Person       whilst the prisoner was 
Suspect description   Suspect description   Information from a House        being held for an unrelated  
Vehicle description   Vehicle description        Stop-Check Shop       crime  
Other witness evidence  Other witness evidence  Registered informants    Office The suspect was charged 
Unusual M.O.  Unusual M.O.  Local knowledge    Factory/Industrial The case was T.I.C.ed   
M.O. indicating a  M.O. indicating a  Local contacts   Warehouse The case was written-off 
     possible suspect      possible suspect None   Other (please describe)  
Distinctive and  Distinctive and  Other (please describe): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
     identifiable property details        identifiable property details   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CCTV/In House Video  Patterns relating to a  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CCTV other premises       suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
None   Patterns relating to an area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Other (Please describe) None   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other (Please describe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Man hours used on the:  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation =   
 
Was the suspect caught in the act:  YES           NO  Was the Suspect caught at / near the scene: YES           NO 
 
Offender(s) Age(s):    Offender(s) Address (street name and post code):     
In your estimation was this burglary A) opportunistic: YES  NO      
                                                           B) planned: YES  NO 
What, in your estimation , is the likelihood of the goods being stolen to order:  
Very unlikely  Unlikely Likely  Very Likely 
     
Please estimate the man hours required to solve this case:             P.T.O. 
D 
  
RESEARCH; DOES NOT NEED TO BE DISCLOSED IN NORMAL COURT 
PAPERS 
DETECTED CASE: SIDE 2- Burglary Other Building Only  
Were any other lines of investigation pursued in relation to this case that DID NOT lead to the detection: 
 YES  NO 
If YES, please complete questions 1-4. 
 
1. Did any investigations result from information gathered at the scene: YES NO 
If YES please describe:……………………………………………………………………… 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
2. Was any relevant evidence (to this case) obtained from other burglaries: 
Forensic:(please describe)  Suspect Description Other witness evidence 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Vehicle description 
……………………………  Unusual M.O. 
……………………………  M.O. indicating a possible suspect 
……………………………  Distinctive and identifiable property details 
Patterns relating to a suspect  Patterns relating to an area 
No evidence   Another common factor(please describe): 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Did any investigations result from this evidence:  YES NO 
If YES please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
3. Was any information relevant to this case provided by: 
Intelligence on local criminals  Local knowledge 
Intelligence on travelling criminals  Registered Informants 
Local Contacts    None 
Information from stop-checks  
Surveillance of :   Area    Person    House    Shop    Offices    Factory/Industrial 
   Warehouse    Other Operations 
If Other, Please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . 
Did any investigations result from this information:  YES NO 
If YES please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
Man Hours Used for Surveillance = 
 
4. Please describe any other investigations that were conducted but have not been described above: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………………..  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………………..  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……………….. 
  
RESEARCH; DOES NOT NEED TO BE DISCLOSED IN NORMAL COURT 
PAPERS 
 UNDETECTED CASE- Burglary Other Building Only 
 
Will the officer please complete the following questions for the filed (undetected) case detailed below.  Tick the 
appropriate boxes for each question. 
Crime Number:          /           /98      Officer Collar No:                         
Incident log no (URN):                         (please ensure the URN number is filled in)    
Date of Offence:   Date Filed:  Date Questionnaire Completed:    
1. Was any of the following information gathered at the scene:    
        
No information gathered 
  Forensic:(please describe)  Suspect Description  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Vehicle description 
……………………………  Other witness evidence 
…………………………….  Unusual M.O. 
…………………………….  M.O. indicating a possible suspect 
……………………………. 
CCTV evidence   Distinctive and identifiable property details  
Please describe any information gathered: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Did any investigations result from this evidence:  YES NO 
If YES please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
2. Was any relevant evidence (to this case) obtained from other burglaries:     YES NO 
 
Forensic:(please describe)  Suspect Description  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Vehicle description 
……………………………  Unusual M.O. 
…………………………….  Other witness evidence 
…………………………….  M.O. indicating a possible suspect 
…………………………….  Distinctive and identifiable property details 
Patterns relating to a suspect  Patterns relating to an area   
Please describe the nature of any evidence gathered: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Did any investigations result from this evidence:  YES NO 
If YES please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
 
3. Was any information relevant to this case provided by:     
Intelligence on local criminals  Local knowledge 
Intelligence on travelling criminals  Registered Informants    
Information from stop-checks  Local Contacts 
Surveillance of :    Area    Person    House    Shop    Offices    Factory/Industrial 
   Warehouse    Other 
E 
  
Man Hours Used for any Surveillance = 
Please describe any information provided: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Did any investigations result from this information:  YES NO 
If YES please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
        
4. Does this burglary form part of a pattern or series:  YES NO 
If YES does this pattern relate to: 
A person   An area   Specific Building Type   Distinctive M.O.   Another common factor  
Please describe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
5.   Did this burglary provide information that was a factor in the clearance of another case: 
    YES NO 
If YES does this information relate to: 
A person   An area   Specific Building Type   Distinctive M.O.   Another common factor 
Please describe:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
6. Were any other investigations not already described pursued in relation to this case:   
YES NO   
If YES please describe:……………………………………………………………………… 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
7. Will there be any further investigation (e.g. awaiting forensic results): YES NO 
If YES,  what further investigation will take place: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
8. Was this offence filed at source: YES NO  
 
9. Please estimate the man hours spent on this case: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  
  
APPENDIX 2: ADJUSTMENTS & CALCULATIONS 
  
1) ADJUSTMENT TO SAMPLE PERCENTAGES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNEQUAL PROPORTIONS OF THE DETECTED AND UNDETECTED CASES 
 
 
The sample of burglaries that was drawn from the 7070 burglaries committed during the six-
month data collection period consisted of 27% of detected cases and 6.2% of undetected cases 
in the sample.  In order to judge the impact of the results from the sample on the population, it 
is necessary to consider the detected and undetected burglaries separately.  For example: 
 
Population consists of 7070 burglaries of which 1060 were detected and 6010 were undetected.   
 
Sample consists of the two strata, 285 detected and 372 undetected, which equates to the 27% detected cases 
(285/1060) and 6.2% undetected (372/6010). 
 
Therefore, if 14.5% of burglaries sampled occurred within an office environment, this figure must be adjusted to 
take into account the difference between detected and undetected.  If from this sample we have 10% (29/285) 
detected and 18% (67/372) undetected, the following calculation must be undertaken to convert the above figure 
to population percentages. 
 
 
Population figure  = (29 * 100/27) + (67 * 100/6.2)  
= 107 + 1081 
= 1188 
 
Therefore population % of office burglaries is 1188/7070 
= 16.8% 
 
    
  
2) CALCULATION OF CONFIDENCE LIMITS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNEQUAL PROPORTIONS OF THE DETECTED AND UNDETECTED CASES 
 
 
 
95% confidence limits on the 16.8% of office burglaries from previous population calculation 
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